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1    INTRODUCTION
Private international law is the branch of law in each legal system that 
regulates cases with a foreign element. What this foreign element may be 
will vary but its existence is a necessary prerequisite before the rules of 
private international law will be engaged. Where all elements of a case 
are connected to Scotland then the rules of private international law will 
have no role to play and the case will be disposed of according to domestic 
Scots law. However, as soon as this foreign element does exist, whether 
this be as a consequence of the parties themselves or the subject matter of 
the dispute, the rules of private international law will become operative.
The increasing availability and ease of international travel and commu-
nication has fundamentally altered the world in which we live. Problems of 
private international law, once relegated to the periphery of a legal system, 
are now to the fore in almost every branch of private law. Overseas travel is 
no longer restricted to the wealthy and most individuals now visit foreign 
countries regularly, whether this be for purposes of business, education 
or pleasure. Even a relatively small business is likely to have a number of 
international suppliers and clients. International relationships of a personal 
nature, and the children thereof, are now commonplace. Should there be 
a contractual dispute between a company based in Scotland and a supplier 
based in Germany, or a breakdown of a marriage between a Scottish man 
and an Australian woman who live together with their children in England, 
the challenge for private international law is to provide a set of rules capable 
of doing justice in the given circumstances. 
THE THREE PILLARS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
Private international law has three key objectives:
(1) to set out the conditions under which a court will have jurisdic-
tion to deal with a case containing a foreign element;
(2) once jurisdiction is confirmed, to identify the system of law that 
will be applied in order to resolve the dispute; and
(3) to determine the circumstances in which a foreign judgment will 
be recognised and, if necessary, enforced.
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Jurisdiction
The first issue to be decided by the Scottish court is whether it has juris-
diction to hear a case which contains a foreign element. Jurisdiction is 
premised upon the court having some connection to the dispute, such as 
the fact that a contractual obligation was, or should have been, performed 
in  Scotland, or the fact that spouses lived together as man and wife in Scot-
land. In a purely domestic case there will be only one appropriate forum but 
when a foreign element exists the rules of private international law attempt 
to achieve justice by delimiting the jurisdiction of the Scottish courts in 
order to avoid conflicts of jurisdiction with the courts of other countries. 
Accordingly, the Scottish jurisdictional rules identify the circumstances in 
which it is considered legitimate for a Scottish court to take jurisdiction 
over a case, even though the case has connections to a foreign country, 
or even a number of foreign countries. Further, as it is inevitable that in 
certain circumstances the same or similar proceedings may be continuing 
in the courts of two different countries in parallel, the rules of jurisdiction 
also determine what effect such foreign proceedings will have on the Scot-
tish proceedings. As we shall see in later chapters, there are two distinct 
approaches to the problem of parallel proceedings: a flexible approach that 
originally developed in Scotland, and a more rigid approach adopted in EU 
legislative instruments. Finally, it is also possible for parties to clothe the 
courts of a particular country with jurisdiction via agreement. In certain 
contexts, primarily in relation to civil and commercial matters, this right 
of party autonomy is generally unfettered and parties are able to choose the 
courts of any country, whether or not that country has an objective link 
to the dispute. In other contexts, such as where one party is considered to 
be in a “weaker” position, or due to the specific nature of the dispute, the 
choice may be confined to a limited number of pre-established  jurisdictions. 
Choice of law
Once the jurisdiction of the court has been established, the rules of private 
international law then operate to identify the law which the court should 
apply in order to determine the dispute before it. As with jurisdiction, 
the principal concern of the choice of law rules is to identify an appli-
cable law which is connected to the dispute and is considered to be the 
law most appropriate to determine the rights of the parties. As we shall 
see, just because a Scottish court is able to claim jurisdiction, this does not 
necessarily mean that Scots law will be the most appropriate law. Instead, 
the Scottish court will, where appropriate, apply foreign rules of law in 
order to determine the dispute before it. If this were not the case and the 
Scottish court, along with its foreign counterparts, always applied its own 
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law in every case before it, this would lead to the problem of “forum shop-
ping” in which a pursuer shops around the available forums in order to 
find the legal system most favourable to his case. Only by being open to 
the application of foreign rules of law can the problem of forum shopping 
be minimised, if not entirely prevented, and significant steps have been 
taken, particularly within the European Union, to ensure that, no matter 
where a case is brought, the same applicable law will be identified. Finally, 
and reflective of the approach taken towards questions of jurisdiction, it 
may also be possible for parties to come to an agreement as to the law to be 
applied to determine their dispute. 
Recognition and enforcement 
Issues of jurisdiction and choice of law arise when the Scottish court is 
asked to consider an ongoing dispute. In contrast, questions of recognition 
and enforcement occur when a foreign court has previously considered 
itself to have jurisdiction over a case, has decided that case according to 
the law it considered appropriate to determine the rights of the parties, 
and the successful party subsequently wishes to have the foreign judgment 
recognised and enforced in Scotland. The recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments is essential if parties are to be treated justly and fairly, as 
to refuse to recognise foreign judgments would force the successful party 
to go to the expense and inconvenience of beginning fresh proceedings in 
Scotland (and any other country in which they wished to have the judg-
ment recognised and enforced). Significant steps have been taken within 
the European Union to facilitate the free movement of judgments by 
ensuring the almost automatic recognition of a judgment granted in one 
Member State in all other Member States, and these developments will be 
considered further in the relevant chapters.
THE NAME OF THE SUBJECT
The subject is variously known as “private international law”, “inter-
national private law” and “the conflict of laws”. This is merely a differ-
ence of nomenclature and, however described, the core of the subject is 
that it is the branch of law which seeks to regulate the international rela-
tions of private individuals. This can be contrasted with the subject of 
public international law which seeks to regulate relations between states. 
As regards the third formulation, it should be noted that it is not the laws 
themselves which will be in conflict. Indeed, one of the principal aims of 
the subject is to avoid such conflicts. Instead, the conflict is to be found as 
between the individual litigants who will have conflicting views as to the 
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most  appropriate law to be applied in the case. It is the first of these terms, 
“private international law”, that will be utilised throughout this book.
THE MEANING OF “COUNTRY”
Already in this introduction, and many more times throughout this book, 
reference will be made to “foreign” courts and “foreign” laws, or the fact 
that elements of a particular dispute are located “overseas” in another 
“country”. This reference to a foreign country should not be read in 
the political sense and, instead, a “country” for the purposes of private 
international law denotes any territorial unit with a separate system of 
law. Consequently, the United States of America is not a “country” for 
the purposes of private international law and reference is instead made to 
its constituent parts, such as the states of New York or Texas. Similarly, 
Scotland is a separate “country” for the purposes of private international 
law and the other component parts of the United Kingdom are as much 
a foreign country as, say, France or Germany. In light of this, the issue of 
“intra-UK” conflicts will be considered at various points throughout this 
book, although, it must be admitted, there is a large degree of similarity 
among the rules of private international law adopted in each part of the 
United Kingdom.
HARMONISATION
There has been a significant trend in recent years towards the harmonisation 
of the rules of private international law. While the extent of harmonisation 
varies, there are now certain areas in which a number of states, particularly 
the EU Member States, adopt harmonised rules of jurisdiction, choice of 
law and recognition and enforcement. Such rules ensure that the courts 
of different countries assume jurisdiction on identical grounds and, once 
jurisdiction is assumed, apply the same law to determine the relevant issues. 
This unified approach then facilitates the recognition and enforcement 
elsewhere of the resultant judgments. The majority of topics considered in 
this book have been subject to at least some degree of harmonisation, with 
such developments emanating from two principal sources.
The Hague Conference on Private International Law
The Hague Conference on Private International Law is a global inter-
governmental organisation, founded in 1893, which has developed a 
number of multilateral legal instruments, some having met with notably 
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more success than others. The Conference boasts a current membership 
of 74 members (73 states and the European Union) and a number of non-
member states are also party to various conventions. Arguably the Confer-
ence’s most successful instrument has been the Convention of 25 October 
1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction which will be 
considered in Chapter 11.
The European Union
Of increasing importance at the regional European level are the measures 
adopted by the European Union. Such developments have a relatively 
recent history, with a key change occurring on 1 May 1999 following the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, Art 65 of which empowered 
the EU to take measures in the field of judicial co-operation in civil matters 
having cross-border implications, in so far as necessary for the proper func-
tioning of the internal market. This power was extended further with 
the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009. The 
Treaty of Lisbon amended the EU’s two core treaties: the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union (TEU) and the Treaty establishing the European Community 
(TEC), with the latter being re-named the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU). Article 81 of the TFEU removed the 
requirement that measures on judicial co-operation in civil matters having 
cross-border implications be “necessary” for the proper functioning of the 
internal market and replaced this with the more permissive phrase that the 
EU adopt such measures “particularly when necessary for the proper func-
tioning of the internal market” (emphasis added).
A variety of instruments have been introduced as a result of these 
powers, some of which have their origins prior to the entry into force 
of the Treaty of Amsterdam. A number of these developments will be 
con sidered throughout this book, particularly the Brussels I Regulation 
(Chapters 3 and 4), the Brussels IIa Regulation (Chapters 8 and 11), the 
Rome I Regulation (Chapter 5) and the Rome II Regulation (Chapter 6). 
As the United Kingdom has reserved the right to decide on a case-by-case 
basis whether it will participate in any particular instrument there are also 
a number of initiatives, such as the Rome III Regulation, to which the 
United Kingdom is not party.
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Essential Facts
• Private international law is the branch of law in each legal system 
that regulates cases with a foreign element.
• Private international law has three main objectives: (1) to determine 
jurisdiction; (2) to identify the applicable law; and (3) to facilitate 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
• There has been a significant trend in recent years towards the 
harmonisation of private international law rules, principally as a 
result of the work of the Hague Conference on Private International 
Law and the European Union. 
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As a consequence of the growing ease and availability of international travel, 
it is becoming increasingly common for individuals to develop connections 
with a number of legal systems during the course of their lives. At the same 
time, there is also an expectation that, regardless of where a person may 
happen to be at any given point, certain legal matters – primarily issues 
of legitimacy, adoption, marital status and succession – should always be 
governed by the law to which that person “belongs”. This is known as 
the doctrine of personal law: a doctrine which seeks to identify the most 
appropriate law to deal with issues of status, regardless of the fact that the 
individual in question (the propositus) may have links (perhaps very strong 
links) to other systems of law.
While there is broad agreement that an individual should be “connected” 
to a particular law, there is less agreement regarding precisely how this 
connection should be established. The traditional connecting factor 
adopted in Scotland and almost all common-law countries is that of domi-
cile, while most of the civil-law jurisdictions of continental Europe opt 
instead for the law of an individual’s nationality. Both these traditional 
connecting factors are gradually being marginalised by the rise to promi-
nence of the contemporary connecting factor of habitual residence.
DOMICILE
Domicile is the tie or connection between an individual and a place 
governed by a single system of law. Because domicile denotes a connection 
between an individual and a single system of law it follows that there is 
no such thing as a British domicile – only a Scottish domicile, an English 
domicile etc. Domicile is a personal matter that can be changed without 
state authorisation, and even without an individual realising that such a 
change has occurred. Accordingly, there is no “register” of domicile and 
any disputes as to a person’s domicile can be resolved only following adju-
dication by the court.
The central principle underlying the concept of domicile is the identi-
fication of a person’s permanent home. When international mobility was 
rare and the large majority of people would be born, would live and would 
ultimately die in the same country, often without ever leaving its confines, 
2 PERSONAL CONNECTING FACTORS
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domicile was a relatively simple and straightforward concept. Now, 
however, to equate the concepts of home and domicile is too simplistic 
due to the attribution of the latter being subject to a number of strict legal 
rule – rules which can appear to pay little attention to the factual realities 
of a person’s life. In conjunction with the sharp increase in international 
mobility, these strict legal rules have led to a wide gulf developing between 
the common-sense understanding of a person’s home and the legal concept 
of domicile – a gulf exacerbated by the failure of numerous attempts at 
fundamental reform of the concept. Indeed, as will be identified below, it 
is perfectly possible for an individual to be domiciled in a country he has 
never visited. Further complexity is apparent in Scotland following the 
partial reform of the law as a result of s 22 of the Family Law (Scotland) 
Act 2006.
General principles
There are three general principles that underpin the law of domicile and 
influence the more detailed rules considered below:
(1)  Every individual must have a domicile. An individual will be attrib-
uted a domicile from the moment he is born to the moment he 
dies and, while this domicile may change, there can be no gaps in 
an individual’s domicile. An individual will therefore be ascribed 
a domicile even if the circumstances of his life suggest that he does 
not have a readily identifiable home.
(2)  Every individual must have only one domicile at any given time. Even if 
the reality of an individual’s life would suggest that he has two 
homes in two different countries the law of domicile refuses to 
countenance the idea of concurrent domiciles.
(3)  An existing domicile is presumed to continue until a new domicile has been 
acquired. The burden of proving a change of domicile lies on those 
who assert such a change.
Domicile of a newborn – domicile of origin
In light of the fact that no person can be without a domicile, every indi-
vidual will be allocated a domicile – known as a domicile of origin – from 
the moment of his birth. While it will often be the case that the domi-
cile of origin will equate with the country of birth, this is entirely coinci-
dental as the place of birth is in no way determinative of the domicile of 
origin. The principles of the concept of the domicile of origin were most 
famously set out in a Scottish appeal to the House of Lords, Udny v Udny 
(1869), with the decision in Re Fuld’s Estate No. 3 (1968) offering a more 
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recent  discussion of the core principles of the concept. Due to the partial 
reform introduced by the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 it is necessary to 
consider the law both pre- and post-4 May 2006.
The common law 
Attribution of a domicile of origin under the common law was built upon 
the concept of legitimacy in that a legitimate child would take the domicile 
of his father and an illegitimate child the domicile of his mother (Udny v 
Udny (1869)). It is important to note that the consequence of this rule is 
that the domicile of origin may not necessarily reflect the factual reality of 
a child’s life and may instead allocate a domicile in a country the child had 
never visited. For example, a child born in France to parents domiciled in 
Scotland will be assigned a Scottish domicile and a child born in Scotland 
to parents domiciled in France will be assigned a French domicile. Rules of 
varying clarity also exist in reference to the less common situations of post-
humous children, children legitimated per subsequens matrimonium, children 
of putative marriages, foundlings and adopted children.
Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 
One of the aims of the 2006 Act was to effect the abolition of the status 
of illegitimacy, and any aspect of differential treatment predicated upon 
the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children, from Scots 
law. This was achieved via s 21 of the Act and, as this abolition made 
the common-law rules regarding the attribution of a domicile of origin 
unworkable, s 22 introduced replacement provisions. Although this section 
makes no explicit reference to the concept of the domicile of origin, the 
fact that it applies to all persons under 16 implies that the rules contained 
therein are intended to apply to this initial determination of domicile. 
Section 22 states that:
“(1) Subsection (2) applies where—
 (a) the parents of a child are domiciled in the same country as 
each other; and
 (b) the child has a home with a parent or a home (or homes) with 
both of them.
(2) The child shall be domiciled in the same country as the child’s 
parents.
(3) Where subsection (2) does not apply, the child shall be domiciled 
in the country with which the child has for the time being the 
closest connection.
(4) In this section, ‘child’ means a person under 16 years of age.”
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This section thus introduces two rules – one of dependence and one of 
independence – the applicability of which depend upon the circumstances 
of the child. First, the rule of dependence in s 22(2) states that where the 
parents are domiciled in the same country and the child has a home with 
one or both then the child shall be domiciled in the same country as the 
parents. It is important to note that the domicile of the parents and the 
place where the child has his home with at least one of them need not 
coincide for this rule to be applicable. For example, if a couple domiciled 
in the US state of Texas are posted to Aberdeen for a 2-year work place-
ment and have a child while living in Scotland then the requirements of 
s 22(2) will be fulfilled and the child will take the parents’ joint Texan 
domicile as his domicile of origin, regardless of the fact that the family 
home is currently in Scotland. Further, there is no precise definition of 
what constitutes a “home” for the purposes of this section. While the most 
common example would be where the child actually lives with one or both 
parents on a day-to-day basis, it is submitted that the child would still be 
considered as having a home with his parent(s) notwithstanding occasional 
absences: for example, a child who is sent to boarding school and lives there 
during term time will still be treated as having a home with his parent(s).
If the rule of dependence does not apply, whether because the parents 
do not share a common domicile or, more unusually, the child does not 
have a home with either of them, then recourse must be had to the inde-
pendent rule of s 22(3) which provides that the child will be domiciled in 
the country with which he has the closest connection for the time being. 
No guidance is given in relation to how the “closest connection” of the 
child is to be determined and while this may be a relatively straightforward 
test to apply to older children, difficulties arise when attempting to iden-
tify the country to which a newborn baby has the closest connection. If the 
test were to be applied literally, this would mandate an approach whereby 
all children were ascribed a domicile of origin in their country of birth. 
In the majority of cases the place of birth will be a country with which 
the child will go on to develop more meaningful ties and the rule will 
be uncontroversial. For example, a child who is born to an Anglo–Scot-
tish couple who have lived together in Scotland for 10 years, and intend 
to remain in that country at least for the short term, will be ascribed a 
Scottish domicile of origin as Scotland is clearly the country of closest 
connection. However, there will also be instances in which the place of 
birth will be in a country in which the parent(s) either did not intend to 
remain or intended to remain only for a limited period. For example, a 
child could be born prematurely to the above Anglo–Scottish couple when 
they are on an overseas vacation. Alternatively, this couple could be living 
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in a foreign country for the purposes of work when the child is born but 
always intend to return to Scotland. In both these scenarios an interpreta-
tion of the “closest connection” rule as a “place of birth” rule would result 
in the child acquiring a domicile of origin different to that of his parents 
and in a country with which he has only a fortuitous connection. In such 
circumstances an argument could be made that reference should be had to 
the long-term intentions of the parent(s) but this has the disadvantage that 
the child will then be domiciled in a country in which he has never lived, 
and in which he may not live for perhaps a number of year, if ever.
Transitional arrangements
Article 4 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 (Commencement, Tran-
sitional Provisions and Savings) Order 2006 (SSI 2006/212) makes it clear 
that the rules contained in s 22 are to apply only in relation to proceed-
ings which commence on or after 4 May 2006. This date is also the effec-
tive date from which s 1 of the Law Reform (Parent and Child) (Scotland) 
Act 1986 provides that no person whose status is governed by Scots law 
shall be illegitimate, and the fact that a person’s parents are not or have not 
been married to each other shall be left out of account in determining that 
person’s legal status. It is therefore clear that any question that may arise 
regarding the domicile of a person under 16 who was born on or after 
4  May 2006 will be determined according to s 22. There is a lack of clarity, 
however, regarding the law to be applied if a court is asked to determine 
the domicile of an individual before this date: should the common law that 
was then in force apply or should domicile be determined according to the 
now in force Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006? 
This point is not addressed in the legislation and is yet to be tested by 
the courts but academic opinion suggests that the new domicile rules of 
s  22 should be applied retrospectively in any situation where it is necessary 
to determine such an individual’s domicile on or after 4 May 2006. This 
approach could result in an individual  being attributed a different  domicile 
of origin to that previously identified under the common-law rules. In 
contrast, in circumstances where the domicile of an individual prior to the 
coming into force of the Act is at issue, with this determination uncon-
nected to any finding of domicile after 4 May 2006, it has been argued that 
the common-law rules should continue to apply as this determination will 
relate exclusively to a time which precedes the abolition of illegitimacy and 
the introduction of s 22.
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Domicile of children
Whether under the common law or the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 a 
domicile of origin will be attributed to every person at the moment they are 
born. This domicile will crystallise at the date of birth and any subsequent 
changes in the life of the individual will have no effect on the domicile of 
origin (this is subject to one exception in that the subsequent adoption of 
a child may result in a change in a domicile of origin  (Adoption and Chil-
dren (Scotland) Act 2007, s 40)). While it cannot be changed, a domicile of 
origin can, however, be displaced via the acquisition of a different domi-
cile. The rules governing displacement and acquisition vary on the basis 
of, first, whether the individual in question has reached the age of 16 and, 
second, if the individual is under 16, whether the rules of the common law 
or s 22 of the 2006 Act are to be applied. We will first consider the rules 
applicable to persons under 16.
The common law – domicile of dependence
Under the common-law rules, a child was treated as a dependent person 
who was incapable of acquiring an independent domicile through his own 
acts. Instead, a domicile of origin of a child would only be displaced should 
there be a change in the domicile of the appropriate parent – the father 
in the case of a legitimate child or the mother in the case of an illegiti-
mate child. This basic rule was buttressed by the more fact-specific rules 
contained in the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, s 4. 
This section has now been repealed in Scotland but remains applicable in 
England and Wales and Northern Ireland.
Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006
Section 22 applies to any determination of domicile between birth and the 
age of 16. Accordingly, a domicile of origin will be displaced whenever the 
circumstances of the child’s life lead to a re-evaluation of domicile under 
either the dependent or the independent rule. For example, a domicile of 
origin attributed under s 22(2) will change to a domicile of dependence if 
the parents acquire a new shared domicile and the child has a home with at 
least one of them. Alternatively, if the parents of a child cease to share the 
same domicile, the domicile of that child will no longer be determined by 
s  22(2) and reference will instead be made to s 22(3) which may result in the 
child acquiring a new independent domicile.
Domicile of adults – domicile of choice
From the above discussion it will be apparent that the majority of chil-
dren will be allocated a domicile that is dependent on either one parent 
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(if  domicile is to be determined under the common law) or both parents 
(if s 22(2) of the 2006 Act is applicable). Once a person reaches the age of 
16 this pre-existing domicile (whether a domicile of origin, a dependent 
domicile or an independent domicile) will continue until it is replaced by a 
domicile of choice. A domicile of choice has been described as “a conclu-
sion or inference which the law derives from the fact of a man fixing volun-
tarily his sole or chief residence in a particular place, with an intention of 
continuing to reside there for an unlimited time” (Udny v Udny (1869), per 
Lord Westbury at 99). Any individual with legal capacity can thus acquire 
a domicile of choice in a country via a combination of:
• actual physical residence in the country of choice; and
• an intent to remain in the chosen country indefinitely.
One of these factors is insufficient to facilitate a change of domicile and 
both must co-exist before a domicile of choice will be acquired.
Residence
Actual physical residence in a country is fundamental to the acquisition of a 
domicile of choice. In the absence of residence no amount of intention will 
suffice and an individual cannot acquire a domicile of choice by wishful 
thinking alone (Willar v Willar (1954), per Lord Justice-Clerk Thomson 
at 147). Conversely, the fact of actual residence, even for a number of 
decades, will be insufficient if there is no evidence of intent. For example, 
in Ramsay v Liverpool Royal Infirmary (1930) the House of Lords held, in the 
absence of adequate proof as regards intent, that a man who had lived in 
England for 37 years had not acquired a domicile of choice in that juris-
diction. Once actual residence is coupled with the requisite level of intent 
then the duration of the residence will not be relevant. Thus, residence for 
even a very short period of time will be sufficient for the acquisition of a 
domicile of choice if evidence of an intent to remain in the chosen country 
indefinitely is available. 
Intention
A domicile of choice will be acquired only if an individual has the intention 
to reside permanently, or for an unlimited time, in a particular country. 
The residence must be “freely chosen, and not prescribed or dictated by 
any external necessity, such as the duties of office, the demands of credi-
tors, or the relief from illness” (Udny v Udny (1869), per Lord Westbury 
at 99). Doubts as to long-term intentions or lingering wishes in the mind 
of the individual to live elsewhere will also be fatal to the  acquisition of 
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a domicile of choice, irrespective of the length of actual residence. In 
contrast, residence that at its inception is “prescribed or dictated” may 
ultimately lead to a change of domicile if that residence later becomes 
voluntary. In Mark v Mark (2005) the House of Lords held that, although 
it is a relevant factor, the mere fact that residence in a country is unlawful 
does not  automatically preclude the acquisition of a domicile therein. 
When attempting to identify the requisite level of intent there is “no 
act, no circumstance in a man’s life, however trivial it may be in itself, 
which ought to be left out of consideration” (Drevon v Drevon (1864), per 
Kindersley VC at 133). All evidence as to intent will be considered and 
there is no single factor which is automatically determinative of domicile. 
Further, a factor which is treated as decisive in one case may be disregarded 
in another. Thus, while evidence that an individual has clearly made his 
home for a very long time in a country, as well as having his family in 
that country and having no home elsewhere, is a “strong starting point”, 
it may not be conclusive (Holliday v Musa (2010), per Waller LJ at [67]). 
Declarations as to intent may be relevant but such evidence, if available, 
is to be treated with caution and viewed in light of the speaker’s motives. 
It is important that any such declarations are consistent with the speaker’s 
other statements and actions (Ross v Ross (1930)). The nature of an indi-
vidual’s residence can also provide evidence of intent, with the purchase of 
a house arguably providing a stronger argument in favour of permanent 
intent than, say, living in rental accommodation or in a hotel. 
Loss of a domicile of choice
Once acquired, a domicile of choice in a country can only be abandoned 
when an individual both ceases to reside physically and ceases to intend to 
reside permanently or indefinitely in that country. If one of these elements 
remains, ie an individual decides that he no longer wishes to reside in a 
country permanently but he does not physically leave, a domicile of choice 
will continue. While the departure from a country with the positive inten-
tion not to return will lead to the immediate loss of a domicile of choice, it 
is also possible for a domicile to be lost with a less forthright mentality by 
which a “withering away” of intention occurs over time (Morgan v Cilento 
(2004)). When a domicile of choice is abandoned it is lost forever and can 
only be re-acquired via a fresh concurrence of physical residence and an 
intent to remain permanently in the country in question.
It will often be the case that a termination of both residence and the 
intent to remain permanently in one country will be followed immedi-
ately by the beginning of residence with an intent to remain permanently 
in another country. In such circumstances the previous domicile of choice 
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will be replaced by a new domicile of choice. An individual may, however, 
leave one country with the positive intent not to return but not imme-
diately settle elsewhere, therefore losing a previous domicile of choice 
without acquiring a new domicile. As a fundamental principle of the law 
of domicile is that an individual must never be without a domicile, in these 
circumstances the domicile of origin is deemed to revive. This rule was 
introduced in Udny v Udny (1869), where Lord Westbury explained that 
revival was possible because the domicile of origin was never truly lost:
“When another domicil is put on, the domicil of origin is for that 
purpose relinquished, and remains in abeyance during the contin-
uance of the domicil … It revives and exists wherever there is no 
other domicil, and it does not require to be regained or reconstituted 
animo et facto in the manner which is necessary for the acquisition 
of a new domicil of choice.” (at 99)
The domicile of origin will revive even if the individual concerned has 
not returned to that particular country. Indeed, the domicile of origin 
will revive even if, as is possible under both the common law and the 
Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, the individual concerned has never been 
to this country or had only a transient and long-forgotten connection to 
this place. The revival doctrine has been criticised for potentially leading 
to artificial and absurd results and it has been rejected in other countries 
in favour of a rule of continuance, ie in similar circumstances a previous 
domicile of choice will continue to apply until a new one is required. This 
approach, while perhaps superficially superior, is also open to criticism as it 
may still lead to the application of an inappropriate law. A hybrid approach 
was suggested in the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta where it was held 
that, while the revival rule should normally be followed, if this approach 
produced an absurd result (such as where the revived domicile of origin had 
absolutely no relevance to an individual’s life, home, and activities) then a 
common-law judge had a residual authority to instead conclude that the 
individual has retained his last domicile of choice (Re Foote Estate (2009)). 
NATIONALITY
Although the United Kingdom, and many other countries, traditionally 
rely upon the connecting factor of domicile, other countries utilise the 
concept of nationality in order to connect an individual to a particular legal 
system. In comparison with domicile, the main advantage that the use of 
nationality as a connecting factor provides is that it is much more easily 
ascertained, and therefore more certain. Whereas an individual may be 
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unsure as to his domicile, he will more than likely be aware of his nation-
ality and have documentary evidence to prove it in the form of a pass-
port. On the other hand, this one advantage is outweighed by a number 
of serious disadvantages. First, as with domicile, reliance upon nationality 
may identify a law with which the person in question no longer has any real 
connection. Second, whereas an individual may have only one domicile, 
the possibility of dual nationality causes difficulties when attempting to 
connect an individual to a single legal system. In contrast, the problem of 
statelessness means that a person may not be connected to any legal system 
if nationality were the chosen connecting factor. Third, nationality cannot 
be utilised as a connecting factor in composite states such as the United 
Kingdom which are made up of a number of separate legal systems.
HABITUAL RESIDENCE
In comparison with domicile, habitual residence is intended to be a factual 
concept unblemished by the artificial legal rules which have come to char-
acterise the former. Reliance on the concept of habitual residence has devel-
oped in recent times principally as a result of its utilisation by the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, most notably in the Convention 
of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. 
Further, its adoption by the European Union as the primary connecting 
factor in a number of private international law instruments has confirmed 
its position as the connecting factor of choice, in a number of legal spheres.
There is no single accepted definition of the concept, with a policy 
decision taken not to provide such a definition in order to leave habitual 
residence free from the rigid legal rules that have so bedevilled the deter-
mination of domicile. Instead, habitual residence is intended to be a 
connecting factor that reflects the factual reality of an individual’s life in 
identifying his current centre of gravity – something that will not always 
be possible with domicile. This very broad statement does, however, hide 
a number of complexities. First, while there may be no accepted defini-
tion of the concept, a significant body of case law has developed in which 
habitual residence has been considered and this has inevitably led to an 
entrenchment upon the purely factual nature of the concept. Second, the 
meaning of“habitual residence” may differ according to the circumstances 
in which it is applied, with there being two distinct interpretations of the 
concept – one developed domestically and the other developed through 
EU legislation. Moreover, within each of these two broad interpretations 
further variation is possible, as the meaning of “habitual residence” may 
differ depending on the precise statutory context.
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General characteristics
Although there is no settled definition of “habitual residence”, judicial 
consideration of the concept has led to a number of general rules and 
 characteristics being developed. It must be remembered, however, that 
these are not absolutes, and what is applicable in one specific context might 
be inapplicable in another. With that caveat in mind, the following charac-
teristics may be identified:
• Habitual residence may be equated with ordinary residence. It has been stated 
in the House of Lords that habitual residence is interchangeable with 
the older concept of ordinary residence (Mark v Mark (2005)). Exact 
equivalence will, however, depend on the context in which the 
respective concepts are used.
• Habitual residence may be lost in a day. A person can cease to be habitu-
ally resident in a country in a single day if he leaves that country with 
a settled intention not to return (Al Habtoor v Fotheringham (2001)).
• Habitual residence cannot be acquired in a day. An individual cannot 
become habitually resident in a country in a single day. Instead, an 
appreciable period of time and a settled intention will be necessary 
for the acquisition of a habitual residence (Re J (A Minor) (Abduc-
tion: Custody Rights) (1990)). This may be subject to exceptions where 
it is necessary for an individual to have a habitual residence for the 
purpose of making a particular piece of legislation work, or where an 
individual is returning to a previous habitual residence (Nessa v Chief 
Adjudication Officer (1999)).
• An individual may be without a habitual residence. As a corollary of the 
previous two points, it is possible for an individual to be without a 
habitual residence at certain points in his life. 
• Residence may become habitual whether it is involuntary or illegal. In 
comparison with domicile, habitual residence may be acquired 
involuntarily, as a moment will come when the length of time spent 
in a country will override any intention not to acquire an attach-
ment thereto (Cameron v Cameron (1996)). In Mark v Mark (2005) the 
House of Lords held that residence in England need not be lawful for 
the purpose of establishing divorce jurisdiction.
• An individual may have more than one habitual residence. While there is 
a desire in child abduction case law to avoid a finding of multiple 
habitual residences, the English Court of Appeal has been prepared 
to accept the existence of dual habitual residences in the context of 
divorce jurisdiction (Ikimi v Ikimi (Divorce: Habitual Residence) (2001)).
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Acquisition and loss
In Re J (A Minor) (Abduction: Custody Rights) (1990), Lord Brandon stated 
(at 578-579) that the acquisition of a habitual residence required both 
 residence in a country for an appreciable period of time along with a settled 
intention to remain in that country. These two requirements appear osten-
sibly similar to those relevant to the acquisition of a domicile of choice in 
that there is a requirement of actual residence coupled with intent but their 
interpretation in relation to habitual residence differs in three fundamental 
ways from that applicable to domicile: 
(1) Where residence has persisted for an extended period of time, 
evidence of a settled intent will no longer be essential for the 
acquisition of a habitual residence. This can be contrasted with 
domicile where residence for decades will not, by itself, be suffi-
cient unless coupled with the necessary intent. 
(2) In cases where the residence is short and it is therefore necessary 
to consider the intentions of the individual, what is required is not 
an intention to remain indefinitely but an intention to remain for 
a settled purpose with a sufficient degree of continuity (R v Barnet 
LBC, Ex p Shah (1983)). This requirement may be satisfied even 
when the intention to reside is only for a limited period (Moran v 
Moran (1997)). 
(3) While domicile may be acquired immediately if the requisite inten-
tion exists, habitual residence requires residence for an appreciable 
period of time and may not be acquired in a single day. What 
constitutes an “appreciable period of time” will depend on the 
facts of the individual case and may vary from a very short period 
where there is clear evidence of intent, a matter of months where 
this is an element of doubt, to a period of years in cases where the 
residence is involuntary.
Habitual residence will be lost immediately if an individual leaves a 
country with the intention never to return. On the other hand, short-
term, temporary absences will not lead to a loss of habitual residence. As 
the majority of cases fall somewhere between these two extremes, such 
as where a person moves to another country on a trial basis or for limited 
purposes, it will be necessary to look at the specific circumstances of the 
move in order to establish whether an existing habitual residence has been 
lost, and whether or not it has been replaced with a new habitual resi-
dence. Factors relevant in this determination include the maintenance of 
ties with the previous country of residence; the duration of residence in 
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the new country; and the overall nature of the move. Even if there is clear 
evidence that an individual does intend to return to his country of habitual 
residence, through the passage of time there will come a point when the 
preservation of an existing habitual residence would contravene the factual 
nature of the concept. 
Problems arise when considering the habitual residence of a child in 
that it may be difficult, if not impossible, to identify the necessary settled 
intent or purpose required for the acquisition of habitual residence in 
circumstances where the actual period of residence is relatively short. The 
approach of the courts in the United Kingdom has been to address this 
lacuna by looking instead to the intentions of the parents. Where a shared 
parental intention exists and this correlates with the factual reality of the 
child’s life then the determination will be straightforward. However, in 
cases where there is no shared intent and the circumstances of a move are 
disputed the court will have to make a decision as to habitual residence in 
light of the character, purpose and duration of the move, with the latter 
factor of particular importance.
Habitual residence in the European Union
The connecting factor of habitual residence has been widely adopted by 
the EU legislator in a myriad of different contexts and while the concept 
is to be given an autonomous meaning across all Member States in each 
context in which it is utilised, this meaning will be influenced by the policy 
considerations underpinning the instrument in which it is employed and 
may therefore vary. Although the EU interpretation of habitual residence 
shares some common characteristics with the domestic interpretation 
considered above, two key differences are immediately apparent:
• Habitual residence may be acquired immediately. In Swaddling v Adjudica-
tion Officer (1999) the European Court of Justice established that for 
the purposes of social security law a person could acquire a habitual 
residence immediately, at least when moving from one Member State 
to another. The Family Division of the High Court of England and 
Wales has held that immediate acquisition of a habitual residence is 
also possible in the context of divorce jurisdiction (Marinos v Marinos 
(2007)).
• An individual may have only one habitual residence. While English domestic 
law recognises that an individual could be habitually  resident in two 
different countries at the same time for the purposes of divorce juris-
diction (Ikimi v Ikimi (Divorce: Habitual Residence) (2001)), the court 
in Marinos held that the concept of habitual  residence under the 
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Brussels IIa Regulation (discussed in Chapter 8) has an autonomous 
meaning in Community law which required that an individual have 
only one habitual residence.
Essential Facts
Domicile
• An individual must always have a domicile and may have only one 
domicile at any given time.
• A domicile of origin will be allocated at birth and will be deter-
mined according to either the common-law rule based on legitimacy 
or one of the two rules contained in s 22 of the Family Law (Scot-
land) Act 2006.
• The domicile of an individual under the age of 16 will be deter-
mined according to either the common-law rule of dependence or 
one of the two rules contained in s 22 of the Family Law (Scotland) 
Act 2006.
• An adult will acquire a domicile of choice via a combination of 
actual physical residence in a country and an intent to remain in that 
country permanently.
• A domicile of origin will revive in circumstance where an individual 
abandons an existing domicile of choice without acquiring a new 
one.
Habitual residence
• Habitual residence is a factual concept which has been left undefined 
and its meaning may differ according to the context in which it is 
utilised.
• An individual may be without a habitual residence and in certain 
contexts may have more than one habitual residence.
• A habitual residence may be lost in a day but it cannot normally be 
acquired in a day.
• The acquisition of habitual residence requires both residence in a 
country for an appreciable period of time and a settled intention to 
remain in that country.
• Habitual residence is subject to a different interpretation when 
utilised in EU legislation. This interpretation is guided by the Court 
of Justice of the European Union.
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Essential Cases
Udny v Udny (1869): a Scottish appeal to the House of Lords 
which sets out the principles of domicile.
Mark v Mark (2005): although it is a relevant consideration, the 
fact that residence is unlawful will not preclude acquisition of either 
domicile or habitual residence.
Re J (A Minor) (Abduction: Custody Rights) (1990): An indi-
vidual cannot become habitually resident in a country in a single 
day. An appreciable period of time and a settled intention will be 
necessary for the acquisition of a habitual residence.
Swaddling v Adjudication Officer (1999): for the purposes of 
European Union social security legislation it is possible for an indi-
vidual moving between Member States to acquire a habitual resi-
dence immediately.
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The rules of jurisdiction determine whether or not a court can hear a case 
and this chapter considers the rules of Scots law that delimit the jurisdic-
tion of the Scottish courts to hear actions in civil and commercial matters 
which contain a foreign element. The principle underpinning these rules is 
one of appropriateness, in that a Scottish court should only exercise juris-
diction over a dispute when it can be considered to be an appropriate forum 
to hear the action and dispose of the case. The requirement of appropriate-
ness may be satisfied in a number of ways including, but not limited to: a 
link between at least one of the parties and the forum; a link between the 
subject-matter of the dispute and the forum; or the fact that the parties 
have agreed that a particular forum should have jurisdiction over the 
dispute. The importance of jurisdiction cannot be underestimated as from 
this will flow, among other important consequences, the power to classify 
the nature of the problem, the right to apply the procedural law of the 
forum and also the power to decide the applicable substantive law.
THE FOUR LEGISLATIVE REGIMES 
Four different sets of rules are in place to govern the jurisdiction of the 
Scottish courts regarding civil and commercial matters. These are:
(1) The Brussels I Regulation
Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters is the primary European legal instrument in this area. The Regu-
lation applies in every Member State of the European Union, Denmark 
having accepted its terms via the Agreement between the European 
Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on jurisdiction and the recog-
nition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters with 
effect from 1 July 2007. This Regulation replaced the Brussels Convention 
on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commer-
cial Matters 1968 from 1 March 2002. As there was no fundamental change 
in structure or provisions as between the 1968 Brussels Convention and the 
Brussels I Regulation, case law decided under the former remains relevant 
in the interpretation of the latter. The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments 
Act 1982 (CJJA 1982) gave force of law within the United Kingdom to the 
3 JURISDICTION IN CIVIL AND
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1968 Brussels Convention, with this Act later amended by the Civil Juris-
diction and Judgments Order 2001 (SI 2001/3929) and the Civil Jurisdic-
tion and Judgments Regulations (SI 2007/1655) in order to accommodate 
the Regulation. The Brussels I Regulation will itself be replaced from 10 
January 2015 by Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
(recast) and reference will be made to the key changes to be introduced by 
the recast Regulation where necessary throughout this chapter. Although 
the provisions of the Regulation will be considered in numerical order it 
is important to note that there is a (non-numerical) hierarchical approach 
taken to jurisdiction, with the exclusive jurisdictions in Art 22 at the apex, 
followed by submission under Art 24, then the protective jurisdictions of 
Arts 8–21, then “choice of court” agreements under Art 23 and, finally, 
the general and special grounds of jurisdiction in Arts 2, 5 and 6. Each of 
these grounds will be discussed in turn below.
(2) The Lugano Convention
The Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments in civil and commercial matters was signed at Lugano on 
16 September 1988. The 1988 Lugano Convention was largely modelled 
on the 1968 Brussels Convention, with the object being to apply the prin-
ciples of the latter as between the Member States of the European Union 
and members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Although 
Lugano was considered to be a “parallel” Convention, there remained some 
important differences between the two Conventions. The Lugano Conven-
tion was given effect in the United Kingdom by the Civil Jurisdiction and 
Judgments Act 1991. The transformation of the 1968 Brussels Conven-
tion into the Brussels I Regulation led to a revision of the original Lugano 
Convention, with a revised Convention agreed on 30 October 2007. The 
text of the 2007 Lugano Convention is substantially identical to that of 
the Brussels I Regulation and applies as between all Member States and 
Norway, Switzerland and Iceland. The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgment 
Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/3131) have amended the CJJA 1982 to reflect 
the entry into force of the 2007 Lugano Convention. The consideration 
of the provisions of the Brussels I Regulation set out below can be read as 
also applying to the equivalent provisions of the 2007 Lugano Convention.
(3) CJJA 1982, Sch 4: intra-United Kingdom jurisdictional rules
Schedule 4 of the CJJA 1982 contains a modified version of the Brus-
sels I Regulation for the purpose of allocating jurisdiction as between the 
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different parts of the United Kingdom. The provisions of Sch 4 generally 
follow those of the Regulation, although they are not absolutely identical. 
A brief mention is made at the end of this chapter regarding the circum-
stances in which the rules of Sch 4 differ from the equivalent provisions of 
the Brussels I Regulation. 
(4) CJJA 1982, Sch 8: the residual Scottish rules
The rules in Sch 8 take effect subject to the Brussels I Regulation, the 2007 
Lugano Convention and Sch 4 to the CJJA 1982. Broadly speaking, there-
fore, the rules of Sch 8 apply only in “non-European” cases, ie when a 
defender is not domiciled in an EU or EFTA Member State. The rules 
themselves are in some cases identical to the Regulation, in other cases 
similar, and in further cases remain in the form originally adopted under 
the 1968 Brussels Convention. Further detail regarding the rules of Sch  8 
can be found in Beaumont and McEleavy, Anton’s Private International Law 
(3rd edn, W Green, 2011), Chapter 8.
BRUSSELS I REGULATION 
Scope
Article 1(1) provides that the Brussels I Regulation shall apply in civil and 
commercial matters whatever the nature of the court or tribunal. The 
Regulation shall not, however, extend, in particular, to revenue, customs 
or administrative matters. Article 1(2) states specifically that the Regulation 
will not apply to: (a) the status or legal capacity of natural persons, rights 
in property arising out of a matrimonial relationship, wills and succes-
sion; (b) bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up of insolvent 
companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and 
analogous proceedings; (c) social security; and (d) arbitration. Aside from 
the specific exclusions noted, the term “civil and commercial matters” is 
left undefined in the Regulation. The ECJ has held that this term must 
be given an autonomous meaning not tied to the understanding of any 
one legal system but interpreted primarily according to the objectives and 
scheme of the then Convention and, secondarily, to the general principles 
which emerge from the totality of the national legal systems (LTU v Euro-
control (1976)). 
The precise ambit of the arbitration exclusion under Art 1(2)(d) was 
considered in the West Tankers case (Allianz SpA (formerly Riunione Adriatica 
di Sicurta SpA) v West Tankers Inc (2009)). The decision of the ECJ in this case 
– to the effect that court proceedings incidentally related to arbitration did 
come within the scope of the Regulation, and could therefore oust, at least 
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temporarily, the jurisdiction of the courts at the seat of arbitration – caused 
much controversy in the United Kingdom. The decision in West Tankers 
and the attendant dismay therewith is reflected in the terms of the recast 
Regulation which retains the arbitration exclusion in Art  1(2)(d) but intro-
duces an explanatory recital (Recital (12)) with the effect that the decision 
in West Tankers is overturned at least to the extent that it required a court 
of one Member State to decline jurisdiction in deference to proceedings in 
another Member State apparently in breach of an arbitration  agreement. 
General jurisdiction
Article 2(1) of the Regulation states that persons domiciled in a Member 
State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member 
State. This is the primary jurisdictional basis contained in the Regulation, 
with the underlying principle being that the defendant should normally 
be sued in his “home” court. A person domiciled in a Member State other 
than the United Kingdom may be sued in Scotland only if the Scottish 
courts have jurisdiction as a result of one of the alternative grounds of 
jurisdiction found within the Regulation (Art 3).
Individuals
The discussion of personal connecting factors in the previous chapter 
focused on the traditional definition of domicile that is utilised to iden-
tify a long-term and enduring link between an individual and a particular 
legal system in matters of status. This traditional definition of domicile 
is considered to be somewhat cumbersome, possibly difficult to ascertain, 
and also possessing the potential to produce artificial results. The 1968 
 Brussels Convention left the definition of domicile to individual states and 
the United Kingdom opted to introduce a bespoke, residence-based defini-
tion of domicile more appropriate for determining jurisdiction in civil and 
commercial matters. The definition was introduced for the Convention in 
s 41 of the CJJA 1982, with the corresponding provision for the Brussels I 
Regulation contained in the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Order 2001, 
Sch 1, para  9.
The rules provide that an individual will be domiciled in the United 
Kingdom if and only if he is resident in the United Kingdom and the 
nature and circumstances of this residence indicate that he has a substantial 
connection with the United Kingdom (Sch. 1, para  9(2)). An identical 
rule applies to the identification of domicile within a particular part of 
the United Kingdom (para 9(3)) with an individual further considered to 
be domiciled in a particular place of the particular part if he has a substan-
tial connection to the latter and is resident in the former (para 9(4)). The 
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term “substantial connection” is left undefined but will be presumed to be 
fulfilled when an individual has been resident in the United Kingdom, or 
part thereof, for the last 3 months or more (para 9(6)). This presumption will 
apply unless the contrary is proven. Paragraph 9(5) addresses the situation 
where an individual is considered to be domiciled in the United Kingdom 
but lacks a substantial connection to any particular part,  by stating that he 
is to be treated as domiciled in the part of the United Kingdom in which 
he is resident. Continuous residence for the entire 3-month period is not 
a prerequisite for the acquisition of domicile and, in contrast to the tradi-
tional understanding of domicile, it is possible for an individual to have 
more than one domicile under these provisions (Daniel v Foster (1989)).
If a Scottish court has to determine whether an individual is domiciled 
in another Member State then Art 59(2) requires that the court must apply 
the law of this other state. This contrasts with the traditional approach 
to domicile under which a Scottish court will apply Scots law to deter-
mine the domicile of an individual anywhere in the world. The Regulation 
does not address the determination of the domicile of a person in a state 
other than a Member State. In the United Kingdom an individual will be 
domiciled in a third state if he is resident in that state and the nature and 
circumstances of his residence indicate that he has a substantial connection 
with that state (para 9(7)). This is an identical test to that applied to deter-
mine domicile in the United Kingdom but one which does not utilise the 
presumption based on 3 months’ residence.
Corporations
Unlike the position for individuals, the Brussels I Regulation does provide 
an autonomous definition of the domicile of corporations and other legal 
persons. Article 60 provides that such an entity will be domiciled at the 
place where it has its statutory seat, central administration or principal 
place of business. As the concept of “statutory seat” is unknown in the 
United Kingdom and Ireland, Art 60(2) provides that this phrase should 
be construed as meaning the registered office or, where there is no such 
office anywhere, the place of incorporation or, where there is no such place 
anywhere, the place under the law of which the formation took place. As 
with the position for individuals, it is possible, under the terms of Art 60, 
for a juristic person to have more than one domicile. 
Special jurisdiction
Although primacy is given to the courts of the defender’s domicile, Art 5 
of the Regulation permits a claimant to pursue his claim in another forum 
when there is a close link between the subject-matter of the dispute and 
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the alternative forum. The most important grounds of special jurisdiction 
relate to contract and delict. 
Contract
Article 5(1)(a): Article 5(1)(a) of the Brussels I Regulation states that a 
person domiciled in a Member State may, in another Member State, be 
sued in matters relating to a contract, in the courts for the place of perfor-
mance of the obligation in question. The characterisation of a matter as one 
“relating to contract” is given an autonomous definition and includes cases 
where one party denies that a contract exists (Boss Group Ltd v Boss France 
SA (1997)). The House of Lords held in Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Glasgow 
City Council (No 2) (1999) that an action for restitution for sums paid under 
a contract subsequently declared void were claims based on unjustified 
enrichment rather than contract and therefore did not fall within the terms 
of Art 5(1)(a).
Article 5(1)(a) gives jurisdiction to the courts for the place of perfor-
mance of the obligation in question, meaning that obligation which forms 
the basis of the legal proceedings. The place of performance of other inde-
pendent obligations under the contract will not be relevant in identifying 
this place (De Bloos SPRL v Bouyer SA (1976)). It is common for a claim 
to relate to several distinct contractual obligations with differing places of 
performance and this could cause any litigation brought under Art 5(1)(a) 
to become fragmented across jurisdictions. Such a separation of jurisdiction 
can be avoided if a principal obligation can be identified, with the courts for 
the place of performance of that principal obligation then having jurisdic-
tion not only over that claim but also over all other claims in relation to 
obligations that are considered accessory to the principal, even if the acces-
sory obligations have a different place of performance (Shenavai v Kreischer 
(1987)). However, the principal obligation must form part of the basis of 
proceedings (Bitwise Ltd v CPS Broadcast Products BV (2003)). If a principal 
obligation cannot be identified because multiple obligations are considered 
to be of equal importance, a court will have jurisdiction only in respect 
of the obligation the place of performance of which is within its territory 
(Leathertex Divisione Sintetici SpA v Bodetex BVBA (1999)). 
Where a single place of performance cannot be identified then any reli-
ance on Art 5(1)(a) will be frustrated. Thus, in Besix SA v Wasse reinigungsbau 
Alfred Kretzschmar GmbH & Co KG (2003) the ECJ held that Art 5(1) of the 
Convention, which is in identical terms to Art 5(1)(a) of the Regulation, 
did not apply to a dispute relating to the breach of a worldwide exclusivity 
clause as by its very nature this clause could not be said to be performed solely 
in one place and no single place of performance was therefore  identifiable.
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Article 5(1)(b): Article 5(1)(b) of the Regulation was introduced in order 
to remedy the difficulties that had arisen under the 1968 Brussels Conven-
tion, by providing tailored rules applicable to the two most common forms 
of contracts, those for the sale of goods and the provision of services. 
Accordingly, for the purpose of this provision and unless otherwise agreed, 
the place of performance of the obligation in question is to be, in the case 
of the sale of goods, the place in a Member State where, under the contract, 
the goods were delivered or should have been delivered and, in the case of 
the provision of services, the place in a Member State where, under the 
contract, the services were provided or should have been provided. These 
provisions are to apply “unless otherwise agreed”, meaning that the parties 
are permitted to come to an agreement concerning the place of perfor-
mance. Moreover, it should be noted that Art 5(1)(b) operates to locate all 
obligations under a contract within a single country: either the place of 
delivery or the place where the services were provided. Unlike the position 
under Art 5(1)(a), there is no specific focus on the place of performance 
of the precise obligation in question. If Art 5(1)(b) does not apply then 
Art  5(1)(c) directs that Art 5(1)(a) should be relied on.
Problems have arisen under Art 5(1)(b) concerning the identification of 
the place of performance when goods are to be delivered to, or services 
provided in, more than one place. In the case of the sale of goods, the Euro-
pean Court held in Color Drack GmbH v Lexx International Vertriebs GmbH 
(2010) that where there are several places of delivery all within the same 
Member State, the principal place of delivery should be identified and, if 
such a place was not identifiable, the claimant could bring proceedings in 
the place of delivery of his choice. In Wood Floor Solutions Andreas Domberger 
GmbH v Silva Trade SA (2010) the European Court considered a similar 
issue but this time in relation to a contract for the provision of services 
in different Member States. The court held that the place of performance 
should be construed as referring to the place where the main provision of 
services is performed. In the present case, concerned with a commercial 
agency contract, the European Court added that where this place could 
not be identified then the place of performance would be considered to be 
the place of the agent’s domicile. In Rehder v Air Baltic Corp (2010), where 
a passenger wished to claim compensation from an airline for a cancelled 
flight from Germany to Lithuania, the European Court held that both the 
place of departure and the place of arrival were equally closely linked to 
the contract for the provision of services and the claimant could choose to 
sue in either place. 
Difficulties have also arisen as regards the application of Art 5(1)(b) to 
contracts which combine obligations for both the provision of services and 
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for the sale of goods, with these obligations being performed in different 
Member States. In Société ND Conseil SA v Société Le Meridien Hotels et Resorts 
World Headquarters (2007) a contract concerned with the creation of adver-
tising and promotional material, together with the manufacturing and 
packaging of that material in England before its delivery to the customer 
in France, was held by the French Cour de Cassation to be one for the 
provision of services, with the consequence that the place of performance 
under Art 5(1)(b) was England. In Car Trim GmbH v KeySafety Systems Srl 
(2010) the European Court held that a contract could still be classified as a 
contract for the sale of goods even in circumstances where the supplier is 
required to produce and manufacture the goods according to the specific 
requirements of the customer.
Delict
Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation provides that a person domiciled 
in a Member State may, in another Member State, be sued in matters 
relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict in the courts for the place where the 
harmful event occurred or may occur. In the case of Kalfelis v Bankhaus 
Schroder Munchmeyer Hengst & Co (1988) the European Court declared that 
an autonomous meaning should be given to the phrase “matters relating 
to tort, delict or quasi-delict” to the effect that it covered all actions which 
seek to establish the liability of a defendant and which are not related to 
a “contract” within the meaning of Art 5(1). The court in Kalfelis further 
emphasised that any court with jurisdiction under Art 5(3) would have 
jurisdiction only as regards the delictual element of a claim and would not 
have jurisdiction with regard to any other matters not based in delict.
The European Court has also been asked to consider the meaning of the 
phrase “the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur” in light 
of multi-locality delicts, ie where elements of the delict, most obviously 
the place of acting and the place of effect, are located in different Member 
States. In Handelswekerij GJ Bier BV v Mines de Potasse d’Alsace SA (1978) the 
pollution of the Rhine in France harmed the plants of a market gardener 
in the Netherlands and the European Court held that the defender could 
be sued in either the courts for the place where the damage occurred (the 
Netherlands) or for the courts of the place of the event giving rise to this 
damage (France). More recently, in Zuid-Chemie BV v Philippo’s Mineralen-
fabriek NV/SA (2009), in a case where a defective product was produced 
in Germany but used by the claimant in the Netherlands, the European 
Court held that the “place where the damage occurred” referred to the 
place where the damage occurred as a result of the normal use of the pro -
duct for which it was intended (the Netherlands), with the place of the 
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event giving rise to the damage being where the product was (defectively) 
produced (Germany).
The ruling in Bier has been applied to a claim of damage to reputation 
in the context of a multi-state defamation in the case of Shevill v Presse 
Alliance SA (1995). In this case the European Court held that the phrase 
“place where the harmful event occurred” should be interpreted as to give 
jurisdiction to both the courts of the place where a defamatory article was 
published (in this case, France) and, in addition, the courts of each country 
in which the publication was distributed and where damage to reputation 
was sustained. In Shevill this meant that the claimant was able to bring 
proceedings in England even though only 230 copies out of a total number 
of approximately 252,792 copies were sold within that jurisdiction. The 
European Court did, however, limit the effect of this decision by holding 
that only the courts of the place where the publisher was established could 
award damages for all harm sustained, wherever it occurred. In contrast, if 
the claim were brought in the courts of a place where the publication was 
distributed then the courts of that place could award damages only for the 
harm suffered within the chosen jurisdiction.
The decision in Shevill was revisited by the European Court in the context 
of material published online in the joined cases of eDate Advertising GmbH 
v X and Martinez v MGN Ltd (2011). In its decision the Court acknowl-
edged that the universality of information disseminated via the internet 
reduces the effectiveness of distribution as a criterion for establishing juris-
diction and, consequently, the approach taken in Shevill required adapta-
tion. Accordingly, the Court held that a person who considered that his 
personality rights had been infringed by means of content placed online 
on an internet website could bring an action, first, in respect of all the 
damage caused, before the courts of either the Member State in which the 
publisher of the content was established or the Member State in which 
the centre of his interests is based, or, second, before the courts of each 
Member State in the territory of which content placed online was or had 
been accessible, but only in respect of the damage caused in the territory 
of that Member State 
The place where the harmful event occurred is limited to those places 
where direct damage is suffered and the courts of those places in which the 
indirect consequences of this damage are suffered, most obviously through 
financial losses, will not have jurisdiction under Art 5(3). Thus, in Dumez 
France SA v Hessische Landesbank (1990) it was held that Art 5(3) did not 
give the French courts jurisdiction in an action by the French parents of 
German subsidiary companies against German banks whose conduct had 
allegedly caused the German subsidiaries to become insolvent, thereby 
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causing loss to the parent companies. Jurisdiction under Art 5(3) is thus 
limited to the place where the harmful event actually occurs, not the place 
where the claimant feels the adverse consequences of this event. This logic 
was applied by the English Court of Appeal in the case of Henderson v Jaouen 
(2002) in deciding that when a person who had suffered personal injuries 
resulting from a road accident in France experienced a deterioration of 
his condition in England this fact was not sufficient to clothe the English 
courts with jurisdiction.
Other special jurisdictions
Article 5 also provides grounds of special jurisdiction in matters relating 
to maintenance (Art 5(2)); as regards a civil claim for damages or restitu-
tion which is based on an act giving rise to criminal proceedings (Art 5(4)); 
as regards a dispute arising out of the operations of a branch, agency or 
other establishment (Art 5(5)); in claims against a person in their role as 
settlor, trustee or beneficiary of certain trusts (Art 5(6)); and as regards 
a dispute concerning the payment of remuneration claimed in respect of 
the salvage of a cargo or freight (Art 5(7)). The first of these, jurisdiction 
in matters relating to maintenance, has now been superseded by Council 
Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, appli-
cable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and co-operation in 
matters relating to maintenance obligations (see Chapter 9) and has been 
removed from the recast Regulation. Article 7 provides a special ground of 
jurisdiction operative in actions relating to liability from the use or opera-
tion of a ship.
Co-defendants, third parties and counterclaims
Article 6 permits a person domiciled in a Member State to be sued in 
another Member State if he is one of a number of co-defendants, a third 
party in an action on warranty or guarantee, or on a counterclaim arising 
from the same contracts or facts on which the original claim was based. As 
regards the first of these grounds, where a person is one of a number of 
co-defendants, the claims must be so closely connected that it is expedient 
to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable 
judgments resulting from separate proceedings. Claims may still be consid-
ered closely connected even if they have different legal bases (Freeport Plc v 
Arnoldsson (2008)). Proceedings may be consolidated in the domicile of the 
“anchor” defendant even if this person is not the “main”, or most impor-
tant, defendant; once the requirement of a close connection is established 
there is no further need to establish separately that the claims were not 
brought solely for the purpose of removing the main defendant from the 
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jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State in which he is domiciled. In 
Stewart v Trafalgar House Steamship Co Ltd (2013) Lord Uist, sitting in the 
Outer House of the Court of Session, ruled that jurisdiction established 
under Art 6(1) on the basis of an “anchor” defendant will continue even 
if it is discovered subsequently that an action against this defendant was 
incompetent. Jurisdiction will be established at the time the action is raised 
and, once established, could not be lost, whatever might happen to the 
action.
 Protective jurisdiction
The Brussels I Regulation makes special provision for the determination 
of jurisdiction in matters relating to insurance (Section 3, Arts 8–14), 
consumer contracts (Section 4, Arts 15–17) and individual contracts of 
employment (Section 5, Arts 18–21). These bespoke provisions are consid-
ered necessary in order to protect the perceived “weaker” party of the 
insured, the consumer and the employee respectively. 
Matters relating to insurance
Articles 8–14 provide an almost exclusive code governing jurisdiction in 
matters related to insurance as between the insurer and the insured. Most 
notably, Art 9(1)(b) states that an insurer domiciled in a Member State may 
be sued in another Member State, in the case of actions brought by the poli-
cyholder, the insured or a beneficiary, in the courts for the place where the 
plaintiff is domiciled. The geographical reach of this provision is enlarged 
by the “deemed domicile” provision of Art 9(2) which states that an insurer 
who is not domiciled in a Member State but has a branch, agency or other 
establishment in one of the Member States shall, in disputes arising out 
of the operations of the branch, agency or establishment, be deemed to 
be domiciled in that Member State. The policyholder, the insured or a 
beneficiary – all of whom are considered to be the weaker party in matters 
relating to insurance – thus has the option to sue in his own domicile: 
a reversal of the principle underlying the general jurisdictional provision 
of Art 2. Articles 10 and 11(1) provide additional provisions in respect of 
liability insurance and the insurance of immoveable property.
Article 12(1) provides that an insurer may bring proceedings against a 
policyholder, the insured or a beneficiary only in the courts of the Member 
State in which the defendant is domiciled, subject to the  exceptions 
contained in Arts 11(3) and 12(2). Article 13 limits the possibility of these 
protective rules being circumvented by a “choice of court” agreement 
under Art 23 (discussed below), by providing that such an agreement will 
be valid only if it complies with that article. Under the terms of Arts 13(5) 
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and 14 these limitations do not apply to cases of marine, aviation and “large 
risks” insurance. These rules of protective jurisdiction are subject to the 
rule of Art 24 (discussed below) granting jurisdiction to the court of the 
Member State before which a defendant enters an appearance. This will 
continue to be the case under the terms of the recast Regulation but the 
new Art 26 thereof will require that where the policyholder, the insured 
or a beneficiary does enter an appearance the court shall ensure that the 
defendant is informed of his right to contest the jurisdiction of the court 
and of the consequences of entering an appearance. 
Consumer contracts
Articles 15–17 contain special provisions for jurisdiction over consumer 
contracts in order to protect the perceived economically weaker and legally 
less experienced party of the consumer. 
Article 15 operates as a definitional provision and provides clarity as to 
the meaning of “consumer” and “consumer contract”. Under Art  15(1) a 
per son will be considered to be a consumer if he concluded a contract for 
a  purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession. If  a 
person concludes a contract for the purchase of goods to be used for mixed 
purposes which are in part within and in part outside his trade or profession 
then these special provisions shall not apply unless it can be shown that the 
trade or professional purpose is so limited as to be negligible in the overall 
context of the supply (Gruber v Bay Wa AG (2006)). 
Articles 15(1)(a), (b) and (c), in conjunction with Art 15(3), provide clar-
ification with regard to what is, and is not, considered to be a consumer 
contract. Article 15(1)(c) extends these protective provisions to contracts 
concluded by the consumer with a person who pursues commercial or 
professional activities in the Member State of the consumer’s domicile or, 
by any means, directs such activities to that Member State, or to several 
states including that Member State, and the contract falls within the scope 
of such activities. The meaning of “directing activities” in the context of 
electronic consumer transactions was considered by the European Court 
in the joined cases of Pammer v Reederei Karl Schluter GmbH & Co KG and 
Hotel Alpenhof GmbH v Heller (2011). The Court held that the mere acces-
sibility of a trader’s website in the Member State in which the consumer 
is domiciled does not constitute the directing of activities. Instead, it had 
to be ascertained whether, before the conclusion of any contract with the 
consumer, it was apparent from the trader’s websites and overall activity 
that the trader envisaged doing business with consumers domiciled in the 
Member State of the consumer’s domicile in the sense that the trader was 
minded to conclude a contract with those consumers.
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Once a party is considered to be a consumer who has concluded a con -
sumer contract within the terms of Art 15 then Art 16 provides similar 
protection to that available in matters relating to insurance. Thus, the 
consumer may bring proceedings in his “home” court against a party 
domiciled in a different Member State (Art 16(1)), including a party with 
a deemed domicile (Art 15(2)), while proceedings may be brought against 
the consumer in the courts of his domicile only (Art 16(2)), subject to the 
exceptions found in Arts 15(1) and 16(3). Article 17 limits the enforce-
ability of “choice of court” agreements in order to protect consumers 
by preventing businesses from inserting jurisdiction clauses that waive or 
alter these protective rules. Once again, these rules of protective jurisdic-
tion are subject to Art 24, which in the future will include the protective 
notification requirement under Art 26 of the recast Regulation when the 
consumer is the defendant.
Individual contracts of employment
Section 5 of the Brussels I Regulation provides an almost comprehensive 
set of jurisdictional rules, subject to the exceptions found in Arts 18(1) and 
20(2), for individual contracts of employment. Under Art 19 an employer 
domiciled in a Member State, including an employer with a deemed domi-
cile (Art 18(2)), may be sued not only in that state but also in another 
Member State in the courts for the place where the employee habitually 
carries out his work or in the courts for the last place where he did so or, if 
the employee does not or did not habitually carry out his work in any one 
country, in the courts for the place where the business which engaged the 
employee is or was situated. In contrast, the employee may be sued only in 
the courts of the Member State in which he is domiciled (Art 20(1)). 
As with the other grounds of protective jurisdiction, the enforceability 
of “choice of court” agreements is limited to circumstances in which such 
an agreement will not be detrimental to the weaker party, in this case 
the employee (Art 21). Article 24 is applicable to individual contracts of 
employment in the same manner as for matters relating to insurance and 
consumer contracts, including the caveat to be added under the new Art 26 
of the recast Regulation when the employee is the defendant. The recast 
Regulation extends the scope of the protective jurisdiction  provisions to 
actions against employers domiciled outside the European Union and also 
permits recourse to the co-defendant provisions of the current Art  6(1) 
(new Art 8(1)) but only in the case of proceedings brought against an 
employer.
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Exclusive jurisdiction
Article 22 of the Brussels I Regulation identifies a number of circumstances 
in which the courts of a particular Member State will be considered to have 
exclusive jurisdiction. Article 22 is mandatory and will prevent recourse to 
any other jurisdictional ground. In particular, the functioning of Art 22 
remains unaffected by any agreements as to jurisdiction or by the submis-
sion of the defendant to a jurisdiction other than that identified under 
Art 22. Article 22 applies regardless of domicile, with the consequence 
that it applies even if neither party is domiciled in an EU state. Broadly 
speaking, exclusive jurisdiction is allocated in relation to certain proceed-
ings concerned with immovable property, corporations, public registers, 
intellectual property and the enforcement of judgments.
“Choice of court” clauses
Under Art 23(1) of the Brussels I Regulation if parties, one or more of 
whom is domiciled in a Member State, have agreed that a court or the 
courts of a Member State are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes 
which have arisen or which may arise in connection with a particular 
legal relationship, that court or those courts shall have jurisdiction. The 
Regulation therefore respects party autonomy by permitting the proroga-
tion of jurisdiction in that parties may yield to the jurisdiction of a court 
to which they would not otherwise be subject. Parties are free to iden-
tify any Member State of their choosing, there is no requirement for any 
pre-existing connection to the chosen forum. Further, it is possible for a 
“choice of court” clause to be effective even if it does not directly state the 
identity of the Member State in which proceedings should be brought, as 
long as the Member State chosen can be identified (Coreck Maritime GmbH 
v Handelsveem BV (2000)). 
Article 23(1) contains a rebuttable presumption that any court identified 
in such a clause will have exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute. As this is a 
rebuttable presumption, parties remain free to agree a non-exclusive juris-
diction clause. If the clause is exclusive then it will operate as to exclude 
any otherwise applicable ground of jurisdiction under the Regulation apart 
from those exclusive grounds of jurisdiction under Art 22 (Art 23(5)). As 
discussed above, the effectiveness of a “choice of court” agreement may 
also be limited in the context of matters relating to insurance, consumer 
contracts and individual contracts of employment. An exclusive choice of 
jurisdiction under Art 23 may also be superseded by Art 24.
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Formal requirements
Before a “choice of court” agreement will be effective it must satisfy 
certain requirements of formal validity which are detailed in Art 23(1). 
These are that the agreement must be in writing or evidenced in writing; 
or in a form which accords with practices which the parties have estab-
lished between themselves; or, in international trade or commerce, in a 
form which accords with a usage of which the parties are or ought to have 
been aware and which in such trade or commerce is widely known to, 
and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the 
particular trade or commerce concerned. These requirements are absolute 
and may not be augmented or abated by the provisions of national laws of 
Member States (Elefanten Schuh GmbH v Jacqmain (1981)). Any communi-
cation by electronic means which provides a durable record of the agree-
ment shall be equivalent to “writing” (Art 23(2)). Matters of substantive 
validity (principally consent) are not currently addressed by the Regulation 
but under the recast Regulation such matters will be referred to the law of 
the courts of the Member State identified in the “choice of court” clause. 
Parties not domiciled in a Member State
Article 23(1) applies only when at least one of the parties is domiciled in 
a Member State. Jurisdiction clauses in favour of the courts of a Member 
State which are entered into by parties neither of whom are domiciled in a 
Member State are governed by Art 23(3). Under this provision a choice of 
a court or the courts of a Member State by such parties will be effective to 
prevent the courts of other Member States taking jurisdiction. However, 
there is an important difference between Art 23(1) and Art 23(3) in that, 
under the former, the court identified in such a clause must accept jurisdic-
tion, whereas, under the terms of the latter, a court identified thereunder 
may decline jurisdiction should it so wish. This distinction will disappear 
under the recast Regulation with the scope of what is currently Art 23(1) 
being expanded to apply to all parties, regardless of domicile.
2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements
Article 23 applies only when a “choice of court” agreement identifies a 
court or the courts of a Member State, and this restriction remains in the 
recast Regulation. Consequently, if a “choice of court” agreement is made 
in favour of a court or the courts of a jurisdiction outside the European 
Union then Art 23 will not apply. Such an agreement (and certain others) 
may in the future be regulated by the terms of the Hague Convention of 
30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements. This Convention has been 
acceded to by Mexico and signed by the United States and the European 
DUP_PrivateInternationalLaw5.indd   37 12/09/2014   14:43
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW38
Union but is yet to come into force. After coming into force, the Hague 
Convention will apply in all cases where one or more parties reside in a 
Contracting State other than an EU Member State. 
Submission
Article 24 states that, apart from jurisdiction derived from other provisions 
of the Regulation, a court of a Member State before which a defendant 
enters an appearance shall have jurisdiction. Accordingly, if a defendant 
submits to the jurisdiction of the court then that court will be permitted to 
hear the dispute even if it would not otherwise have jurisdiction under the 
Regulation. There are two limits on this jurisdictional basis. First, it does 
not apply when the defendant enters an appearance to challenge or contest 
the jurisdiction of the court, even if at the same time he makes submis-
sions in his defence on the substance. Second, the principle of submission 
does not apply where another court has exclusive jurisdiction by virtue 
of Art 22. In contrast, Art 24 can be relied upon even if a valid “choice 
of court” agreement exists under Art 23. In these circumstances submis-
sion under the former overrides an earlier agreement under the latter. As 
identified above, the recast Regulation will introduce a protective require-
ment of notification in matters relating to insurance, consumer contracts 
and individual contracts of employment when the submitting party is the 
perceived weaker party.
Conflicts of jurisdiction
It is possible under the Brussels I Regulation that the courts in two or 
more Member States will be allocated jurisdiction. For example, the courts 
of one state may have jurisdiction under the Art 2 ground of the defen-
dant’s domicile while the courts in another state may be able to take juris-
diction under one of the Art 5 grounds of special jurisdiction. Indeed, a 
multiplicity of jurisdictions may even be possible within the same article. 
If a choice of jurisdiction is apparent then the claimant may choose the 
Member State in which to initiate his action but the risk remains that 
proceedings in relation to what is essentially the same dispute and between 
the same parties may be commenced in two or more jurisdictions. If these 
proceedings are allowed to complete this could potentially lead to different 
courts giving conflicting and irreconcilable judgments, not to mention the 
increased litigation costs of the parties. 
Article 27 of the Regulation attempts to limit potential conflicts of juris-
diction by adopting the lis pendens system of jurisdiction allocation which 
places a significant emphasis on the priority of process. This article states 
that where proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the 
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same parties are brought in the courts of different Member States, any court 
other than the court first seised shall of its own motion stay its proceedings 
until such time as the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established. If 
the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established then any court other 
than the court first seised must decline jurisdiction in favour of that court. 
Article 30 provides clarity as regards when a court shall be deemed to be 
seised. This article applies regardless of the domicile of the parties. 
The “first come, first served” rule of Art 27 is one of strict priority and 
it is important to note its mandatory nature in that the court first seised, 
once its jurisdiction is established, must accept jurisdiction. Similarly, a 
court seised later must stay it proceedings until the court first seised has 
determined whether or not it has jurisdiction. The European Court has 
held that Art 27 will apply even if there is an exclusive “choice of court” 
agreement in favour of a court seised later (Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl 
(2005)). The court identified in such a clause will consequently be required 
to stay its own proceedings until the court first seised has declared that 
is has no jurisdiction. This decision has been criticised for encouraging a 
party to adopt delaying tactics by commencing proceedings, often of a 
negative nature, before a court other than that identified in a jurisdiction 
clause, in order to delay the determination of the dispute in the previously 
chosen forum. This problem is exacerbated by the subsequent decision of 
the European Court in Turner v Grovit (2005) in which the court held that 
the use of anti-suit injunctions to prevent vexatious litigation constituted 
an interference with the jurisdiction of a foreign court and was therefore 
incompatible with the Regulation.
These criticisms have been addressed in the recast Regulation with the 
new instrument reversing the decision in Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl 
by giving priority to the court specified in a jurisdiction clause, regardless 
of whether or not it is the court first seised. Accordingly, the new Art 31(2) 
states that where an agreement confers exclusive jurisdiction on the court 
of a Member State then, once this court is seised, any court of another 
Member State shall stay its proceedings until such time as the chosen court 
declares that it has no jurisdiction. The recast Regulation thus reverses the 
priority of process so that, in the future, a “choice of court” agreement will 
take precedence over the “first in time” rule.
Article 28 applies to actions that are considered to be related to one 
another even if they do not involve the same cause of action and may be 
between different parties. In these circumstances any court other than the 
court first seised may stay its proceedings and possibly decline jurisdiction 
if the court first seised has jurisdiction over the actions in question and its 
law permits the consolidation thereof. Actions are deemed to be related 
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where they are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and deter-
mine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting 
from separate proceedings. In contrast to Art 27, under Art 28 a notable 
amount of discretion is conferred on the later court to decide whether the 
actions are related and, if so, whether proceedings should be stayed.
Forum non conveniens
In contrast to the strict system of lis pendens enforced in the Brussels I Regu-
lation, under the common law of Scotland the doctrine of forum non conve-
niens permits a defender to request that a court should decline to exercise 
jurisdiction because there is some other tribunal, having competent juris-
diction, in which the case may be tried more suitably for the interests of 
all the parties and for the ends of justice (Sim v Robinow (1892)). A plea of 
forum non conveniens may be made whether or not proceedings have already 
been initiated abroad. The burden of proof is on the defender to show 
that there is a competent and more appropriate forum available elsewhere. 
The appropriateness of the alternative forum will be considered in order to 
determine whether it is the natural forum with the most real and substan-
tial connection to the dispute in terms of the convenience of the parties, 
the availability of witnesses, the applicable law, whether proceedings have 
already been initiated in the identified court, or if related proceedings are 
under way in either court. The existence of an exclusive jurisdiction clause 
in favour of a particular court is considered to be a very strong factor in 
this determination. If the existence of a clearly more appropriate forum is 
established then a plea of forum non conveniens will be accepted unless the 
pursuer can show that requiring him to litigate in this forum would be 
unjust. The pursuer could thus argue that he would be denied justice in 
the clearly more appropriate forum because of issues such as the cost of 
 litigation, procedural delays, or concerns over the competence or fairness 
of the identified courts. The mere fact that this alternative forum may not 
be as advantageous to the pursuer is not enough to constitute a denial of 
justice.
Reliance on the doctrine of forum non conveniens will be competent 
only where to do so is not inconsistent with what is now the Brussels I 
 Regulation or the Lugano Convention (CJJA 1982, s 49). A plea of forum 
non conveniens can therefore be made in cases falling within Sch 4 to the 
1982 Act (intra-UK cases) and s 22(1) of the 1982 Act states that nothing 
in Sch 8 (the residual Scottish rules) shall prevent the court from declining 
jurisdiction on the ground of forum non conveniens. However, the European 
Court has held that a court of a Member State is precluded from declining 
the jurisdiction conferred on it by Art 2 on the ground that a court of a 
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non-Member State would be a more appropriate forum, even if the juris-
diction of no other Member State is in issue and the proceedings have no 
connection to any other Member State (Owusu v Jackson (2005)). 
Under the recast Regulation the effects of the decision in Owusu will 
be ameliorated partially by the introduction of elements of the doctrine 
of forum non conveniens into the Brussels regime when an action is pending 
before the court of a (non-EU) third state at the time when a court in a 
Member State is seised of an action which is related to the action in the 
court of the third state. The new Art 34 thus gives a Member State court 
a limited discretion to stay its proceedings when proceedings have been 
initiated first in a third state but only when the requirements of that article 
are met in that it is expedient to hear and determine the related actions 
together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from sepa-
rate proceedings; it is expected that the court of the third state will give 
a judgment capable of recognition and, where applicable, of enforcement 
in that Member State; and the court of the Member State is satisfied that 
a stay is necessary for the proper administration of justice. Recital (24) 
provides guidance concerning the circumstances relevant to the proper 
administration of justice. 
INTRA-UNITED KINGDOM CASES
Section 16 of the CJJA 1982 applies a modified form of the jurisdictional 
provisions of the Brussels I Regulation as between the different parts of the 
United Kingdom. These modified rules are set out in Sch 4 (as amended by 
the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Order 2001, Sch 2) and apply when 
the subject-matter of the proceedings is within the scope of the Regulation 
and the defendant is domiciled in the United Kingdom or the proceedings 
are of a kind mentioned in Art 22 of the Regulation (exclusive jurisdic-
tion regardless of domicile). Schedule 4 has two main functions in that it 
will provide identification of a specific territorial unit when the Brussels  I 
Regulation allocates jurisdiction to the United Kingdom generally and it 
also applies in cases which are internal to the United Kingdom but are 
related to more than one territorial unit thereof. Although Sch 4 appears 
very similar to the terms of the Regulation, there are four key differences 
between the provisions of Sch 4 and the corresponding provisions of the 
Regulation, as discussed earlier in this chapter:
(1) The rules of special jurisdiction in matters relating to contract 
refer to the courts for the place of performance of the obligation 
in question and do not include the bespoke provisions under the 
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Regulation relating to contracts for the sale of goods or the provi-
sion of services (Sch 4, r 3(a)).
(2) The articles in the Regulation regulating jurisdiction in matters 
relating to insurance are not replicated in Sch 4.
(3) In relation to “choice of court” agreements, Sch 4, unlike Art 23 
of the Regulation, contains no presumption of exclusivity, nor 
requirements as to writing (Sch 4, r 12).
(4) As identified above, the provisions in the Regulation relating to lis 
pendens are excluded from Sch 4.
Essential Facts
• There are four regimes governing the jurisdiction of the Scottish 
courts: the Brussels I Regulation; the 2007 Lugano Convention; 
the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, Sch 4; and the Civil 
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, Sch 8.
• Article 2 of the Brussels I Regulation provides that the general 
ground of jurisdiction is the domicile of the defendant. Domicile 
is given a specific definition for both individuals (CJJA 1982, s 41 
as amended by the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Order 2001, 
Sch  1, para  9) and companies (Art 60).
• Article 5 provides alternative grounds of special jurisdiction when 
there is a close link between the subject-matter of the dispute and 
the forum – most notably in matters relating to contract and delict.
• Grounds of protective jurisdiction apply in matters relating to insur-
ance (Arts 8–14), consumer contracts (Arts 15–17) and individual 
contracts of employment (Arts 18–21).
• Article 22 identifies a number of circumstances in which the courts 
of a particular Member State will be considered to have exclusive 
jurisdiction.
• Article 23 permits the prorogation of jurisdiction of a court or 
courts of a Member State by parties. They is no requirement for any 
pre-existing connection to the chosen forum.
• Article 24 will clothe the court of a Member State with jurisdic-
tion should the defendant enter an appearance, provided that such 
appearance was not solely or primarily made in order to challenge 
or contest that jurisdiction. 
• The Regulation attempts to limit potential conflicts of jurisdiction 
by adopting a “first come, first served” rule under Art 27.
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• In cases falling outside the ambit of the Brussels I Regulation and 
the Lugano Convention, the Scottish courts may utilise the doctrine 
of forum non conveniens in order to identify a more appropriate forum.
Essential Cases
De Bloos SPRL v Bouyer SA (1976): the “place of performance 
of the obligation in question” in Art 5(1)(a) refers to the obligation 
which forms the basis of the legal proceedings.
Handelswekerij GJ Bier BV v Mines de Potasse d’Alsace SA 
(1978): the “place where the harmful event occurred or may occur” 
in Art 5(3) refers to both the place where the damage occurred and 
the place of the event which gives rise to this damage.
Shevill v Presse Alliance SA (1995): in a claim of damage to repu-
tation in the context of a multi-state defamation the claimant has 
the option under Art 5(3) of bringing his action in either the courts 
of the place of publication or in the courts of any place in which 
the publication was distributed and where damage to reputation is 
sustained.
Dumez France SA v Hessische Landesbank (1990): Art 5(3) is 
limited to the place where the harmful event actually occurs, not 
the place where the claimant feels the adverse consequences of this 
event.
Pammer v Reederei Karl Schluter GmbH & Co KG (2011): 
the mere accessibility of a trader’s website in a Member State does 
not, by itself, constitute a directing of activities for the purposes of 
Art  15.
Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl (2005): Art 27 (priority of 
process) will apply even if the court seised first was seised in viola-
tion of an exclusive “choice of court” agreement.
Owusu v Jackson (2005): if a court assumes jurisdiction under the 
Regulation then it is precluded from utilising the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens.
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4 RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF 
FOREIGN DECREES
The precise rules for the recognition and enforcement in the United 
Kingdom of judgments emanating from the courts of another country 
are determined by the geographical location of what is referred to as 
the court of origin. If that court is situated in the territory of an EU or 
EFTA Member State then the recognition and enforcement provisions of 
the Brussels I Regulation or the 2007 Lugano Convention are applicable 
respectively. If the court of origin is situated in a jurisdiction to which the 
Administration of Justice Act 1920 or the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal 
Enforcement) Act 1933 applies then judgments therefrom will be subject 
to the enforcement procedure contained in the relevant Act. The recog-
nition and enforcement of the judgments of a court of origin which is 
situated in a jurisdiction that is neither an EU/EFTA Member State, nor 
subject to the terms of the 1920 Act or 1933 Act, will be determined under 
the common law. Provision also exists under the Civil Jurisdiction and 
Judgments Act 1982 for the recognition and enforcement of a judgment 
granted in one part of the United Kingdom in the other parts thereof. This 
chapter will consider each of these regimes.
THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN 
 JUDGMENTS AT COMMON LAW
Enforcement via the common law will be necessary when a judgment 
origin ates from a foreign country which is not bound by the Brussels  I 
 Regulation/the 2007 Lugano Convention, nor linked by reciprocal 
arrangements with the United Kingdom under the Administration of 
Justice Act 1920 or the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 
1933. Before a foreign decree in personam will be enforced in Scotland the 
foreign court of origin must have had jurisdiction to grant the decree. Once 
jurisdiction is established then the judgment will be recognised unless one 
of the limited number of defences to recognition can be established.
Jurisdiction
It is fundamental to the recognition and enforcement in Scotland of a 
foreign judgment that the court of origin is regarded by Scots law as having 
had jurisdiction over the action to which the judgment relates. This ques-
tion will be determined not with reference to the domestic understanding 
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of jurisdiction (whether of the court of origin or the Scottish courts) but 
according to the classification of jurisdiction in an international context. 
By this standard, certain grounds of jurisdiction will be considered accept-
able while others will be considered exorbitant and thus unacceptable. 
The former category includes jurisdiction on the basis of the residence or 
presence of the defender, with temporary physical presence considered 
sufficient (Adams v Cape Industries Plc (1990)). Jurisdiction will be granted 
over a corporate defender if the corporation carries on business within the 
territory of the court, although the mere fact that a company has a website 
accessible in a particular country does not automatically mean that it is 
carrying on business there (Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth (2009)). Jurisdiction 
will also be accepted if taken on grounds of prorogation, submission or 
reconvention (counterclaims). In contrast, jurisdiction exercised on the 
basis of domicile (in its traditional form), nationality, the ownership of 
immoveable property (in actions unrelated to that property) or the arrest-
ment of moveables would not be recognised under the common law of 
Scotland. 
Defences
Even if a foreign court has taken jurisdiction on an acceptable basis, the 
subsequent decree may still be refused recognition under the common law 
on some other ground. First, a foreign decree resulting from a penal or 
revenue action will not be enforced in Scotland. The Protection of Trading 
Interests Act 1980 also prohibits the enforcement under the common law 
of those judgments identified within that Act. Second, a foreign judgment 
may also be challenged on the ground of fraud. Such challenge may allege 
that the fraudulent behaviour was attributable to the court, the other party 
to the proceedings, or both. Third, enforcement could be resisted where 
the decree is contrary to natural justice because of some form of procedural 
irregularity, although a mere difference to the procedural rules applicable 
in Scotland will not be sufficient. Fourthly, a foreign judgment could be 
challenged on the ground of public policy. 
A foreign decree will be enforced in Scotland only if it is considered to 
be “final”. A decree which is interlocutory and liable to variation or altera-
tion will not be enforced. However, a foreign decree need not be final in 
the sense that it cannot be made the subject of appeal to a higher court 
in the country of origin but it must be final and unalterable in the court 
which pronounced it (Nouvion v Freeman (1889)). It is important to note 
that it is not a relevant objection to a foreign judgment that the court came 
to a mistaken conclusion, either on the facts or on the law. The merits of a 
foreign decree will not normally be examined, except in cases where fraud 
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is alleged. If a party believes that a foreign case was decided  incorrectly 
then this should be challenged under the foreign legal system, not as a 
means by which to resist enforcement in Scotland. 
Enforcement
At common law, a foreign decree is enforced in Scotland by raising an 
action for decree conform in the Court of Session. Decree conform may be 
granted only against a person who was a party to the foreign proceedings 
and who is personally liable under that judgment by the law of the foreign 
court. An action for decree conform is incompetent when the judgment 
which it is sought to enforce may be enforced under the provisions of the 
Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933, the Brussels I 
Regulation, the 2007 Lugano Convention, or the intra-UK scheme under 
the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982. A decree conform may be 
sought even if the foreign judgment comes within the terms of the Admin-
istration of Justice Act 1920, but the pursuer may not be able to recover the 
expenses of the action (s 9(5)). A foreign decree may also be founded upon 
for purposes of res judicata as a defence to an action on the same ground in 
Scotland. 
STATUTORY SCHEMES FOR THE RECOGNITION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
Apart from the common-law method of obtaining a decree conform, a 
foreign judgment may be enforced in Scotland by compliance with those 
statutory procedures which facilitate the registration and subsequent 
enforcement of a foreign judgment as though it were a Scottish judgment. 
The two most important statutes are the Administration of Justice Act 
1920 and the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933. The 
former applies only to Commonwealth countries whereas the latter applies 
also to judgments of courts in politically foreign countries. Both Acts are 
dependent upon reciprocity. 
Administration of Justice Act 1920
Part II of the Administration of Justice Act 1920 provides for the enforce-
ment within Scotland, and other parts of the United Kingdom, of certain 
judgments of the superior courts of Commonwealth countries which make 
reciprocal provisions for the enforcement of the judgments emanating from 
the corresponding courts of the United Kingdom. The Act applies only to 
countries specified by Orders in Council and, while no new countries may 
now be specified, the extant provisions remain in force (ss 13 and 14). The 
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1920 Act applies only to judgments or orders made by a superior court in 
civil proceedings whereby a sum of money is made payable (s 12(1)). Such 
a judgment may be enforced in Scotland on application to the Court of 
Session, with the Scottish court retaining a discretion to register and enforce 
the foreign judgment only if it thinks it just and convenient to do so (s 9(1)). 
A foreign judgment may not be registered if the original court acted 
without jurisdiction (s 9(2)(a)); the defender, being a person who was 
neither carrying on business nor ordinarily resident within the jurisdiction 
of the original court, did not voluntarily appear or otherwise submit or 
agree to submit to the jurisdiction of that court (s 9(2)(b)); or the defender 
was not duly served with the process of the original court and did not 
appear, notwithstanding that he was ordinarily resident or was carrying 
on business within the jurisdiction of that court or agreed to submit to 
the jurisdiction of that court (s 9(2)(c)). An external judgment that other-
wise comes within the terms of the 1920 Act may also be refused recogni-
tion and enforcement if it was obtained by fraud (s 9(2)(d)); if an appeal is 
pending, or the defender is entitled and intends to appeal (s 9(2)(e)); or if it 
is contrary to public policy (s 9(2)(f )).
When the foreign judgment is registered it will then be enforced as a 
decree of the Court of Session, with the same force and effect as if it had 
been a judgment originally obtained in that court (s 9(3)(a)). The court shall 
have the same control and jurisdiction over the judgment as it has over 
similar judgments given by itself, but only in so far as relates to execution 
(s 9(3)(b)).
Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933
The 1933 Act provides further provision for the enforcement within the 
United Kingdom of the judgments of the courts of foreign countries, 
including, but not limited to, those of the Commonwealth. Whereas the 
1920 Act applies only to the judgments of superior courts, the 1933 Act 
makes reciprocal enforcement of the judgments of any recognised court 
within a foreign country, with both the country and the recognised court, 
or courts, specified by Orders in Council. Such an Order will be made only 
after the Crown is satisfied that substantial reciprocity of treatment will be 
assured as regards the enforcement in that country of similar judgments 
given in similar courts of the United Kingdom (s 1). The 1933 Act remains 
applicable to states party to the Brussels I Regulation and the 2007 Lugano 
Convention in relation to matters to which the Regulation and Conven-
tion do not apply. 
Following registration under the 1933 Act, a foreign judgment will be 
enforced in Scotland as if it were a Court of Session decree. Before registra-
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tion will be permitted the judgment must be either final and conclusive or 
require the judgment debtor to make an interim payment to the judgment 
creditor. A judgment is considered final and conclusive notwithstanding 
that it may be subject to appeal or that an appeal is pending against it 
(s  1(3)). In addition, the judgment must require the payment of a sum of 
money, not being a sum payable in respect of taxes or other charges of a 
like nature, or in respect of a fine or other penalty (s 1(2)). A judgment from 
a recognised court will not be enforced where it is given on appeal from a 
court which is not a recognised court or if its purpose was for the enforce-
ment of a judgment given in a third country (s 1(2A)).
Section 4(1)(a) contains grounds upon which a registration shall be set 
aside, including: where the court of origin had no jurisdiction; the defender 
did not receive notice of those proceedings in sufficient time to enable him 
to defend the proceedings and did not appear; the judgment was obtained 
by fraud; or the enforcement of the judgment would be contrary to public 
policy in the country of the registering court. As regards jurisdiction, s 4(2) 
and s 4(3) detail when a foreign court will, and will not, be deemed to have 
had jurisdiction. A foreign judgment to which the 1933 Act applies may 
not be enforced except by way of registration under the Act (s 6). Unlike 
the position under the 1920 Act, where registration is discretionary, regis-
tration under the 1933 Act is a matter of right, provided that the judgment 
has not been wholly satisfied or it could not be enforced by execution in 
the country of the original court (s 2(1)).
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS UNDER 
THE BRUSSELS I REGULATION AND THE 2007 LUGANO 
CONVENTION
The jurisdictional provisions of the Brussels I Regulation were discussed in 
Chapter 3. The requirement of all Member States to adopt uniform grounds 
of jurisdiction under the Regulation is reflected in the permissiveness of 
the rules of recognition and enforcement contained in Arts 32–56 which 
are designed to ensure that a judgment given in one Member State will 
move freely throughout the European Union. The principle on which the 
Regulation is based is the desire to minimise the obstacles to the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments issued from the courts of Member States, 
notably by restricting the ability of the court of a Member State in which 
enforcement is sought to review the jurisdiction of the court of origin. The 
same principle underpins the 2007 Lugano Convention, the text of which 
is aligned with that of the Brussels I Regulation, meaning that what is said 
below regarding the latter instrument applies mutatis mutandis to the former. 
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The recognition and enforcement rules of the Regulation apply only 
to judgments of Member States within the scope of the Regulation as 
defined in Art 1. The Regulation applies to any species of judgment, not 
only money judgments, including interim orders as well as final orders. 
Unlike the position under the Acts of 1920 and 1933, there is no restric-
tion of the provisions to  the judgments of certain courts and Art 1(1) states 
that the Regulation applies whatever the nature of the court or tribunal. 
The enforcement procedure under the Regulation applies to all judgments 
within its scope, whether or not they are against persons domiciled in a 
Member State and whether or not the court of origin assumed jurisdiction 
on a ground set out in the Regulation or on a residual ground of jurisdic-
tion found in its national law. In light of this, Art 59 of the 1968 Brussels 
Convention permitted Contracting States to enter a binding agreement 
with a non-Contracting State to the effect that it would not recognise 
judgments given in other Contracting States against defendants domiciled 
or habitually resident in that non-Contracting State when the court of 
origin based its jurisdiction on a residual ground. The effect of such agree-
ments is preserved under the Regulation, but no new agreements may be 
made (Art 72).
Recognition
Article 33(1) of the Regulation provides that a judgment given in a Member 
State shall be recognised in the other Member States without any special 
procedure being required. Articles 34 and 35 provide limited grounds for 
the refusal of recognition. Article 34(1) provides that a judgment shall not 
be recognised if such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy 
in the Member State in which recognition is sought. Recourse to public 
policy will be permitted only in exceptional circumstances where recogni-
tion would be at variance to an unacceptable degree with the legal order of 
the Member State in which enforcement is sought in as much as it infringes 
a fundamental principle of that state (Bamberski v Krombach (2001)). The 
world “manifestly” did not appear in the 1968 Brussels Convention but 
was included in the Regulation to emphasise the exceptional nature of the 
circumstances justifying refusal under this ground. The court in which 
recognition is sought may not review the merits of the judgment (Art 36), 
nor apply the test of public policy to the grounds of jurisdiction relied on 
by the court of origin (Art 35(3)).
Article 34(2) provides that a judgment shall not be recognised where it 
was given in default of appearance, if the defendant was not served with the 
document which instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent docu-
ment in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for 
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his defence, unless the defendant failed to commence proceedings to chal-
lenge the judgment when it was possible for him to do so. Article 34(3) and 
(4) permit non-recognition of a judgment when it is irreconcilable with a 
judgment given in a dispute between the same parties in the Member State 
in which recognition is sought or when it is irreconcilable with an earlier 
judgment given in another Member State or in a third State involving the 
same cause of action and between the same parties, provided that the earlier 
judgment fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition in the Member 
State addressed.
Article 35(1) requires Member States to refuse to recognise a judg-
ment which conflicts with the mandatory provisions applicable in matters 
relating to insurance consumer contracts, or the grounds of exclusive juris-
diction discussed in the previous chapter. However, even in these circum-
stances, the court in which recognition is sought will still be bound by the 
findings of fact on which the court of origin based its jurisdiction.
Enforcement
A judgment given in a Member State and enforceable in that state shall 
be enforced in Scotland when, on the application of any interested party, 
it has been registered for enforcement (Art 38). This terminology differs 
slightly from the general requirement applicable to all other Member States 
that a judgment will be enforceable once it has been “declared enforceable” 
(known as the exequatur procedure). There is no equivalent of a declaration 
of enforceability in the United Kingdom, so reference is made instead to 
the judgment being “registered for enforcement”.
Registration of the judgment is a prerequisite to enforcement but the 
procedure of registration is essentially of an administrative nature, with the 
party against whom enforcement is sought not being entitled to be heard 
at this stage of the proceedings (Art 41). This party does not even have the 
right to be informed of the application for registration, with such absence 
of notice being deliberate in order to preserve the element of surprise and 
prevent the removal of assets from the Member State in which enforce-
ment is sought. Once registered, the judgment will have the same force 
and effect as if it had originally been given by the registering court, with 
enforcement powers and proceedings available on that basis. Articles 43–46 
detail the circumstances in which an appeal can be made against a declara-
tion of enforceability, with Art 45 providing that a court considering an 
appeal may set aside registration only on one of the grounds specified in 
Arts 34 and 35 (discussed above in the context of recognition).
One of the key changes to be introduced under the recast  Regulation is the 
abolition of exequatur as a necessary prior step to enforcement.  Accordingly, 
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under the recast Regulation a judgment given in one Member State will 
be recognised in all other Member States without any specific procedure 
and, if enforceable in the Member State of origin, will be enforceable in the 
other Member States without any declaration of enforceability (registra-
tion for enforcement in the United Kingdom) being required. This move 
follows similar developments in other areas in which the European Union 
has passed specialist measures to facilitate enforcement without exequatur in 
relation to uncontested claims (Regulation 805/2004);  a special European 
order for payment procedure (Regulation 1896/2006); and a European 
small claims procedure (Regulation 861/2007).
RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT WITHIN THE UNITED KINGDOM
Sections 18 and 19 of and Schs 6 and 7 to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judg-
ments Act 1982 provide for the enforcement in one part of the United 
Kingdom of a judgment emanating from another part thereof where that 
judgment falls within the ambit of ss 18 and 19. Schedule 6 applies to 
money provisions while Sch 7 applies to non-money provisions. Enforce-
ment is by means of registration, in the court in which enforcement is 
sought, of a certificate granted by the court of origin. Registration is in the 
Court of Session only, even if the court of origin was an inferior court. 
Registration under either Schedule shall be set aside if the registration was 
contrary to the provisions of the applicable Schedule, and may be set aside 
if the registering court is satisfied that the matter in dispute had previously 
been the subject of a judgment by another court having jurisdiction in the 
matter (Sch 6, para 10; Sch 7, para 9).
Essential Facts
• The rules applicable to the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
decrees are determined by the geographical location of the court of 
origin.
• Enforcement via the common law will occur only if the foreign 
court is considered to have had jurisdiction over the action to which 
the judgment relates. Jurisdiction is determined on an international, 
rather than a domestic, basis.
• A statutory scheme for the reciprocal recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments exists under the Administration of Justice Act 
1920 and the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933.
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• The Brussels I Regulation provides permissive rules of recognition 
and enforcement in order to facilitate the free movement of judg-
ments between Member States. Equivalent provisions are included 
in the 2007 Lugano Convention.
• The reciprocal enforcement of judgments between the different 
parts of the United Kingdom is governed by the Civil Jurisdiction 
and Judgments Act 1982, ss 18 and 19 and Schs 6 and 7. 
Essential Cases
Adams v Cape Industries Plc (1990): temporary physical presence 
is considered an acceptable basis of jurisdiction under the common 
law.
Nouvion v Freeman (1889): before a foreign judgment will be 
recognised and enforced under the common law it must be final and 
unalterable in the court of origin.
Bamberski v Krombach (2001): recourse to the public policy 
exception of the Brussels I Regulation is permitted only when 
recognition would be at variance to an unacceptable degree with 
the legal order of the Member State in which enforcement is sought 
in as much as it infringes a fundamental principle of that state.
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5 CHOICE OF LAW IN CONTRACT
The rules applicable to choice of law in contract are now found in Regula-
tion (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations, commonly 
referred to as the “Rome I Regulation”. This Regulation completely 
replaces the earlier Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contrac-
tual Obligations 1980, commonly referred to as the “1980 Rome Conven-
tion” and brought into force in the United Kingdom by the Contracts 
(Applicable Law) Act 1990. The 1980 Rome Convention came into 
effect in the United Kingdom on 1 April 1991 and applied to contracts 
concluded between that date and 16 December 2009. The Rome I Regu-
lation applies to contracts concluded as from 17 December 2009. Thus, 
although replaced as from 17 December 2009, the 1980 Rome Conven-
tion will continue to be relevant for the foreseeable future, as its provisions 
remain applicable to disputes relating to contracts concluded before that 
date. This chapter will primarily consider the provisions of the Regulation 
but reference will be made to the terms of the Convention as and when 
appropriate. The common law remains applicable to the small number of 
contracts concluded before 1 April 1991 and to contracts concluded after 
that date but which fall outside the scope of the Convention or the Regu-
lation. The limited relevance of these common-law rules means that they 
will not be considered in this chapter.
SCOPE
The scope of the Rome I Regulation is stated positively in Art 1(1) in that 
it shall apply, in situations involving a conflict of laws, to contractual obli-
gations in civil and commercial matters. Although the equivalent article 
of the 1980 Rome Convention uses a slightly different formulation, there 
would appear to be no material difference in the two provisions. In order 
to ensure consistency, the term “civil and commercial matters” is to be 
interpreted in the same way as under the Brussels I Regulation. The term 
“contractual obligations” is left undefined and the question as to whether 
or not an obligation is considered to be a contractual one will be regarded 
as a matter to be decided by the European Court as a matter of EU law. 
Article 1(1) also limits the scope of the Regulation by stating that it shall 
not apply to revenue, customs or administrative matters. Again, this phrase 
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is to be interpreted consistently with the identical wording found in the 
Brussels I Regulation. The scope of the Regulation is also narrowed by the 
express exclusion of certain matters as detailed in Art 1(2) and (3). Article 
2 states that the law specified by the Regulation shall be applied whether or 
not it is the law of a Member State. Under this principle of universal appli-
cation the Regulation, and the Convention before it, does not discriminate 
in its selection of the applicable law and the law of a non-EU Member State 
will be treated identically to the law of an EU Member State. 
A composite state, such as the United Kingdom, is not required to apply 
the Regulation to internal conflicts between the laws of different territorial 
units within that state (Art 22(2)). However, in the interests of simplicity 
and uniformity of application, the United Kingdom has opted to extend 
the rules of the Regulation to intra-UK conflicts (for Scotland, see the 
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Scotland) Regulations 2009 
(SSI 2009/410)).
APPLICABLE LAW BY CHOICE
Recital (11) of the Rome I Regulation states that “The parties’ freedom to 
choose the applicable law should be one of the cornerstones of the system 
of conflict-of-law rules in matters of contractual obligations”. The priority 
of party autonomy is embodied in Art 3(1) which states that “A contract 
shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. The choice shall be 
made expressly or clearly demonstrated by the terms of the contract or 
the circumstances of the case”. It is important to note that, whether a 
governing law is chosen by express provision or by implication, parties 
are completely free to choose this law and there is no requirement that the 
law have some extant connection to the parties or the contract, ie parties 
are free to choose a wholly neutral law, otherwise entirely unconnected to 
their circumstances.
Express choice
Parties can choose expressly the law to govern their contract via the inclu-
sion of a clause in the contract stating that the contract is to be governed 
by the law of a particular country. Choice of the governing law is limited 
to the law of a country. In the context of composite states, each territorial 
unit thereof will be considered as a country for purposes of identifying the 
applicable law (Art 22(1)). Parties may not choose a religious law, such as 
Sharia law, to govern their contract (Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd v Shamil 
Bank of Bahrain EC (2003)).
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Implied choice
In many cases a contract may not include an express choice of law but it 
is nevertheless clear that the parties assumed or intended that the law of a 
particular country would govern their contract. Such an implied choice will 
be respected if the choice can be “clearly demonstrated by the terms of the 
contract or the circumstances of the case”. Under the equivalent provision 
of the Convention it is stated that the choice must be “demonstrated with 
reasonable certainty”. Although not express, a choice of a particular law 
must be just that – a choice – and a court is not permitted to infer a choice 
of law that it believes the parties would have chosen, had they applied their 
minds to the question.
Guidance as to the factors relevant in determining whether the parties have 
made an implied choice of law is given in the Report on the Convention on 
the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations by Professors Mario Giuliano 
and Paul Lagarde, commonly referred to as the Giuliano–Lagarde Report. 
This guidance is non-exhaustive but refers to issues such as  reliance on a 
standard form governed by a particular system of law, a previous course of 
dealing between the parties under contracts that were governed by an express 
choice of law, an express choice of law made in related transactions between 
the parties, or the choice of a place where disputes are to be settled by arbitra-
tion (p 16). For example, in the case of Egon Oldendorff v Libera Corp (No 2) 
(1996) it was held, relying on the terms of the Giuliano–Lagarde Report, that 
where an international contract between a German company and a Japanese 
company expressly provided for arbitration in London and was governed by 
a well-known English standard form of charterparty that, in the absence of 
an express choice of law, the parties had impliedly chosen English law.
In its identification of those factors relevant in determining an implied 
choice of law, the Giuliano–Lagarde Report also states that the choice 
of a particular forum may show in no uncertain manner that the parties 
intended the contract to be governed by the law of that forum, subject to 
the other terms of the contract and all the circumstances of the case. During 
the drafting of the Rome I Regulation it was proposed by the Commission 
that a presumption should be introduced to the effect that if the parties 
had chosen the courts of a Member State to govern any disputes arising 
out of the contract they would be presumed to have chosen the law of that 
Member State as the governing law. This proposal was not accepted but 
in Recital (12) to the Regulation it is stated that “An agreement between 
the parties to confer on one or more courts or tribunals of a Member State 
exclusive jurisdiction to determine disputes under the contract should be 
one of the factors to be taken into account in determining whether a choice 
of law has been clearly demonstrated”.
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Division of or change in the governing law
The last sentence of Art 3(1) provides that “By their choice the parties can 
select the law applicable to the whole or to part only of the contract”. This 
allows dépeçage – a splitting of the applicable law. This choice is limited by 
the fact that it must be logically consistent in that each separate choice of 
law must relate to a part of a contract which is capable of being governed 
by a different law without giving rise to contradictions. If inconsistency 
does occur then there is no effective choice by the parties and reference 
must be made to the terms of Art 4 in order to identify the applicable law. 
Parties may at any time change the governing law of the contract, either 
by altering a previously agreed choice or by making a choice where previ-
ously they had not done so (Art 3(2)). Any change in the applicable law that 
is made after the conclusion of the contract shall not prejudice its formal 
validity or adversely affect the rights of third parties.
Freedom of choice and mandatory rules
The freedom of choice given to parties under Art 3(1) to choose the law 
applicable to their contract is not absolute and, instead, Art 3(3) operates 
to prevent parties from evading the mandatory rules of the system of law 
with which the contract and the parties are otherwise wholly connected. 
Article 3(3) thus states that “Where all other elements relevant to the situ-
ation at the time of the choice are located in a country other than the 
country whose law has been chosen, the choice of the parties shall not 
prejudice the application of provisions of the law of that other country 
which cannot be derogated from by agreement”. For example, if all 
elements relevant to the situation are located in Scotland, the parties will 
be unable to avoid the mandatory rules of Scots law by agreeing that the 
law of France is to govern the contract. While this choice will be respected 
and French law will indeed be the governing law it will be applied subject 
to the mandatory rules of Scots law. Article 3(3) applies only when all 
elements relevant to the situation are located in a single country other 
than the country chosen. If an element can be located elsewhere then 
Art  3(3) has no application. For the purposes of Art 3(3), the choice of law 
clause itself and, if present, a “choice of court” clause, are not elements 
relevant to the situation. In Emeraldian Ltd Partnership v Wellmix Shipping 
Ltd (2010), a case decided under Art 3(3) of the 1980 Rome Convention 
which contains slightly different wording but is ultimately of the same 
effect, a choice of English law under a contract with very strong connec-
tions to China was not subject to the mandatory rules of the latter, as the 
beneficiary of the contract in issue was a Liberian company.
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Similar to Art 3(3), Art 3(4) operates to prevent parties avoiding an 
otherwise applicable mandatory rule of Union law through choosing the 
law of a third state by providing that “Where all other elements relevant to 
the situation at the time of the choice are located in one or more Member 
States, the parties’ choice of applicable law other than that of a Member 
State shall not prejudice the application of provisions of Community law, 
where appropriate as implemented in the Member State of the forum, 
which cannot be derogated from by agreement”. It is important to note 
the wider scope of Art 3(4) in that it applies even when the elements may 
be located in different countries, as long as those countries are all Member 
States and the choice is of the law of a third state. 
APPLICABLE LAW IN THE ABSENCE OF CHOICE 
The Convention
Article 4 of both the Convention and the Regulation determines the law 
applicable to a contract in the absence of a choice by the parties. Unlike 
the position with Art 3, there is a significant divergence between Art 4 of 
the Convention and its counterpart in the Regulation, meaning that the 
provisions of each instrument must be considered separately. Article 4(1) 
of the Convention states that “To the extent that the law applicable to the 
contract has not been chosen in accordance with Article 3, the contract 
shall be governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely 
connected”. A second sentence provides for the application of dépeçage. 
Characteristic performance
Article 4(2) attempts to make the identification of the law of the country 
to which the contract is most closely connected more certain by providing 
that
“Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Article, it shall be 
presumed that the contract is most closely connected with the country 
where the party who is to effect the performance which is character-
istic of the contract has, at the time of conclusion of the contract, his 
habitual residence, or, in the case of a body corporate or unincorpo-
rate, its central administration. However, if the contract is entered 
into in the course of that party’s trade or profession, that country 
shall be the country in which the principal place of business is situated 
or, where under the terms of the contract the performance is to be 
effected through a place of business other than the principal place of 
business, the country in which that other place of business is situated”.
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Article 4(3) provides a special presumption applicable when the subject-
matter of the contract is a right in immovable property or a right to use 
immovable property; while Art 4(4) supplies a special presumption appli-
cable when the contract is for the carriage of goods.
The “performance which is characteristic of the contract” presents little 
difficulty in the case of unilateral contracts under which the characteristic 
performance should be clear. In bilateral contracts whereby the parties 
undertake mutual reciprocal performance, with the counter-performance 
of one of the parties usually being in the form of a payment of money, it 
is the performance for which this payment is due, and not the payment 
itself, which usually constitutes the characteristic performance (for exam-
ples of which, see the Giuliano–Lagarde Report, p 20). Thus, in the most 
common examples of a contract for the sale of goods or the provision 
of services, the characteristic performance will be the provision of these 
goods or services. The identification of the characteristic performance will 
be more difficult, if not impossible, when a complex contract is at issue 
and recourse may have to be made to Art 4(5), under which the presump-
tion of Art 4(2) will not apply and attention will return to Art 4(1) and 
the identification of the country with which the contract is most closely 
connected 
The party who is to effect the characteristic performance
Once the characteristic performance is identified this performance must 
be connected to a particular country. The Convention achieves this by 
anchoring the characteristic performance in the country to which the party 
who is to effect this performance is connected. Thus, in a contract for the 
sale of goods this party will be the seller and in a contract for the provision 
of services this party will be the service provider. If this party was acting 
in the course of his trade or profession then it is to be presumed that the 
country with which the contract is most closely connected is the country 
in which the principal place of business is situated or, where, under the 
terms of the contract, the performance is to be effected through a place of 
business other than the principal place of business, the country in which 
that other place of business is situated. If the party to effect the charac-
teristic performance was not acting in the course of his trade or profes-
sion then it is to be presumed that the country with which the contract is 
most closely connected is that in which, at the time of the conclusion of 
the contract, he had his habitual residence or, where that party is a body 
 corporate or unincorporate, its central administration.
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Disregarding the presumption
Article 4(2) of the Convention applies subject to Art 4(5) which states that 
“Paragraph 2 shall not apply if the characteristic performance cannot be 
determined, and the presumptions in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 shall be disre-
garded if it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract 
is more closely connected with another country”. Accordingly, the 
Art  4(2) presumption of closest connection will not apply where either 
the  characteristic performance cannot be determined or, even if the char-
acteristic performance can be determined, the law thereby identified shall 
be disregarded if it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the 
contract is more closely connected with another country (this ability to 
disregard the identified law also applies to the presumptions contained in 
Art 4(3) and  (4)).
Difficulties have arisen as to the identification of the circumstances in 
which it is appropriate to depart from the law identified under the presump-
tion in favour of the law that is considered to be more closely connected 
to the contract. The leading Scots case on this issue is Caledonia Subsea 
Ltd v Micoperi Srl (2003), a case in which the business of the characteristic 
performer was situated in Scotland but the contract was to be performed 
in Egypt. It was held that Art 4(2) intended to accord a special significance 
to the place of business of the principal performer as the indicator of the 
country with which the contract had the closest connection, moving away 
from emphasising the place of performance, and that the presumption 
should not be disregarded unless, exceptionally, there was a clear prepon-
derance of factors showing a closer connection with another country. Such 
a “clear preponderance of factors” did not exist in the present case and 
the presumption remained operative in order to identify Scots law as the 
applicable law.
In the English case of Definitely Maybe (Touring) Ltd v Marek Lieberberg 
Konzertagentur GmbH (No 2) (2001), the party effecting the characteristic 
performance of the contract had its principal place of business in England, 
with that performance being the provision of the English pop group, 
Oasis, to play two concerts in Germany. Thus, under the Art 4(2) presump-
tion, the applicable law was identified as the law of England. However, 
it was held that the obligations of the other party to arrange and market 
the concerts had arisen in Germany, the country in which the concerts 
had taken place, and, in light of these facts, the country with which the 
contract was most closely connected for the purpose of Art 4(5) was actu-
ally Germany. In Intercontainer Interfrigo SC (ICF) v Balkenende Oosthuizen 
BV (2010), the Grand Chamber of the European Court held, when consid-
ering the operation of Art 4(5) to displace the presumption applicable to 
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a contract for the carriage of goods under Art 4(4), that when it was clear 
from the circumstances as a whole that the contract was “more closely 
connected” with a country other than that determined on the basis one of 
the Art 4 presumptions, it was for the court to disregard that presumption 
and apply the law of the country with which the contract was most closely 
connected.
The Regulation
Article 4(1) of the Rome I Regulation contains much more precise and 
detailed rules in cases where the parties have not chosen the applicable law. 
In the two most common types of contracts, for the sale of goods and the 
provision of services, Art 4(1) takes the presumption under Art 4(2) of the 
Convention that the country most closely connected thereto will be that of 
the seller/service provider and turns this into a fixed rule. Thus, under the 
Regulation, a contract for the sale of goods shall be governed by the law 
of the country where the seller has his habitual residence (Art  4(1)(a)) and 
a contract for the provision of services shall be governed by the law of the 
country where the service provider has his habitual residence (Art 4(1) (b)). 
Article 19 provides clarity as to what is considered to be the habitual resi-
dence of both natural persons and companies and other bodies, corporate 
or incorporated. Articles 4(1)(c)–(h) provide rules for other specific types 
of contract.
Article 4(2) provides guidance as to the applicable law in circumstances 
where the contract is not covered by any of the Art 4(1) rules or, alterna-
tively, the contract has elements that fall within more than one limb of 
Art 4(1). In such cases the contract shall be governed by the law of the 
country where the party required to effect the characteristic performance 
of the contract has his habitual residence. It is essential to the operation of 
Art 4(2) that, regardless of the fact that the contract either is not covered 
by any of the Art 4(1) rules, or is covered by more than one of these rules, 
the characteristic performance of the contract must be identifiable. If the 
characteristic performance cannot be identified then Art 4(2) will not apply 
and recourse must be had to Art 4(4).
Article 4(3) is the equivalent of Art 4(5) of the Convention in stating that 
“Where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the contract is 
manifestly more closely connected with a country other than that indicated 
in paragraphs 1 or 2, the law of that other country shall apply”. The addition 
of the word “manifestly” is a deliberate attempt to ensure that the Art  4(3) 
exception will only be applicable in exceptional circumstances where a 
country other than that indicated under Art 4(1) or (2) is significantly more 
closely connected to the contract. The mere fact that the contract is to be 
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performed in a place other than that identified under Art 4(1) or (2) will 
not, by itself, be sufficient to satisfy the“manifestly more closely connected” 
test. Recital (20) of the Regulation indicates that in deciding whether a 
contract is manifestly more closely connected with a country other than 
that indicated, account should be taken of, inter alia,  whether the contract 
in question has a very close relationship with another contract or contracts. 
Article 4(4) provides that where the law applicable cannot be deter-
mined under Art 4(1) or (2), the contract shall be governed by the law of 
the country with which it is most closely connected. This provision will 
apply only when the contract does not fall within one of the specific rules 
of Art 4(1), or falls within more than one of these rules with there being a 
lack of harmony as to the law identified under each separate rule, and no 
characteristic performance can be identified for the purposes of Art 4(2). 
As with Art 4(3), Recital (21) of the Regulation indicates that one relevant 
factor in determining the country with which the contract is most closely 
connected is whether the contract in question has a very close relationship 
with another contract or contracts. 
SPECIFIC CONTRACTS
The Rome I Regulation provides bespoke provisions for the identification 
of the applicable law in relation to contracts of carriage (Art 5); consumer 
contracts (Art 6); insurance contracts (Art 7); and individual employ-
ment contracts (Art 8). The justification for these specific provisions is to 
be found in Recital (23) in which it is explained that where contracts are 
concluded with parties regarded as being weaker, those parties should be 
protected by conflict of law rules that are more favourable to their interests 
than the general rules.
Contracts of carriage
Article 4(4) of the 1980 Rome Convention provides a specific presump-
tion applicable to contracts for the carriage of goods. A similar provision is 
to be found in Art 5 of the Regulation, which also regulates contracts for 
the carriage of passengers. As regards contracts for the carriage of goods, 
Art 5(1) of the Regulation provides that, in the absence of choice, the law 
applicable to such contracts shall be the law of the carrier’s habitual resi-
dence, provided that the place of receipt, place of delivery, or the habitual 
residence of the consignor is also situated in that country. Failing this, the 
applicable law will be the law of the agreed place of delivery. 
In the absence of choice, the law applicable to a contract for the carriage 
of passengers shall be the law of the country where the passenger has 
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his habitual residence, provided that either the place of departure or the 
place of destination is situated in that country. Failing this, the law of the 
country where the carrier has his habitual residence shall apply. While this 
provision applies only in the absence of choice, it is important to note that 
parties do not have complete freedom of choice, with any choice of appli-
cable law limited to those laws specified in Art 5(2). 
Article 5(3) provides that, where no choice has been made by the parties 
and it is clear from the circumstances of the case that the contract is mani-
festly more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in 
Art 5(1) or (2), the law of that other country shall apply.
Consumer contracts
Article 5 of the Convention applies to certain consumer contracts (Art 5(1)) 
when such a contract is entered into in any of the circumstances described 
in Art 5(2). In such circumstances the consumer would be protected in one 
of two ways. First, where the parties have agreed an applicable law, that 
choice would remain as the underlying law of the contract but this choice 
would not deprive the consumer of the protection of the mandatory rules 
of the law of the country in which he has his habitual residence (Art 5(2)). 
Second, where the parties do not agree an applicable law, the presumptions 
and rules of Art 4 will be displaced in favour of the law of the country in 
which the consumer has his habitual residence.
These special protective rules were revised in the Rome I Regulation 
and are now found in Art 6. Article 6(1) defines the type of consumer 
contracts to which its provisions apply, namely contracts concluded by a 
natural person for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his 
trade or profession (the consumer) with another person acting in the exer-
cise of his trade or profession (the professional). As with the protective 
jurisdictional provisions of the Brussels I Regulation, if the contract has 
a dual purpose in that it is entered into partly for private purposes and 
partly for professional or trade purposes then it will not be a consumer 
contract unless the business use element is negligible (Gruber v Bay Wa AG 
(2006)). If a contract does come within the terms of Art 6(1) it will be 
governed by the law of the country where the consumer has his habitual 
residence, provided that the professional pursues his commercial or profes-
sional activities in the country where the consumer has his habitual resi-
dence or, by any means, directs such activities to that country or to several 
countries including that country, and the contract falls within the scope of 
such activities. The meaning of “directs such activities” is to be interpreted 
consistently with the Brussels I Regulation so that the mere accessibility 
of the professional’s website in the country where the consumer has his 
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habitual residence does not, by itself, constitute the directing of activities. 
Article 6(2) preserves party autonomy by allowing parties to choose 
the law applicable to a contract which fulfils the requirements of Art 6(1) 
but this choice is limited in that it may not have the result of depriving 
the consumer of the protection afforded to him by provisions that cannot 
be derogated from by agreement by virtue of the law of the consumer’s 
habitual residence. In other words, a choice of law will be effective but it 
will be subject to the non-derogable provisions of the law of the habitual 
residence of the consumer. Article 6(4) specifies a number of contracts to 
which Art 6(1) and (2) do not apply.
Insurance contracts
Insurance contracts were not the subject of special coverage under the 
Rome Convention, with the rules thereof only applicable to contracts of 
insurance where the risk is situated outside the Member States of the EU 
(Art 1(3)). The Convention did, however, apply to all contracts of reinsur-
ance (Art 1(4)). In contrast, Art 7 of the Rome I Regulation does provide 
specific treatment of insurance contracts.
Article 7 applies to insurance contracts covering a “large risk” (as defined 
in Art 7(2)), whether or not the risk covered is situated in a Member State, 
and to all other insurance contracts covering risks inside the territory of 
a Member State. Contracts of reinsurance do not come within the terms 
of these bespoke provisions. An insurance contract covering a large risk is 
governed by the law chosen by the parties in accordance with Art 3. If the 
parties have not chosen the applicable law then the insurance contract will 
be governed by the law of the country where the insurer has his habitual 
residence. However, where it is clear from all the circumstances of the 
case that the contract is manifestly more closely connected with another 
country, the law of that other country shall apply (Art 7(2)). This is the 
same result as would be achieved if the general rules in Arts 3 and 4 were 
applicable.
In the case of an insurance contract other than a contract covering a 
large risk, in order to provide protection for the policy holder the ability 
of the parties to choose the applicable law is restricted to only those laws 
identified in Art 7(3). However, where the law chosen is either the law of 
any Member State where the risk is situated at the time of conclusion of the 
contract (Art 7(3)(a)); or the law of the country where the policy holder has 
his habitual residence (Art 7(3)(b)); or in a business-to-business insurance 
contract, where the risks insured against relates to activities in more than 
one Member State, the law of any of those States (Art 7(3)(e)), if the law 
of that Member State permits wider part autonomy then the parties may 
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take advantage of that greater freedom in order to choose an applicable law 
permitted by that law. In the absence of choice, an insurance contract other 
than a contract covering a large risk shall be governed by the law of the 
Member State in which the risk is situated at the time of the conclusion of 
the contract, as defined by Art 7(6). For example, the risk under a contract 
for vehicle insurance is situated in the Member State in which the vehicle is 
registered. Article 7(4) applies where, under the law of a Member State, the 
insurance of a risk is compulsory, while Art 7(5) provides a rule applicable 
when a contract covers risks situated in more than one Member State. 
Individual employment contracts
Article 6 of the Convention and Art 8 of the Regulation provide specific 
rules applicable to individual employment contracts. Although the provi-
sions are not identical, they are very similar and will be interpreted in the 
same way (Koelzsch v Luxembourg (2012)). Under Art 8(1), the default rule 
is that an individual employment contract will be governed by the law 
chosen by the parties. This choice is restrained, however, by the fact that 
such a choice of law may not have the result of depriving the employee of 
the protection afforded to him by provisions that cannot be derogated from 
by agreement under the law that, in the absence of choice, would have been 
applicable elsewhere under Art 8. In other words, while the choice of law 
will be effective, it will be applied subject to the mandatory rules of the 
law which would have been identified under Art 8 in the absence of choice.
Where the law applicable to the individual employment contract has 
not been chosen by the parties, Art 8(2) provides that the contract shall 
be governed by the law of the country in which or, failing that, from 
which the employee habitually carries out his work in performance of 
the contract. The country where the work is habitually carried out shall 
not be deemed to have changed if the employee is temporarily employed 
in another country. If, for whatever reason, the law applicable cannot be 
determined under Art 8(2) then Art 8(3) states that the contract shall be 
governed by the law of the country where the place of business through 
which the employee is engaged is situated. Article 8(4) permits the applica-
tion of the law of a country other than that identified under Art 8(2) or (3) 
when it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is more 
closely connected with that other country.
CONSENT AND MATERIAL VALIDITY
Article 8(1) of the Convention and Art 10(1) of the Regulation provide 
that the existence and validity of a contract, or of any term of a contract, 
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shall be determined by the law which would govern it under the applicable 
instrument if the contract or term were valid. This is sometimes called the 
“putative applicable law”. According to the Giuliano–Lagarde Report, this 
provision was intended to cover all aspects of the formation of the contract 
“other than general validity” (p 28). This phrase is understood to mean that 
the respective article of each instrument is intended to cover any matter 
relating to formation of the contract which is not governed by the other 
provisions of the relevant instrument, ie those issues referred to as matters 
of essential validity under the common law.
Article 10(2) of the Regulation goes on to provide that a party, in order 
to establish that he did not consent, may rely upon the law of the country 
in which he has his habitual residence if it appears from the circumstances 
that it would not be reasonable to determine the effect of his conduct in 
accordance with the law specified in Art 10(1). A similar provision appears 
in Art 8(2) of the Convention but with slightly different wording. The 
reason for the inclusion of this discretionary power is to solve the problem 
that in certain legal systems the silence on the part of the offeree implies 
acceptance (Giuliano–Lagarde Report, p 28). In Egon Oldendorff v Libera 
Corp (1995) Mance J, as he then was, stated that application of Art 8(2) 
of the Convention should adopt a “dispassionate, internationally minded 
approach” (at 70).
FORMAL VALIDITY 
Issues of formal validity are governed by Art 11 of the Regulation which 
is in similar terms to Art 9 of the Convention. “Form” is defined in the 
Giuliano–Lagarde Report as including “every external manifestation 
required on the part of a person expressing the will to be legally bound, 
and in the absence of which such expression of will would not be regarded 
as fully effective” (p 29). Article 11 favours formal validity by identifying a 
number of different laws by which formal validity may be tested, compli-
ance with the requirements of any of which will ensure formal validity. 
The principal rule of Art 11(1) is that a contract concluded between 
persons who, or whose agents, are in the same country at the time of its 
conclusion is formally valid if it satisfies the formal requirements of the 
law which governs it in substance under the Regulation, or of the law of 
the country where it is concluded. Article 11(2) provides that a contract 
concluded between persons who, or whose agents, are in different coun-
tries at the time of its conclusion is formally valid if it satisfies the formal 
requirements of the law which governs it in substance under the Regula-
tion, or of the law of either of the countries where either of the parties or 
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their agent is present at the time of conclusion, or of the law of the country 
where either of the parties had his habitual residence at that time. Article 
11(3) applies to “unilateral acts” intended to have legal effect relating to an 
existing or contemplated contract. Article 11(4) provides that the formal 
validity of consumer contracts shall be governed by the law of the country 
where the consumer has his habitual residence, while Art 11(5) supplies a 
special rule relating to the formal validity of contracts relating to immove-
able property.
CAPACITY
Article 1(2)(a) excludes questions of legal capacity of natural persons from 
the scope of the Regulation but this is stated as being without prejudice to 
Art 13. This article, which is in almost identical terms to the earlier Art 11 
of the Convention, states that “In a contract concluded between persons 
who are in the same country, a natural person who would have capacity 
under the law of that country may invoke his incapacity resulting from the 
law of another country, only if the other party to the contract was aware 
of that incapacity at the time of the conclusion of the contract or was not 
aware thereof as a result of negligence”. This provision is very limited in 
its terms, in particular the fact that it only applies to natural persons and 
only when those persons are contracting in the same country. Less specific 
is the reference simply to an incapacity resulting from the law of “another 
country”, with no further guidance being given as to how this other law 
should be identified.
SCOPE OF THE LAW APPLICABLE
Article 12(1) provides that the applicable law identified by the Regula-
tion shall govern, in particular, matters of interpretation (Art 12(1)(a)); 
performance (Art 12(1)(b)); the consequences of a total or partial breach of 
 obligations (Art 12(1)(c)); the various ways of extinguishing obligations, 
and prescription and limitation of actions (Art 12(1)(d)); and the conse-
quences of nullity of contract (Art 12(1)(e)). The terms of Art 12(1) are 
almost identical to the equivalent Art 10(1) of the Convention. Article 
12(2) (Art 10(2) of the Convention) goes on to state that in relation to the 
manner of performance and the steps to be taken in the event of defec-
tive performance, regard shall be had to the law of the country in which 
performance takes place.
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RESTRICTIONS ON THE APPLICABLE LAW
Overriding mandatory provisions
Overriding mandatory provisions are provisions the respect for which is 
regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests, such as 
its political, social or economic organisation, to such an extent that they are 
applicable to any situation falling within their scope, irrespective of the law 
otherwise applicable to the contract under the Regulation (Art 9(1)). This 
definition did not appear in the Convention but the concept of overriding 
mandatory provisions is the same in both instruments in that they are provi-
sions that a legal system considers so important that they should be applied 
regardless of what the applicable law is under its private international law 
rules. Unlike the mandatory provisions considered earlier under Art 3(3) 
and (4), overriding mandatory provisions will apply both when the parties 
have made a choice as to the applicable law and also when the applicable 
law has been determined under the Regulation in the absence of choice.
Article 9(2) of the Regulation provides that “Nothing in this Regula-
tion shall restrict the application of the overriding mandatory provisions 
of the law of the forum”. The same effect, although worded differently, is 
achieved by Art 7(2) of the Convention. This means that the forum is free 
to apply the overriding mandatory provisions of its own law no matter 
what law is otherwise applicable to the contract. Examples of such over-
riding mandatory provisions in the United Kingdom can be found in the 
Employment Rights Act 1996, s 204(1), and the Unfair Contract Terms 
Act 1977, s 27(2).
Article 9(3) provides that effect may be given to the overriding manda-
tory provisions of the law of the country where the obligations arising 
out of the contract have to be or have been performed, insofar as those 
overriding mandatory provisions render the performance of the contract 
unlawful. The equivalent provision of the Convention, Art 7(1), was 
worded differently in that it was much broader in its scope in referring to 
the law of “another country” with which the situation has a “close connec-
tion”. It was not given effect to in the United Kingdom and a number 
of other Member States. The provision of the Regulation is much more 
specific than its predecessor in that it is limited to the rules of the country 
of performance and only to those rules which make performance illegal. 
Further, even if these requirements are met, the decision to apply Art 9(3) 
remains a discretionary one (“effect may be given”). In deciding whether to 
exercise this discretion, Art 9(3) provides some guidance in instructing that 
regard shall be had to the nature and purpose of the overriding mandatory 
provisions of the place of performance and to the consequences of their 
application or non-application in the case before the court.
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Public policy of the forum
Article 21 of the Regulation provides that “The application of a provi-
sion of the law of any country specified by this Regulation may be refused 
only if such application is manifestly incompatible with the public policy 
(ordre public) of the forum”. This is practically identical to the wording of 
its predecessor in Art 16 of the Convention. For Art 21 to apply it is not 
the foreign provision in general which is opposed but its application in the 
particular case before the court. In Duarte v Black & Decker Corp (2007), 
Art 16 of the Convention was relied on to disregard a restrictive covenant 
governed by the law of Maryland in circumstances where the employee 
was working in England when he entered into the covenant, the job he 
wished to take up was based in England, and the covenant would be unen-
forceable under English law. 
Essential Facts
• The rules applicable to choice of law in contract are governed by 
either the 1980 Rome Convention or the Rome I Regulation. The 
former applies to contracts concluded between 1 April 1991 and 
16 December 2009; the latter to contracts concluded as from 17 
December 2009.
• Article 3 of the Convention permits parties to choose the law appli-
cable to their contract, subject to the mandatory provisions of Art 
3(3) and (4). This choice may be express or implied.
• Article 4(1) of the Convention determines the applicable law in the 
absence of choice by providing that a contract will be governed by 
the law of the country with which it is most closely connected. 
• Article 4(1) of the Regulation provides specific rules to identify the 
applicable law in the absence of choice in relation to different types 
of contracts.
• The applicable law identified under Art 4 of the Convention may be 
disregarded if the contract is more closely connected with another 
country (Art 4(5)). The Regulation requires that the contract be 
manifestly more closely connected with another country (Art  4(3)).
• Special provision is made under the Regulation for contracts of 
carriage (Art 5); consumer contracts (Art 6); insurance contracts 
(Art  7); and individual employment contracts (Art 8).
• Article 9 of the Regulation (Art 7 of the Convention) permits the 
application of the overriding mandatory provisions of both the 
forum and the place of performance notwithstanding the law other-
wise applicable under the Regulation.
DUP_PrivateInternationalLaw5.indd   70 12/09/2014   14:43
CHOICE OF LAW IN CONTRACT 71
Essential Cases
Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd v Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC 
(2004): choice of the governing law is limited to the law of a country.
Emeraldian Ltd Partnership v Wellmix Shipping Ltd (2010): 
Art 3(3) of the Convention applies only when all elements relevant 
to the situation are located in a single country.
Caledonia Subsea Ltd v Micoperi Srl (2003): the Art 4(2) pre -
sumption of the Convention should only be displaced under 
Art  4(5) when there is a clear preponderance of factors showing a 
closer connection with another country.
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6 CHOICE OF LAW IN NON-CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATIONS
The rules applicable to choice of law in non-contractual obligations are 
now found in Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations, commonly referred to as the Rome II Regulation. This Regu-
lation largely, but not entirely, replaces both the traditional common-law 
rules and the statutory regime introduced by the Private International Law 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995. Accordingly, the majority of this 
chapter will consider the provisions of the Rome II Regulation but some 
mention will be made at the end of the chapter of both the common-law 
rules and the provisions of the 1995 Act.
ROME II REGULATION
Scope
The Rome II Regulation applies to events giving rise to damage occur-
ring from 11 January 2009 (Arts  31 and 32, as interpreted by the ECJ 
in Homawoo v GMF Assurances SA (2012)). The Regulation applies in all 
Member States other than Denmark and the use of the term “Member 
State” in the Regulation means any Member State other than Denmark 
(Art 1(4)).
The material scope of the Regulation is stated positively in Art 1(1) 
in that it shall apply, in situations involving a conflict of laws, to non-
contractual obligations in civil and commercial matters. The phrase “civil 
and commercial matters” is to be given the same meaning as under the 
Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation. Whether an obligation 
is considered to be “non-contractual” is to be understood as an autonomous 
concept (Recital (11)). The Regulation only covers certain non-contractual 
obligations, with Art 2(1) stating that, for the purposes of the Regulation, 
“damage” shall cover any consequence arising out of tort/delict, unjust 
enrichment, negotiorum gestio or culpa in contrahendo. The Regulation extends 
to anticipated events in that it applies to non-contractual obligations that 
are likely to arise (Art 2(2)), with any reference to an event giving rise to 
damage including events giving rise to damage that are likely to occur and 
references to damage including damage that is likely to occur (Art 2(3)).
The material scope of the Regulation is also stated negatively in Art 1(1) 
in that it expressly does not apply to revenue, customs or  administrative 
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matters or to the liability of the state for acts and omissions in the exer-
cise of State authority (acta jure imperii). As with the phrase “civil and 
commercial matters”, the reference to “revenue, customs or administrative 
matters” is to be interpreted in the same way across Brussels I, Rome I and 
Rome  II. The exclusion of claims arising out of acta jure imperii includes 
claims against officials who act on behalf of the state and liability for acts of 
public authorities, including liability of publicly appointed office-holders 
(Recital  (9)). The scope of the Regulation is also narrowed by the express 
exclusion of certain matters as detailed in Art 1(2) and (3). All matters 
excluded from the Regulation remain subject to either the common-law 
rules or the rules contained in the Private International Law (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1995.
Article 3 states that the law specified by the Regulation shall be applied 
whether or not it is the law of a Member State. The Rome II Regulation 
thus takes the same approach as the Rome I Regulation in adopting the 
principle of universal application by giving the same treatment to the law 
of a non-EU Member State as it does to the law of an EU Member State. 
A composite state, such as the United Kingdom, is not required to apply 
the Regulation to internal conflicts between the laws of different territorial 
units within that state (Art 25(2)). However, in the interests of simplicity 
and uniformity of application, the United Kingdom has opted to extend 
the rules of the Regulation to intra-UK conflicts (for Scotland, see the Law 
Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (Scotland) Regulations 2008 
(SSI 2008/ 404). 
Applicable law by choice
Under Art 14, the Rome II Regulation implements the principle of 
party autonomy by allowing parties to choose the law applicable to non-
contractual obligations. This is similar in approach to the choice that is 
given to parties to choose the law applicable to contractual obligations 
under the Rome I Regulation but, as non-contractual obligations will not 
normally be contemplated in advance, Art 14(1)(a) permits an agreement 
to be entered into only after the event giving rise to the damage occurred, 
unless all parties are pursuing a commercial activity, in which case an agree-
ment freely negotiated may be entered into before the event giving rise to 
the damage occurred (Art 14(1)(b)). The rationale behind the restriction 
contained in Art 14(1)(a) is a desire to protect a weaker party who may not 
understand the significance of agreeing a choice of law before the damage 
has occurred. This mirrors the protective approach taken to “choice of 
court” agreements in matters relating to insurance, consumer contracts 
and  individual contracts of employment under the Brussels I Regulation. 
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Once the event giving rise to the damage has occurred it is assumed that 
even a weaker party will be able to determine the law applicable under the 
Regulation in the absence of choice and will therefore be able to make an 
informed decision as to which law best suits his interests. In contrast, a party 
pursuing a commercial activity is considered to be in a more informed posi-
tion and therefore cognisant of the consequences of making such a choice 
before the event giving rise to the damage has occurred.
The choice, whether made before or after the event giving rise to 
the damage, must be either expressed or demonstrated with reasonable 
certainty by the circumstances of the case. This language is very similar 
to that found in Art 3(1) of both the 1980 Rome Convention and the 
Rome I Regulation and reference should be made to the discussion related 
to these provisions in the previous chapter. Parties do not benefit from 
complete freedom of choice under the Rome II Regulation, as Arts  6(4) 
and 8(3) provide that a choice of law may not be made in relation to non-
contractual obligations arising out of an act of unfair competition or the 
infringement of intellectual property rights. More generally, the choice 
of the parties is also subject to both the mandatory rules of the country in 
which all the elements relevant to the situation at the time when the event 
giving rise to the damage occurs are located (Art 14(2)), and the mandatory 
rules of Union law where all the elements relevant to the situation at the 
time when the event giving rise to the damage occurs are located in one or 
more of the Member States and the parties have chosen a law other than 
that of a Member State (Art 14(3)). Again, these provisions mirror those 
discussed in the previous chapter in relation to the Rome I Regulation and 
reference should be made thereto.
Torts/delicts: applicable law
Article 4 of the Rome II Regulation contains a general rule applicable to 
torts/delicts. This general rule is then supplemented by a number of addi-
tional rules applicable to specific forms of delictual liability.
Article 4(1): the law of the country in which the damage occurs
Article 4(1) states that:
“Unless otherwise provided for in this Regulation, the law appli-
cable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a tort/delict shall 
be the law of the country in which the damage occurs irrespective of 
the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred 
and irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect 
consequences of that event occur”. 
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This general rule, operative in the absence of choice and also subject to 
the determination of the applicable law elsewhere in the Regulation, thus 
identifies the lex loci damni, the law of the country in which the damage 
occurs, as the applicable law. Accordingly, in cases of personal injury or 
damage to property, the country in which the damage occurs should be 
the country where the injury was sustained or the property was damaged 
respectively. 
The issue of multi-locality delicts was previously considered under the 
Brussels I Regulation where it was seen that the similar phrase in Art 5(3) 
of that instrument of “the place where the harmful event occurred or may 
occur” has been interpreted for jurisdictional purposes to include both the 
place where the damage occurred and the place of the event which gives 
rise to this damage. In contrast, as can clearly be seen from the terms of 
Art 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation, any reference to the law of this latter 
place is not competent for choice of law purposes. Article 4(1) also excludes 
reference to the law of the country or countries in which only the indirect 
consequences of the event giving rise to the damage occur. This reflects a 
similar approach to jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regulation and means 
that the law of a country in which an individual suffers consequential finan-
cial loss or a deterioration in his condition following an injury suffered in 
another country will not be applicable under this rule. 
Article 4(2): common habitual residence
Where the person claimed to be liable and the person sustaining damage 
both have their habitual residence in the same country at the time when 
the damage occurs, Art 4(2) provides that the law of that country shall 
apply. Although described by Recital (18) as an “exception” to the general 
principle of the application of the lex loci damni, Art 4(1) is subservient 
to Art  4(2) and, if the circumstances of the latter are apparent, this will 
oust the application of the former. Article 23 of the Regulation defines the 
habitual residence of companies and other bodies, corporate or unincor-
porated, as the place of central administration or, where the event giving 
rise to the damage occurs, or the damage arises, in the course of opera-
tion of a branch, agency or any other establishment, the place where the 
relevant branch, agency or any other establishment is located (Art 23(1)). 
The habitual residence of a natural person acting in the course of his busi-
ness activity is stated to be his principal place of business (Art 23(2)). The 
habitual residence of a natural person acting in a non-business capacity is 
left undefined.
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Article 4(3): the law that is manifestly more closely connected
Under Art 4(3), where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that 
the tort/delict is manifestly more closely connected with a country other 
than that indicated in Art  4(1) or (2), the law of that other country shall 
apply. This test is the same as that adopted in Art 4(3) of the Rome I Regu-
lation and similar to that found in Art 4(5) of the 1980 Rome Conven-
tion, and reference should be made to the discussion of these provisions 
in Chapter 5. Some guidance is also given in Art 4(3) itself, as the second 
sentence thereof states that a manifestly closer connection with another 
country might be based in particular on a pre-existing relationship between 
the parties, such as a contract, that is closely connected with the tort/delict 
in question. As Art 4(3) is not subject to the restrictions found in Art 4(1), 
the operation of the “manifestly more closely connected” rule could result 
in the application of either the law of the country in which the event 
giving rise to the damage occurred or the law of the country in which 
the indirect consequences of that event occur. The operation of Art 4(3) 
could also facilitate the displacement of the law of the common habitual 
residence applicable under Art 4(2) by the law of the country in which 
the damage occurs if the latter is manifestly more closely connected to the 
delict than the former.
Torts/delicts: specific rules
After providing the general rule of Art 4, the Regulation goes on to detail 
a number of specific rules in Arts 5–9 for particular types of delictual 
liability. Recital (19) justifies the need for these bespoke provisions on the 
basis that the application of the general rule “does not allow a reasonable 
balance to be struck between the interests at stake”.
Product liability
The rules of Art 5 are presented in the form of a “cascade” provision which 
operates without prejudice to Art 4(2). In other words, in the absence of 
a choice of law under Art 14, the law principally applicable to a non-
contractual obligation arising out of damage caused by a product shall 
be the common habitual residence of the parties as identified in Art 4(2). 
If the parties do not share a common habitual residence then a series of 
connecting factors is provided in Art 5(1) to the effect that the law appli-
cable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of damage caused by a 
product shall be (a) the law of the country in which the person sustaining 
the damage had his habitual residence when the damage occurred, if the 
product was marketed in that country; or, failing that, (b) the law of the 
country in which the product was acquired, if the product was marketed 
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in that country; or, failing that, (c) the law of the country in which the 
damage occurred, if the product was marketed in that country. In many 
cases the law of marketing, acquisition, habitual residence and damage will 
probably coincide. If the person claimed to be liable could not reasonably 
foresee the marketing of the product, or a product of the same type, in the 
country the law of which is applicable under the cascade, the law applicable 
shall be the law of the country in which that person is habitual resident. 
Article 5(2) provides a “manifestly more closely connected” exception 
equivalent to that found in Art 4(3). The complexity of this provision is 
compounded further by difficult issues of interpretation, particularly as 
regards the word “marketed”, which is not defined in the Regulation.
Unfair competition and acts restricting free competition
Article 6 applies to acts of unfair competition and acts restricting free 
competition – categories that are unknown to the Scots law of delict. 
Recital (21) states that the special rule of Art 6 is not an exception to the 
general rule in Art 4(1) but rather a “clarification” of it, with the focus 
remaining on the law of the country in which the damage occurs. As 
regards unfair competition, if such an act affects exclusively the interests 
of a specific competitor then the rules of Art 4 will be applicable (Art 6(2)). 
Where the effects of an act of unfair competition are more general in that 
they affect multiple competitors or the market as a whole then the law 
applicable will be the law of the country where competitive relations or the 
collective interests of consumers are, or are likely to be, affected (Art 6(1)).
Article 6(3)(a) provides that the law applicable to a non-contractual obli-
gation arising out of a restriction of competition shall be the law of the 
country where the market is, or is likely to be, affected. Article 6(3)(b) 
applies to cases in which the market is, or is likely to be, affected in more 
than one country and allows the pursuer to base his claim in one law if the 
conditions of that article are met. Article 6(4) restricts party autonomy in 
requiring that the law applicable under Art 6 may not be derogated from 
by an agreement under Art 14. It should be noted that this restriction only 
applies when the applicable law is determined by Art 6, if an act of unfair 
competition affects exclusively the interests of a specific competitor then 
Art 6(2) directs that Art 4 is to apply, under the terms of which a choice of 
law will be permitted.
Environmental damage
Article 7 applies to environmental damage or damage sustained by persons 
or property as a result of such damage. What is to be understood as envi-
ronmental damage is identified in Recital (24). In cases of environmental 
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damage, Art 7 directs that the law applicable shall be the law determined 
pursuant to Art 4(1): the law of the country in which the damage occurs. 
However, in direct contrast to Art 4(1), Art 7 also allows the pursuer to 
base his claim on the law of the country in which the event giving rise to 
the damage occurred. Article 7 is thus consistent with the choice of juris-
diction given to the pursuer in relation to delictual claims under Art 5(3) 
of the Brussels I Regulation. The parties may also make an agreement as to 
the applicable law in terms of Art 14.
Infringement of intellectual property rights
Article 8(1) applies the principle of lex loci protectionis in providing that 
the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising from infringe-
ment of an intellectual property right shall be the law of the country for 
which protection is claimed. The term “intellectual property rights” is to 
be interpreted as including copyright, related rights, the sui generis right 
for the protection of databases and industrial property rights (Recital 
(26)). Article 8(2) provides that, in the case of a non-contractual obligation 
arising from an infringement of a unitary Community intellectual prop-
erty right, the law applicable shall, for any question that is not governed by 
the relevant Community instrument, be the law of the country in which 
the act of infringement was committed. Article 8(3) limits party autonomy 
in declaring that the law applicable under this article may not be derogated 
from by an agreement between the parties.
Industrial action
No definition of “industrial action” is included in the Regulation and 
Recital (27) states that the exact concept of industrial action, such as 
strike action or lock-out, varies from one Member State to another and 
is governed by each Member State’s internal rules. Article 9 provides that 
“Without prejudice to Article 4(2), the law applicable to a non-
contractual obligation in respect of the liability of a person in the 
capacity of a worker or an employer or the organisations repre-
senting their professional interests for damages caused by an indus-
trial action, pending or carried out, shall be the law of the country 
where the action is to be, or has been, taken.”
Accordingly, if the matter falls within the scope of Art 9 then, in the 
absence of an agreement as to applicable law under Art 14, the default 
position is that the law of the common habitual residence of the parties 
will apply (“without prejudice to Art 4(2)”). If the parties do not share a 
common habitual residence then the law of the country where the action 
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is to be, or has been, taken will be applicable. If the parties do share a 
common habitual residence then the law of this country must be applied to 
industrial actions and there is no possibility of displacing this law in favour 
of the law that is manifestly more closely connected to the delict. 
Other non-contractual obligations
Chapter III of the Rome II Regulation provides special rules in circum-
stances where a non-contractual obligation arises out of unjust enrichment, 
negotiorum gestio or culpa in contrahendo. 
Unjust enrichment
A substantial proportion of problems arising under the head of unjust 
enrichment relate to a pre-existing relationship (usually contractual), 
between the parties. Article 10(1) acknowledges this by providing that if 
a non-contractual obligation arising out of unjust enrichment, including 
payment of amounts wrongly received, concerns a relationship existing 
between the parties, such as one arising out of a contract or a tort/delict, 
that is closely connected with that unjust enrichment, it shall be governed 
by the law that governs that relationship. The applicable law of the unjust 
enrichment will thus be guided by the applicable law identified according 
to the Rome I Regulation (if the pre-existing relationship is contractual), 
or the other provisions of the Rome II Regulation (if the pre-existing rela-
tionship is delictual). This has the benefit that the entire legal situation will 
be governed by the same law.
Where the applicable law cannot be determined by reference to the 
underlying relationship between the parties, Art 10(2) provides the second 
rule in the cascade in that if the parties have their habitual residence in the 
same country when the event giving rise to unjust enrichment occurs, the 
law of the common habitual residence will be applicable. If there is no 
underlying relationship between the parties, nor do they share a common 
habitual residence, Art 10(3) directs that the applicable law will be the law 
of the country in which the unjust enrichment took place. In circumstances 
in which a claim of unjust enrichment has links to a number of countries 
it is thought that “the country in which the unjust enrichment took place” 
points towards the country of immediate enrichment of the defender.
In similar terms to Art 4(3), Art 10(4) allows for the displacement of the 
law otherwise indicated under Art 10 when it is clear from all the circum-
stances of the case that there is a country with which the non-contractual 
obligation arising out of unjust enrichment is manifestly more closely 
connected. In such circumstances the law of this country will be the appli-
cable law. Reliance on Art 10(4) could lead to an entirely new law being 
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identified or it could be used to disrupt the cascade by, for example, leading 
to an application of the law of the common habitual residence in place of 
the law governing the pre-existing relationship. It is important to note that 
the rules of Art 10 will apply only in the absence of an agreement as to the 
applicable law under Art 14.
Negotiorum gestio
Negotiorum gestio refers to the situation in which a person (the gestor) inter-
venes, without any authority, to manage the affairs of another (the dominus) 
who, temporarily or permanently, is unable to manage his own affairs, in 
circumstances in which it is reasonable to assume that authority would 
have been given had the situation rendered it possible to apply for it. A 
gestor is entitled to be reimbursed for any expenditure he has incurred, 
regardless of whether the dominus was ultimately enriched by his actions. 
In such circumstances Art 11 applies a similar cascade provision to that 
found in Art 10 in relation to unjust enrichment. Thus, the applicable law 
will be the law governing the pre-existing relationship between the parties 
(Art 11(1)); or, failing that, the law of the country of common habitual 
residence at the time of the event giving rise to the damage (Art 11(2)); 
or, failing that, the law of the country in which the act was performed 
(Art  11(3)). Article 11(4) operates in identical fashion to Art 10(4). The 
application of Art 11 can be avoided if the parties make an agreement as to 
the applicable law under Art 14.
Culpa in contrahendo
The concept of culpa in contrahendo refers to those rules of national legal 
systems concerning the standard of conduct required of parties in pre-
contractual negotiations. Recital (30) states that the concept is to be given 
an autonomous meaning for the purposes of the Regulation, with the 
consequence that matters which may be treated as contractual in Scots law 
will be classified as culpa in contrahendo for the purposes of the Rome  II 
Regulation. Recital (30) provides further guidance by stating that the 
Regulation concept of culpa in contrahendo includes the violation of the duty 
of disclosure and the breakdown of contractual negotiations. Article 12 
covers only non-contractual obligations presenting a direct link with the 
dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract, whether or not the contract 
is actually concluded.
If a contract is concluded then difficulties may arise with regard to the 
precise boundary between what is pre-contractual (and therefore governed 
by Art 12 of the Rome II Regulation), and what is contractual (and there-
fore governed by the Rome I Regulation). Such difficulties are ameliorated 
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by Art 12(1) which provides that the law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract 
is the law that applies to the contract, or that would have applied to the 
contract had it been entered into. Accordingly, reference should be made 
to the terms of the Rome I Regulation considered in Chapter 5.
 Article 12(2) is another cascade provision that applies when the appli-
cable law cannot be determined under Art 12(1). In such circumstances the 
applicable law will be the law of the country in which the damage occurs, 
irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage 
occurred and irrespective of the country or countries in which the indi-
rect consequences of that event occurred; or, where the parties have their 
habitual residence in the same country at the time when the event giving 
rise to the damage occurs, the law of that country. The applicable law iden-
tified under Art  12(2)(a) and (b) may be avoided under Art 12(2) (c) where 
it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the law of another 
country is manifestly more closely to the situation. Article 12(2)(c) only 
applies within its own paragraph and cannot be relied upon to avoid the 
application of the law identified in Art 12(1). Finally, as with Arts  10 and 
11, parties may subject a non-contractual obligation arising out of deal-
ings prior to the conclusion of a contract to the law of their choice under 
Art  14.
Reach of the applicable law
Once the applicable law is identified, Art 15 of the Regulation provides a 
detailed, but non-exhaustive, list of the issues to which it will apply. Of 
particular note is Art 15(c) which states that the applicable law identified 
under the Regulation will govern the existence, the nature and the assess-
ment of damage or the remedy claimed. This is significant as, prior to the 
entry into force of the Rome II Regulation, the choice of law rule relating 
to damages (whether at common law or under the Private International 
Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995) was partly substantive and partly 
procedural in that the applicable law determined what heads of damage 
were available but the quantification of damages was considered to be a 
procedural matter and therefore governed by the law of the forum. This 
classification of the quantification of damages as a matter of procedure to 
be regulated by the law of the forum was confirmed by the House of Lords 
in Harding v Wealands (2006). The terms of Art 15(c) in that the applicable 
law shall govern the existence, the nature and the assessment of damage or 
the remedy claimed rejects this previous approach by applying the appli-
cable law to both the identification of the heads of damage and the quanti-
fication of damages. This can be compared with the assessment of damages 
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under the Rome I Regulation, the equivalent Art 12(1)(c) of which states 
that the applicable law shall govern, within the limits of the powers conferred on 
the court by its procedural law, the consequences of a total or partial breach 
of obligations, including the assessment of damages insofar as it is governed 
by rules of law. The italicised words limit the scope of the applicable law 
under the Rome I Regulation and are notable for their absence under the 
Rome  II Regulation.
Limits on the reach of the applicable law
Three notable limits are placed on the applicable law in terms of Arts 16, 
17 and 26. Article 16 provides that nothing in the Regulation shall restrict 
the application of the provisions of the law of the forum in a situation 
where they are mandatory irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to 
the non-contractual obligation. This is a similar provision to Art 9 of the 
Rome I Regulation and reference should be made to the discussion of that 
article in the previous chapter. It should be noted, however, that Art   16 
contains no definition of overriding mandatory provisions (in contrast 
to Art 9(1) of the Rome I Regulation), nor does it make any allowances 
for the overriding mandatory provisions of a third state (Art 9(3) of the 
Rome  I Regulation).
Article 17 requires that, in assessing the conduct of the person claimed 
to be liable, account shall be taken, as a matter of fact and insofar as is 
appropriate, of the rules of safety and conduct which were in force at the 
place and time of the event giving rise to the liability, even where the 
non-contractual obligation is governed by the law of another country. 
According to Recital (34), the term “rules of safety and conduct” should be 
interpreted as referring to all regulations having any relation to safety and 
conduct, including, for example, road safety rules in the case of an accident.
Article 26 states that the application of a provision of the law of any 
country specified by the Regulation may be refused only if such applica-
tion is manifestly incompatible with the public policy (ordre public) of the 
forum. It is not sufficient that the foreign rule of law should appear to 
be contrary to public policy in general: the operation of Art 26 requires 
that the application of the rule in the particular case before the court be 
contrary to public policy. According to Recital (32), the application of a 
provision of the law designated by the Regulation which would have the 
effect of causing non-compensatory exemplary or punitive damages of an 
excessive nature to be awarded may, depending on the circumstances of 
the case and the legal order of the Member State of the court seised, be 
regarded as being contrary to the public policy of the forum.
DUP_PrivateInternationalLaw5.indd   83 12/09/2014   14:43
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW84
CLAIMS FALLING OUTSIDE THE ROME II REGULATION
Where delictual actions fall outside the material or temporal scope of the 
Rome II Regulation reference must be made to the pre-existing Scot-
tish choice of law rules. These divide into the traditional common-law 
rules and the statutory regime introduced by the Private International 
Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995. Given the extensive scheme of 
applicable law introduced by the Regulation, and its extension to intra-
UK cases, the significance of both the common law and the 1995 Act has 
been marginalised to a residual role focused on non-contractual obliga-
tions arising out of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, 
including  defamation, which are excluded from the scope of the Regula-
tion by Art  1(2)(g).
The common law
The common-law rules remain relevant to defamation claims which are 
excluded from both the scope of the Rome II Regulation (Art 1(2)(g)) and 
the 1995 Act (s 13). The common law is based on the rule of double action-
ability which requires regard to be paid to both the lex loci delicti (the law of 
the place where the delict occurred), and the lex fori (the law of the forum), 
where an action concerning a delict committed overseas is litigated in the 
United Kingdom. In Scotland, there is no concept of party autonomy at 
common law and the applicable law will be determined independently of 
the parties’ intentions. As a result of the applicability of the double action-
ability rule, an act committed outside Scotland will be actionable as a delict 
within Scotland only if it was actionable as a delict both by Scots law and 
by the lex loci delicti. The flexible exception to this rule that developed in 
England first to displace the lex loci delicti (Boys v Chaplin (1971)) and, later, 
to displace the lex fori (Red Sea Insurance Co Ltd v Bouygues SA (1995)) has 
never been embraced in Scotland and the strict application of the double 
actionability rule remains part of Scots law. 
Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995
The exclusion of non-contractual obligations arising out of violations of 
privacy and rights relating to personality from the scope of the Regulation 
means that such claims remain governed in Scotland by the provisions of 
the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995. The 
Act abolished the common-law requirement of double actionability for 
claims falling within its scope and provides in s 11 that the applicable law 
will be the law of the country in which the events constituting the delict 
in question occur (s 11(1)). In the case of a multi-locality delict, the appli-
cable law is the law of the country in which the most significant element 
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or elements of those events occurred (s 11(2)(c)). This general rule of s 11 
is subject to displacement under s 12 if it appears, in all the circumstances, 
from a comparison between the significance of the factors which connect a 
delict with the country whose law would be the applicable law under the 
general rule and the significance of any factors connecting the delict with 
another country, that it is substantially more appropriate for the applicable 
law to be the law of the other country. In making this assessment, the 
court may take into account, in particular, factors relating to the parties, to 
any of the events which constitute the delict in question or to any of the 
circumstances or consequences of those events.
Essential Facts
• The rules applicable to choice of law in non-contractual obliga-
tions are found primarily in the Rome II Regulation but both the 
common law and the Private International Law (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1995 retain a residuary role. 
• The key provisions of the Rome II Regulation are:
– Art 4: the applicable law will be the lex loci damni, the law of the 
common habitual residence of the parties or the law manifestly 
more closely connected;
– Arts 5–9: specific rules for certain types of delictual liability;
– Arts 10–12: specific rules relating to claims of unjust enrich-
ment, negotiorum gestio and culpa in contrahendo;
– Art 14: party autonomy;
– Arts 16, 17 and 26: limits on the applicable law.
• Under Art 15(c) the applicable law will govern both the identifica-
tion of the heads of damage and the quantification of damages.
• The common-law rule of double actionability requires actionability 
under both Scots law and the lex loci delicti: there is no flexible excep-
tion to this rule in Scotland. This rule remains applicable to defama-
tion claims.
• The Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 
identifies the lex loci delicti as the applicable law (s 11), subject to 
displacement by the substantially more appropriate law (s 12).
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 Essential Cases
Harding v Wealands (2006): the quantification of damages is a 
matter of procedure to be determined by the law of the forum.
Boys v Chaplin (1971): in England, the common-law rule of double 
actionability is subject to a flexible exception which will operate to 
displace an otherwise applicable law.
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7 MARRIAGE AND CIVIL PARTNERSHIP
This chapter will consider the rules of private international law applicable 
to opposite-sex marriage, same-sex civil partnership and their international 
equivalents.
MARRIAGE
The general concept of marriage is recognised throughout the world, 
although the precise boundaries of the relationship vary considerably 
between jurisdictions. Scots law, at least for the time being, remains 
faithful to what is considered to be the classic definition of marriage given 
by Lord Penzance in Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee (1865–69) that marriage 
is a voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of 
all others. In contrast, whereas Scotland considers marriage to be a monog-
amous institution, certain other countries adopt a polygamous definition 
of marriage under which the marital relationship is not restricted to two 
parties. Further, the restriction that marriage is between specifically one 
man and one woman has been abandoned in an ever-increasing number of 
countries in which marriage is now open to both opposite-sex and same-
sex couples. More subtle differences also exist, such as the fact that parental 
consent is required in England and Wales (and other jurisdictions) for 
parties who have reached their 16th birthday but have not attained the age 
of 18 (Marriage Act 1949, s 3) – a restriction that is unknown in Scotland.
The challenge for private international law is to provide a coherent set 
of rules which reflect this international diversity while giving sufficient 
acknowledgement to the law, or laws, that can claim to have a legitimate 
interest in the marriage. Historically, all questions relating to the validity 
of a marriage were referred exclusively to the lex loci celebrationis – the law 
of the place where the marriage was celebrated. In a world with little 
international mobility, where in most cases an individual would marry in 
his or her country of domicile a fellow domiciliary thereof, such a simple 
rule could be applied with relative ease. However, the developing avail-
ability of international travel both led to the possibility of cross-border 
relationships and provided an opportunity for aspirant spouses to marry 
in a jurisdiction to which they had little, if any, prior connection, possibly 
for the sole purpose of avoiding domiciliary restrictions. This latter point 
is highlighted in the case of Brook v Brook (1861) where a marriage was 
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celebrated in Denmark between two English domiciliaries, a widower and 
the sister of his deceased wife. Such a marriage was at that time prohibited 
under the English law relating to prohibited degrees but valid according 
to the law of Denmark. When a question arose as to the validity of the 
marriage the House of Lords held that the marriage was invalid on the 
basis that the exclusive application of the lex loci celebrationis was no longer 
appropriate and, instead, this law should determine only the formalities 
of the marriage, with the essentials of the marriage, most notably those 
concerned with issues of capacity and consent, referred to the lex domicilii, 
the domiciliary law of each spouse at the time of the marriage. 
Formal validity 
Formal validity is concerned with the actual manner in which a marriage 
is celebrated and covers procedural aspects such as whether notice has to be 
given in advance and, if so, to whom; the form of the marriage ceremony; 
the identity of the celebrant; and the requirement for witnesses. Questions 
of formal validity follow the principle of locus regit actum (the place governs 
the act), with the result that whether any particular ceremony constitutes 
a formally valid marriage depends solely on the law of the place in which 
the ceremony is held (Berthiaume v Dastous (1930), per Lord Dunedin at 83). 
This was previously a rule of the common law but has now been placed 
on a statutory footing in Scotland by s 38(1) of the Family Law (Scot-
land) Act 2006, subject to the limited exceptions discussed below. Accord-
ingly, any marriage celebrated in Scotland must comply with the terms of 
the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 irrespective of the fact that the parties 
may be resident elsewhere and have limited connections to Scotland. The 
opposite of this is also true in that two Scottish domiciliaries celebrating 
a marriage overseas must comply with the requirements of the local law 
and the celebration of a marriage in contravention of this law, but valid 
under Scots law, would be insufficient, subject to the highly specialised 
circumstances identified below. Formal validity will usually be tested at the 
date of the ceremony, although there may be exceptional circumstances in 
which a marriage formally invalid at the time of celebration is later vali-
dated by subsequent legislation of the lex loci, in which case a later date may 
be identified (Starkowski v Att Gen (1954)). 
Identification of the lex loci celebrationis
In the majority of cases the identification of the lex loci celebrationis will 
be unproblematic but difficulties arise in circumstances where a marriage 
has been celebrated in a jurisdiction at a time when at least one of the 
parties thereto is present in a different jurisdiction. In Apt v Apt (1948) the 
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English Court of Appeal upheld a marriage celebrated by proxy in Argen-
tina between a man domiciled and resident there and a woman domiciled 
and resident in England on the basis that proxy marriages were valid by 
Argentine law, which was considered to be the lex loci celebrationis. 
In C v City of Westminster Social and Community Services Department (2008) 
the parties had purportedly entered into a marriage in Bangladesh at a time 
when the wife was present in that country while the husband was both 
domiciled and present in England but had allegedly participated in the 
marriage ceremony via telephone. The parties had reached an agreement 
that the lex loci celebrationis was Bangladesh and further analysis of this was 
not necessary for the disposal of the case. Thorpe LJ (at para 42) challenged 
this consensus in the Court of Appeal and recommended that the issue be 
considered in a future case. Similar circumstances arose in the Scottish case 
of A v K (2011), where a marriage purportedly took place by telephone 
between a woman of UK nationality resident in Edinburgh and a man who 
had a postal address in Pakistan but appeared to be resident in Dubai. The 
subsequent marriage “certificate” stated that the place of solemnisation was 
Pakistan. It was held by Lord Stewart that Pakistan was the sole place of 
celebration. This finding has been criticised by Crawford and Carruthers 
who have argued that in circumstances such as were apparent in these two 
cases there should be a recognition that there can be more than one place of 
celebration (see E B Crawford and J M Carruthers, “Dual locality events: 
marriage by telephone” 2011 29 SLT (News) 227).
Exceptions to the general rule
The rule contained in s 38(1) is subject to the Foreign Marriage Act 1892. 
This Act, as amended, provides that a marriage between parties, of whom 
at least one is a United Kingdom national, will, if solemnised in a foreign 
country in the manner prescribed in the Act, be as valid in law as if it 
had been solemnised in the United Kingdom, even if it does not comply 
with the lex loci celebrationis. Such marriages are commonly referred to as 
“consular marriages”. Provision is also made in the 1892 Act, as amended, 
and the Foreign Marriages (Armed Forces) Order 1964 (SI 1964/1000) 
for the solemnisation of marriages in a foreign territory between parties 
at least one of whom is a member of the armed forces. As with consular 
marriages, a marriage celebrated in the manner prescribed will be as valid 
in law as if it had been solemnised in the United Kingdom, even if the lex 
loci celebrationis has not been complied with. Further exceptions exist under 
English common law where the use of local form is impossible or the 
marriage takes place in a country under belligerent occupation. Following 
the statutory codification of the common-law rule, and the reference 
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therein to only the 1892 Act, these exceptions are no longer applicable in 
Scotland. 
Capacity to marry
Capacity to marry is concerned with issues such as the acceptable degrees 
of affinity or consanguinity and the minimum age at which a party may 
marry. A number of different arguments have been advanced to identify 
the most appropriate law to govern these issues of capacity, with support 
for the law of the ante-nuptial domicile(s) of the parties, the law of the 
intended matrimonial home and the law of the jurisdiction with which the 
marriage has its most real and substantial connection finding at least some 
degree of support from both the judiciary and in academic writings. It is 
the first of these alternatives which has received most support and this has 
now been recognised in Scotland with the common-law rule receiving stat-
utory endorsement in s 38(2) of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006. This 
section implements what is commonly known as the “dual domicile rule” 
in providing that a person’s capacity to enter into a marriage shall be deter-
mined by the law of the place where, immediately before the marriage, that 
person was domiciled. It is important to note that the dual domicile rule is 
one of cumulative application in that, should the parties not share the same 
domicile, each party must have legal capacity to marry according to their 
own lex domicilii. An impediment to marriage existing under the law of the 
domicile of just one of the parties may invalidate the marriage irrespective 
of the fact that all other relevant laws are satisfied. Subject to the excep-
tions noted below, it is now the position in Scotland that the dual domicile 
rule must be applied to determine issues of capacity and reference to any 
alternative rule, such as may still occur in England, even if such alternative 
would uphold the validity of an otherwise invalid marriage, is no longer 
competent. 
Exceptions to the general rule
The general rule of s 38(2) is subject to three exceptions. First, under 
s  38(3), if a marriage entered into in Scotland is void under a rule of Scots 
domestic law, then the Scots rule shall prevail over the domiciliary rule 
under which the marriage would be valid. This exception protects the 
fundamental principles of the domestic understanding of marriage by 
applying the mandatory rules of Scots law as regards capacity to marry to 
all marriages celebrated within Scotland, irrespective of the domicile of 
the parties. For example, regardless of the terms of the domiciliary laws of 
the parties, a marriage celebrated in Scotland will be void if either party is 
under 16 or within the forbidden degrees of relationship as stated in ss  1 
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and 2 of the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 respectively. It should be noted 
that s 38(3) operates only in the negative sense in that it will invalidate 
an otherwise valid marriage; it does not apply positively in order to vali-
date a marriage otherwise invalid under the domiciliary laws of the parties. 
Further, s 38(3) and its reference to the laws of the lex loci celebrationis only 
applies to marriages celebrated in Scotland and the 2006 Act is silent with 
regard to the question of whether capacity should also be required by a 
foreign lex loci celebrationis.
Second, s 38(4) permits a derogation from the general rule when a 
reference to the lex domicilii would be contrary to Scottish public policy. 
Unlike s 38(3), this section may operate both positively and negatively and 
contains no geographical boundary. It could operate to ignore an objec-
tionable domiciliary impediment to marriage, such as restrictions based on 
race or religion. Conversely, an otherwise valid marriage might be refused 
recognition because of an objectionable capacity, such as the ability under 
the lex domicilii to marry at a very young age or to marry a closely related 
person (Cheni v Cheni (1965)).
Finally, the general rule must defer to s 50 of the Family Law Act 1986 
which provides that where a divorce or annulment is either granted or 
recognised in any part of the United Kingdom, the fact that this divorce 
or annulment would not be recognised elsewhere shall not preclude either 
party to the marriage from re-marrying in the United Kingdom or cause 
the re-marriage of either party (wherever the re-marriage takes place) to be 
treated as invalid in the United Kingdom.
As with matters of formal validity, the statutory restatement of both 
this choice of law rule and its exceptions now precludes any reference to 
exceptions found under the common law. Accordingly, the much-criticised 
rule of English law under which a marriage celebrated in England, between 
parties of whom one has an English domicile and the other a foreign domi-
cile, will be valid even if an incapacity exists under the domiciliary law 
of the other party, is no longer part of the law of Scotland, if it ever was 
(Sottomayor v De Barros (No 2) (1879)). 
Consent to marry
While the method of giving consent is a matter for the lex loci celebrationis, 
there was previously some doubt as to the law applicable to the question 
of whether a party gave true consent to a marriage (compare Di Rollo v Di 
Rollo (1959) with Singh v Singh (2005)). This doubt was removed by s  38(2) 
of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 which treats consent in the same 
way as capacity by referring the determination of this issue to the law of 
the ante-nuptial domicile, subject to the aforementioned exceptions. If the 
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marriage is celebrated in Scotland then s 20A of the Marriage (Scotland) 
Act 1977 states that a marriage will be void if a party to the marriage who 
was capable of consenting to the marriage purported to give consent but 
did so by reason only of duress or error, the latter being defined in s 20A(5). 
A marriage will also be void if at the time of the marriage ceremony a party 
to the marriage was incapable of understanding the nature of marriage 
and consenting to the marriage. Further, under s 20A(4), if a party to a 
marriage purported to give consent to the marriage other than by reason 
only of duress or error, the marriage shall not be void by reason only of 
that party’s having tacitly withheld consent to the marriage at the time 
when it was solemnised.
The question as to whether the issue of parental consent to marriage was 
one of formal validity, referable to the lex loci celebrationis, or an element 
of essential validity, referable to the law of the ante-nuptial domicile, also 
caused some difficulty in the past (see Ogden v Ogden (1908) and Bliersbach v 
McEwen (1959)). This issue is now governed by s 38(5) of the Family Law 
(Scotland) Act 2006 which states that if the law of the place in which a 
person is domiciled requires a person under a certain age to obtain parental 
consent before entering into a marriage, that requirement shall not be 
taken to affect the capacity of a person to enter into a marriage in Scotland 
unless failure to obtain such consent would render invalid any marriage 
that the person purported to enter into in any form anywhere in the world.
Polygamous marriages
Polygamous marriages are marital unions involving more than two spouses, 
usually because a legal system permits a husband to take multiple wives. 
While domestic conceptions of marriage as a monogamous institution 
prevent the formation of such marriages within Scotland (Marriage (Scot-
land) Act 1977, s 5(4)(b)), questions have arisen regarding the recognition 
of marriages formed under a law which does permit polygamy. Originally, 
the response to such marriages, based upon an arguably mistaken interpre-
tation of the judgment of Lord Penzance in Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee 
(1865–69), was that marriages formed under a law which permits polygamy 
should not be recognised at all, regardless of whether the marriage was 
potentially or actually polygamous, ie recognition would be refused to all 
marriages formed under a polygamous system of law, even if the marriage 
was in reality monogamous. This aversion towards such marriages was 
gradually relaxed through a growing realisation that recognition could be 
given not in general but for particular purposes, such as the granting of 
matrimonial relief. This approach was placed on a statutory footing by s 2 
of the Matrimonial Proceedings (Polygamous Marriages) Act 1972 which 
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provides that the fact that a marriage was entered into under a law which 
permits polygamy shall not preclude the Scottish courts from entertaining 
proceedings for, or granting, specified matrimonial decrees. The 1972 Act 
was also significant in that it reduced the importance of the distinction 
between potentially and actually polygamous marriages. This Act was 
followed by s 7(2) of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provi-
sions) Act 1995 which confirms that all potentially polygamous marriages 
will, so long as neither party marries a second spouse during the subsistence 
of the marriage, have the same effects for all purposes of the law of Scot-
land as a monogamous marriage. As a consequence of these developments 
it can now be said that a marriage, whether potentially or actually polyga-
mous, will be recognised in Scotland for most purposes.
Capacity to enter into a polygamous marriage
As with monogamous marriage, capacity to enter into a polygamous 
marriage is governed by the law of the ante-nuptial domicile. Accordingly, 
if parties to a marriage which is actually polygamous have their domiciles in 
a country (or countries) which permit polygamy, and they comply with all 
the formal requirements of the lex loci celebrationis, this marriage can be recog-
nised in Scotland. In contrast, an actually polygamous marriage celebrated 
overseas in contravention of a monogamous domiciliary law will not be 
recognised. A Scottish domiciliary is thus prevented from entering an actu-
ally polygamous marriage but any marriage that such an individual enters 
into under a polygamous system of law will still be recognised as a valid 
marriage if it is potentially polygamous but in reality monogamous (s  7(2) of 
the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995).
CIVIL PARTNERSHIP
Alongside opposite-sex marriage a number of jurisdictions have chosen to 
provide legal recognition to same-sex couples through either the provi-
sion of a functional equivalent to marriage (Denmark being the first to do 
so in 1989) or the opening up of marriage itself (the Netherlands being 
the first to do so in 2001). The United Kingdom at present adopts the 
former approach (though moves to permit the latter are under way) and 
since December 2005 has permitted the registration of civil partnerships in 
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Partnership Act 2004. Part 3 
of the 2004 Act governs civil partnerships registered in Scotland while Pt 5 
provides detailed private international law provisions relating to the forma-
tion of same-sex relationships overseas and the subsequent recognition of 
such relationships in Scotland (and the rest of the United Kingdom).
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Civil partnerships registered in Scotland
If a civil partnership is to be registered in Scotland a cumulative reading 
of ss 1, 85 and 86 of the 2004 Act reveals that both the formation of the 
civil partnership and the eligibility (a term used in place of “capacity”) of 
the parties to enter the relationship will be determined exclusively by the 
domestic rules of Scots law. Any reference to the parties also requiring 
eligibility/capacity under their ante-registration domicile is notable by its 
absence. Accordingly, if a civil partnership is registered in Scotland (or in 
any other part of the United Kingdom) then, regardless of the domicile of 
the parties thereto, the lex loci registrationis, the law of the place of registra-
tion, will determine all questions of validity, whether formal or essential. 
Same-sex relationships formed overseas
Questions regarding the validity of a same-sex relationship formed over-
seas are governed by s 215 of the 2004 Act which provides a general rule 
that matters of both capacity and formal validity are to be referred to the 
“relevant law”, which is defined under s 212(2) as the law of the country or 
territory where the relationship is registered (including its rules of private 
international law). The lex loci registrationis, or the lex loci celebrationis in the 
case of a same-sex marriage, is therefore pre-eminent in determining issues 
of both formal and essential validity. As with registrations taking place in 
Scotland, there is no explicit reference to domiciliary law, with the conse-
quence that the 2004 Act in effect provides a statutory codification of an 
approach deemed unsuitable for opposite-sex marriage over 150 years 
ago following the decision in Brook v Brook (1861). The reason for this 
different approach can be found in the still-limited international accept-
ability of legally formalised same-sex relationships. To refer the issue of 
capacity to enter a same-sex relationships to the lex domicilii would, even in 
light of the growing number of jurisdictions granting recognition to such 
relationships, invariable identify a law which had no concept thereof and 
was therefore silent as to capacity to enter such a relationship. Instead, by 
referring the question of capacity to the law of registration/celebration this 
issue has been avoided, although it does create a different issue of “limping 
relationships” which will be recognised in some jurisdictions, notably the 
place of registration/celebration and Scotland, but potentially not by the 
law of the domicile of the parties thereto.
For an overseas same-sex relationship to be recognised in Scotland not 
only must the parties themselves satisfy the terms of the 2004 Act but 
their chosen relationship form must also comply with the characterisation 
requirements of the 2004 Act. These requirements can be found in ss 212 
and 214 which specify that an overseas relationship will be recognised only 
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if it requires registration, is sanctioned by the state, is monogamous and 
between parties of the same sex whom, upon registration, will be treated 
as a couple either generally or for specified purposes, or treated as married, 
for an indeterminate duration. Schedule 20 provides a statutory list of 
those specified relationships which are considered to fulfil this criteria 
without further investigation (this list was updated on 31 January 2013 by 
the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (Overseas Relationships) Order 2012 (SI 
2012/2976)). The requirement that an overseas relationship will only be 
recognised when the parties are of the same sex prevents the recognition 
under the 2004 Act of those overseas non-marital relationships, such as 
are available in, for example, Belgium, France, the Netherlands and New 
Zealand, registered between two parties of the opposite sex.
If a relationship is to be recognised in Scotland then s 215 provides that 
the parties thereto will be “treated as having formed a civil partnership”. 
This method of equating the varying forms of same-sex relationship recog-
nition available around the world with a domestic civil partnership has the 
benefit of simplicity but may also lead to two divergent problems. First, 
individuals party to an overseas relationship with more limited legal conse-
quences, such as the Belgian relationship of cohabitation légale, will automat-
ically be attributed with a more onerous range of rights and obligations. 
In contrast, those individuals party to an overseas same-sex marriage may 
consider that their relationship has been downgraded by being recognised 
not as a marriage but as a civil partnership (Wilkinson v Kitzinger (2006)).
Exceptions to the general rule
There are three exceptions to the general rule that the law of registra-
tion/celebration will determine all issue of validity. First, and replicating 
the provisions applicable to opposite-sex marriage, s 210 of the 2004 Act 
permits the registration of a civil partnership at a British Consulate in accor-
dance with the law of a part of the United Kingdom that the parties have 
chosen to apply in preference to the law of the place where the consulate 
is situated. Second, and once again reflecting the approach to opposite-sex 
marriage, s 211 provides for the registration of a civil partnership according 
to the law of a part of the United Kingdom when at least one of the parties 
is a member of the armed forces. Finally, s 217 permits a residual role for 
the law of domicile when a relationship is entered into overseas if that rela-
tionship involves at least one party who is domiciled in a part of the United 
Kingdom. This section will extend all domestic  domiciliary incapacities to 
any such overseas registration and would prevent, for example, an indi-
vidual domiciled in Scotland evading the Scottish rules as to consanguinity 
or nonage by registering a partnership abroad.




• Validity of an opposite-sex marriage is determined according to 
s  38 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, with matters of formal 
validity referred to the lex loci celebrationis and matters of essential 
validity (notably capacity to marry) referred to the lex domicilii.
• Exceptions to the above are entirely statutory and are to be found 
in s 38(1) as regards formal validity and s 38(2), (3) and (4) as regards 
essential validity. Previous common-law exceptions are no longer 
applicable.
• Polygamous marriages, both potentially and actually polygamous, 
will now be recognised in Scotland for most purposes (Matrimo-
nial Proceedings (Polygamous Marriages) Act 1972, s 2, and Private 
International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, s 7).
Civil partnership
• If a civil partnership is registered in Scotland then Scots law will 
determine issues of both form and eligibility (Civil Partnership Act 
2004, ss 1, 85 and 86).
• The law of the country or territory where an overseas relationship 
is registered (including its rules of private international law) will be 
applied to all issues of validity under s 215 of the 2004 Act, subject 
to the exceptions found in ss 210, 211 and 217.
• All overseas same-sex relationships will be recognised in Scotland as 
civil partnerships.
Essential Cases
Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee (1865–69): provides the classic 
definition of marriage as “the voluntary union for life of one man and 
one woman, to the exclusion of all others”. This definition was relied 
upon initially to prevent the recognition of polygamous marriages.
Brook v Brook (1861): the formal validity of a marriage is deter-
mined by the lex loci celebrationis (the law of the place where the 
marriage takes place), but the essentials of the marriage, most notably 
concerned with issues of capacity and consent, will be referred to 
the lex domicilii (the law of the ante-nuptial domicile of each party).
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A v K (2011): where a marriage by telephone between a woman in 
Scotland and a man purportedly present in Pakistan was stated on 
the marriage certificate as having been celebrated in Pakistan, the lex 
loci celebrationis was held to be the law of Pakistan.
Wilkinson v Kitzinger (2006): an overseas same-sex marriage will 
be recognised in the United Kingdom as a civil partnership.
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8 DIVORCE AND DISSOLUTION
This chapter will consider the private international law rules applicable 
to the dissolution of those formalised personal relationships considered in 
Chapter 7, primarily opposite-sex marriage. These rules first developed 
through the common law before later being subject to statutory codifi-
cation and, more recently, they have become the focus of a number of 
European harmonisation initiatives. Issues of jurisdiction, choice of law 
and recognition will each be considered in turn.
JURISDICTION
The Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 created a new set 
of jurisdictional principles which replaced the law in force prior to 1 
January 1974. This Act provided that the Court of Session would have 
jurisdiction to entertain an action for divorce if either of the parties to the 
marriage was domiciled in Scotland on the date the action was begun, or, 
had been habitually resident in Scotland throughout the period of 1 year 
ending with that date (s 7). These rules remained in place until 1 March 
2001 when Council Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 of 29 May 2000 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matri-
monial matters and in matters of parental responsibility for children of 
both spouses (commonly referred to as the “Brussels II Regulation”) came 
into force. This Regulation introduced a new set of uniform jurisdictional 
rules in matrimonial matters and facilitated the almost automatic recog-
nition of matrimonial judgments throughout the European Union, with 
the exclusion of Denmark. The Brussels II Regulation was quickly revised 
and replaced by Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 
2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility, 
repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 (commonly referred to as the 
“Brussels IIa Regulation”). The Brussels IIa Regulation incorporates the 
provisions relating to matrimonial matters found in the earlier Brussels 
II Regulation with no significant alternations, although it does expand 
the provisions relating to parental responsibility which will be consid-
ered in Chapter 11. From 1 March 2005, the Brussels IIa Regulation 
became directly applicable in all EU Member States, once again excluding 
Denmark. 
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Following the entry into force of the Brussels IIa Regulation the Scot-
tish jurisdictional rules are now contained in the amended s 7(2A) of the 
1973 Act to the effect that the Court of Session will have jurisdiction to 
entertain an action for divorce or separation if (and only if ) the Scottish 
courts have jurisdiction under the Regulation, or, the action is an excluded 
action and either of the parties to the marriage is domiciled in Scotland on 
the date when the action is begun. Section 7(2A) thus identifies both the 
primary grounds of jurisdiction, those available under the Regulation, and 
a single residual ground of jurisdiction applicable when the action is an 
“excluded” action. Section 8 provides further rules granting jurisdiction 
to the sheriff courts if certain localising criteria are met.
Primary grounds of jurisdiction
Article 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation sets out seven jurisdictional bases. 
The order in which they appear in the article is immaterial as there is no 
hierarchy and all grounds have an equal status and exclusive effect. Article 
3(1) provides that, in matters relating to divorce, legal separation or marriage 
annulment, jurisdiction shall lie with the courts of the Member State:
(a) in whose territory:
i. the spouses are habitually resident, or
ii. the spouses were last habitually resident, insofar as one of them 
still resides there, or
iii. the respondent is habitually resident, or
iv. in the event of a joint application, either of the spouses is habit-
ually resident, or 
v. the applicant is habitually resident if he or she resided there for 
at least a year immediately before the application was made, or
vi. the applicant is habitually resident if he or she resided there 
for at least six months immediately before the application was 
made and is either a national of the Member State in question 
or, in the case of the United Kingdom and Ireland, has his or 
her “domicile” there;
(b) of the nationality of both spouses or, in the case of the United 
Kingdom and Ireland, of the “domicile” of both spouses.
Priority has been afforded in Art 3 to the connecting factor of habitual resi-
dence, utilised in a number of different circumstances, but there remains a 
role for the traditional connecting factors of nationality and domicile. This 
is particularly so in Art 3(1)(b) through which jurisdiction can be founded 
on the basis of joint nationality/domicile regardless of where the spouses 
are habitually resident. Where spouses each have dual nationality in the 
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same Member States Art 3(1)(b) gives the courts of either of those states 
jurisdiction to hear matrimonial proceedings and the spouses can seise a 
court in the Member State of their choice (Hadadi v Mesko (2009)). Article 
3(1)(a)(iv) is not applicable in Scotland. Articles 4 and 5 provide two further 
ancillary grounds of jurisdiction, relating to counterclaims and conversions 
respectively.
Article 3(2) provides that, for the purposes of the Regulation,  “domicile” 
shall have the same meaning as it has under the legal systems of the United 
Kingdom and Ireland. In other words, the Regulation adopts the ‘tradi-
tional’ definition of domicile and reference should be made to the discus-
sion of this concept found in Chapter 2. In contrast, “habitual residence” 
is to be given an autonomous meaning for the purposes of the Brussels IIa 
Regulation – a meaning that will not necessarily be the same as the UK 
domestic meaning, nor the same as the meaning ascribed to the concept 
in other instruments. Habitual residence under the Regulation is meant 
to identify the place where an individual has established, on a fixed basis, 
his permanent or habitual centre of interests. In Marinos v Marinos (2007), 
Munby J held that for the purposes of the Regulation a person can have 
only one habitual residence – a finding that is directly at odds with the 
interpretation given to the domestic understanding of habitual residence 
for the purposes of divorce jurisdiction in the case of Ikimi v Ikimi (Divorce: 
Habitual Residence) (2001). In Marinos, Munby J also considered the meaning 
of “resided” for the purposes of Art 3(1)(a)(v) and (vi) and whether this was 
to be understood as requiring habitual residence for the requisite period, or 
some lesser form of residence. Munby J believed the latter was the correct 
interpretation and that only residence simpliciter need be established. This 
view was, however, challenged by Bennett J in Munro v Munro (2007) and 
it is yet to be settled definitively.
Residual ground of jurisdiction
Aside from jurisdiction under the Regulation, the Scottish courts will also 
have jurisdiction under s 7(2A) of the 1973 Act, if the action is an excluded 
action and either of the parties to the marriage is domiciled in Scotland 
on the date when the action is begun. To understand what is meant by an 
excluded action it is necessary to refer to Arts 6 and 7. Article 6 states that 
a spouse who is habitually resident in the territory of a Member State, or 
a national of a Member State, or, in the case of the United Kingdom and 
Ireland, has his or her domicile in the territory of one of these two Member 
States, may be sued in another Member State only in accordance with Art  3 
(or in accordance with the ancillary jurisdictional grounds of Arts 4 and  5). 
Article 6 thus requires that a spouse with a connection to a Member State, 
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whether through habitual residence, nationality or domicile, may only be 
sued in another Member State if the courts of that other state have jurisdic-
tion under Art 3. Consequently, the Scottish residual jurisdictional ground 
of sole domicile may not be utilised by a “Scottish” spouse as against a 
spouse who is “European” in the sense of Art 6, whether or not that spouse 
is currently living in the European Union. It is only when a spouse is not 
“European” that a Scottish court may be able to utilise the residual ground 
of jurisdiction. However, Art 6 must be read in conjunction with Art 7(1) 
which provides that where no court of a Member State has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Art 3 (or Arts 4 and 5), jurisdiction shall be determined, in 
each Member State, by the laws of that state. Accordingly, the Scottish 
ground of residual jurisdiction will become effective only when, first, the 
respondent spouse is not “European” in terms of Art 6, and, second, no 
other court is capable of claiming jurisdiction under the Regulation (Art 7). 
These two requirements are cumulative and both must be satisfied before 
recourse may be had to the residual ground of jurisdiction (Sundelind Lopez 
v Lopez Lizazo (2007)).
Conflicts of jurisdiction
With such broadly drawn jurisdictional rules it is quite possible that 
spouses may be able to bring matrimonial proceedings in the courts of 
more than one country. For example, under the Regulation a married 
Italian couple living in Scotland would be able to bring proceedings in 
both Italy ( joint  nationality: Art 3(1)(b)) and Scotland ( joint habitual resi-
dence: Art 3(1)(a)(i)) The solution adopted by the Scottish courts vis-à-vis 
such conflicts of jurisdiction will depend upon whether jurisdiction has 
been taken under the Regulation or via the residual ground of jurisdiction.
Lis pendens
The Brussels IIa Regulation follows the approach of the Brussels I Regu-
lation when allocating jurisdiction between competing legal systems by 
implementing a “first come, first served” rule of strict priority.  Accordingly, 
Art 19 provides that, where proceedings relating to divorce, legal separation 
or marriage annulment between the same parties are brought before courts 
of different Member States, the court second seised shall of its own motion 
stay its proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of the court first seised 
is established (Art 19(1)). Once the jurisdiction of the court first seised is 
established, the court second seised shall decline  jurisdiction in favour of 
that court (Art 19(3)). This applies when proceedings are brought between 
the same parties, even if the precise cause of action may differ. Article 16 
provides clarity as regards when a court shall be deemed to be seised.
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Mandatory sists
As Art 19 refers to proceedings being brought before the courts of different 
Member States, conflicts wholly internal to the United Kingdom continue 
to be governed by the system of mandatory sists regulated by Sch 3, para  8 
to the 1973 Act. If the four conditions contained in para 8 are satisfied then 
a Scottish court must sist the action before it in favour of the courts in a 
“related jurisdiction”, ie courts elsewhere in the British Isles as defined by 
Sch 3, para 3. The intention behind this provision is to ensure that the case 
is heard in the courts of the country in which the parties had their last, or 
most recent, matrimonial residence and, due to their mandatory nature, 
there is little practical difference between the application of Art 19 of the 
Regulation and Sch 3, para 8 to the 1973 Act.
Discretionary sists
Paragraph 9(1) of Sch 3 to the 1973 Act makes provision for a consisto-
rial action to be sisted, before the beginning of the proof, whether in the 
Court of Session or a sheriff court, if it appears that any other proceedings 
in respect of the marriage in question or capable of affecting its validity 
are continuing in another jurisdiction and that the balance of fairness 
(including convenience) as between the parties to the marriage is such 
that it is appropriate for those other proceedings to be disposed of before 
further steps are taken in the action in the Scottish court. In considering the 
balance of fairness and convenience the court is required to have regard to 
all factors appearing to be relevant, including the convenience of witnesses 
and any delay or expense which may result from the proceedings being 
sisted, or not being sisted (Sch 3, para 9(2)). In De Dampierre v De Dampierre 
(1988) it was established that this terminology was the statutory equiva-
lent of the doctrine of forum non conveniens and that the approach taken to 
the latter was equally applicable to the former. Further detail regarding 
this approach can be found in Chapter 3 but, in short, before the court 
will exercise its discretion under para 9(1) the respondent in the divorce 
proceedings will have to show that that there is another available forum 
which, prima facie, is clearly more appropriate. If successful in this plea, a 
sist will be granted unless the petitioner can show circumstances by reason 
of which justice requires that a sist should nevertheless not be granted. It 
is not enough for the petitioner simply to point to the loss of a legitimate 
personal or juridical advantage if required to litigate abroad.
While Art 19 will apply if jurisdiction is taken under the Regulation, 
the option to sist an action under Sch 3, para 9 remains available when 
proceedings have been brought in Scotland under the residual juris dictional 
ground of the Scottish domicile of either spouse. However, as with the 
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Brussels I Regulation, questions have arisen as to whether a court in the 
United Kingdom which takes jurisdiction under the Regulation may sist 
an action in favour of a court in a country outside of the European Union. 
These questions are answered clearly in Scotland by s 11(2) of the 1973 Act 
which states that the power to sist an action is “subject to Article 19”. Thus, 
in Scotland, once jurisdiction is taken under the Regulation the lis pendens 
approach to competing jurisdictions must be followed and a discretionary 
sist will not be competent. The situation is less clear in England, however, 
and in the case of JKN v JCN (2010) proceedings taken under Art 3 were 
stayed under the equivalent English provisions (1973 Act, Sch 1, para 9) in 
favour of New York.
Civil partnership
The jurisdictional rules relating to civil partnerships are detailed in ss  219 
and 225 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004, and the Civil  Partnership 
( Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments) (Scotland) Regulations 2005 
(SSI 2005/629), reg 4. The 2005 Regulations, made under the power 
provided by s 219, partially replicate Art 3 of the Brussels IIa Regulation 
by providing that proceedings for the dissolution or annulment of a civil 
partnership may be brought in the Court of Session if both civil partners 
are habitually resident in Scotland; both civil partners were last habitually 
resident in Scotland and one of the civil partners continues to reside there; 
the defender is habitually resident in Scotland; the pursuer is habitually 
resident in Scotland and has resided there for at least 1 year immediately 
preceding the date on which the action is begun; or, the pursuer is domi-
ciled and habitually resident in Scotland and has resided there for at least 
6 months immediately preceding the date on which the action is begun. 
Proceedings for dissolution may also be brought in a sheriff court if the 
additional localising requirements of s 225(2) of the 2004 Act are satisfied. 
If jurisdiction cannot be founded on one of the above grounds then 
s  225 provides two further bases on which the Court of Session will have 
jurisdiction. First, s 225(1)(b) grants jurisdiction on the ground that either 
civil partner is domiciled in Scotland on the date when the proceedings are 
begun. Again, an action may be brought on this ground in a sheriff court if 
additional requirements are fulfilled. Finally, s 225(1)(c) provides a ground 
of jurisdiction based not on a personal connection between the parties and 
Scotland, but on the fact that the partnership was registered in Scotland. 
This ground may be utilised only in the Court of Session when that court 
is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to assume jurisdiction in the 
case. This final ground allows the Scottish courts to act as a forum necessitatis 
most obviously in circumstances where a civil partnership was previously 
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registered in Scotland by parties one of whom now wishes to dissolve the 
relationship but lives in a country which does not permit such proceedings.
Although the primary grounds of jurisdiction are modelled on the 
Brussels IIa Regulation, such replication is not extended to the lis pendens 
rule of Art 19 and, instead, provision is made in s 226 and accompanying 
secondary legislation for the implementation of rules replicating the system 
of mandatory and discretionary sists found in Sch 3 to the Domicile and 
Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973. 
CHOICE OF LAW
At common law, when only the courts of the husband’s domicile had juris-
diction, and the domicile of the wife would follow that of her husband, 
no choice of law issues arose as both the lex fori and the lex domicilii would 
be the same. The liberalisation of the grounds of jurisdiction introduced 
by the 1973 Act, accompanied by the abolition of the married woman’s 
domicile, meant that such unity was no longer guaranteed. The possibility 
of a lack of unity between the forum and the domicile or nationality of 
the spouses has been further increased by the broad jurisdictional rules of 
Art 3 based principally on habitual residence. While many European coun-
tries have acknowledged choice of law issues in divorce by allowing for 
the application of a law other than that of the forum, usually the law of 
the parties’ common nationality, the United Kingdom has rigidly adhered 
to the application of the lex fori. As a consequence, the United Kingdom 
decided not to opt into Council Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 of 20 
December 2010 implementing enhanced co-operation in the area of the 
law applicable to divorce and legal separation (commonly referred to as the 
“Rome III Regulation”). This Regulation sets out uniform rules of appli-
cable law for divorce and legal separation in the 14 participating Member 
States based on a limited degree of party autonomy to choose the appli-
cable law and, in the absence of choice, a cascade of alternatives.
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DECREES
Historically, a foreign decree of divorce would be recognised only if it 
were granted by a court of the husband’s domicile. This strict rule was 
gradually loosened over time, with the decision in Indyka v Indyka (1969) 
greatly increasing the circumstances in which a foreign decree of divorce 
would be recognised. This was quickly followed by the Hague Conven-
tion of 1 June 1970 on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations, 
implemented in the United Kingdom by the Recognition of Divorces and 
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Legal Separations Act 1971. The 1971 Act was repealed and replaced by 
the Family Law Act 1986, Pt II of which contains the relevant rules for 
the recognition of decrees granted both in the British Isles and overseas. 
This reference to “overseas” decrees must now be understood in light of 
the harmonised European rules of recognition found in the Brussels IIa 
Regulation which apply to judgments given in a Member State. Thus, the 
Regulation will apply to divorces granted in a Member State (excluding 
Denmark), while the 1986 Act continues to govern the recognition of 
“non-European” divorces, which includes divorces from elsewhere in 
the British Isles and from Denmark. Section 37 of the Family Law (Scot-
land) Act 2006 introduced amendments to the Domicile and Matrimonial 
Proceedings Act 1973 which permit the Court of Session and the sheriff 
court to grant declarator of recognition, or non-recognition, of a matri-
monial decree granted outside the European Union.
Recognition under the Brussels IIa Regulation
Under the Regulation a judgment given in a Member State will be recog-
nised in other Member States without any special procedure being required 
(Art 21(1)). A judgment is defined in Art 2(4) as one for divorce, legal 
 separation or marriage annulment whatever the judgment may be called. 
There is no explicit requirement that the judgment must relate to an oppo-
site-sex union, with the consequence that judgments relating to same-sex 
marriages would probably also come within the scope of the Regula-
tion, at least in those Member States that permit such unions. Automatic 
recognition is subject to the fact that any interested party may apply for a 
decision that the judgment not be recognised (Art 21(3)). The grounds of 
non-recognition are limited to those found in Art 22 which relate to issues 
of public policy (Art 22(a)), natural justice (Art 22(b)) and irreconcilable 
judgments (Art 22(c) and (d)). 
Under the first ground of Art 22(a), recognition will be refused if such 
recognition would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the 
Member State in which recognition is sought. This is an exceptionally 
high standard to meet and recourse to this ground is further limited by 
the fact that the public policy exception may never be utilised in order to 
review the jurisdiction of the court of origin (Art 24). Consequently, a 
judgment must be recognised even if the court of origin assumed jurisdic-
tion incorrectly. Further, Art 26 provides that under no circumstances may 
a judgment be reviewed as to its substance, and Art 25 makes clear that 
recognition may not be refused because the law of the Member State in 
which such recognition is sought would not allow divorce, legal separation 
or marriage annulment on the same facts. 
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The second ground relates to circumstances in which a judgment has 
been granted in default of appearance but will not be available when the 
respondent has accepted the judgment unequivocally (Art 22(b)). The third 
and fourth grounds relate to irreconcilable judgments (Art 22(c) and  (d)). 
These judgments must have been given in proceedings involving the same 
parties but the cause of action need not be identical. The provisions extend 
to those judgments of non-Member States which are recognised in the 
Member State in which recognition is sought. Although the incidence of 
irreconcilable judgments emanating from different Member States will be 
limited by the strict system of lis pendens discussed earlier, since there is 
no possibility of staying proceedings where there is competing litigation 
outside of Europe, the existence of a conflicting non-European matrimo-
nial decree is the most likely problem to occur in practice.
Recognition under the Family Law Act 1986 
The 1986 Act distinguishes between those decrees obtained “by means of 
proceedings” and decrees obtained “otherwise than by means of proceed-
ings”. The 1986 Act contains no detailed guidance on the distinction between 
those two categories but the decision of the House of Lords in Quazi v 
Quazi (1980), interpreting similar wording in the Recognition of Divorces 
and Legal Separations Act 1971, shows that even relatively minimal formali-
ties will be enough to constitute “proceedings” for the purposes of the 
1986 Act. In contrast, in Chaudhary v Chaudhary (1985) the English Court 
of Appeal decided that the mere declaration of a husband that he wished to 
divorce his wife (an act that was effective to dissolve the marriage under the 
law in force in Kashmir), did not amount to  “proceedings”.
Divorces obtained by means of proceedings
The 1986 Act, s 44(2) facilitates the automatic recognition throughout the 
British Islands, meaning the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands and 
the Isle of Man, of divorces, annulments and judicial separations granted 
therein. Such orders cannot be challenged on grounds of jurisdiction. 
Recognition may be refused in Scotland only on the ground of irrecon-
cilability (s 51(1)) or if the order was granted or obtained at a time when, 
according to Scots law, there was no subsisting marriage between the 
parties (s 51(2)). This intra-UK scheme is restricted to orders granted by 
a court of civil jurisdiction (s  44(1)) and does not extend to extra-judicial 
proceedings.
The recognition of overseas divorces obtained by means of proceed-
ings is governed by s 46(1) which provides that such divorces (and annul-
ments and legal separations) will be recognised if effective under the law 
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of the country in which it was obtained (s 46(1)(a)) and, at the date of 
the commencement of proceedings, at least one party to the marriage was 
habitually resident, domiciled in, or a national of that country (s 46(1)(b)). 
A party will be considered domiciled in a country if he was domiciled in 
that country according to either the law of that country in family matters 
or according to the law of the part of the United Kingdom in which the 
question of recognition arises (s 46(5)). 
Recognition of an overseas divorce may be refused on the ground of 
irreconcilability (s 51(1)), or if the order was granted or obtained at a time 
when, according to Scots law, there was no subsisting marriage between 
the parties (s 51(2)). Recognition may also be refused in circumstances 
where there has been a lack of notice of the proceedings given to a party to 
the marriage (s 51(3)(a)(i)). It has been held in England that a foreign decree 
that is otherwise entitled to recognition under s 46 could be refused recog-
nition under s 51(3)(a)(i) if at the time the foreign decree was obtained the 
spouses were living in England and reasonable steps, interpreted according 
to English law and concepts, were not taken to notify the other spouse 
to the foreign proceedings (D v D (Recognition of Foreign Divorce) (1994)). 
Recognition may also be refused if one of the parties had an inadequate 
opportunity to take part in the foreign proceedings (s 51(3)(a)(ii)). To avoid 
duplication with s 51(3)(a)(i), the reason for the lack of participation must 
be for something other than an absence of notice. Finally, recognition may 
be refused where such recognition would be manifestly contrary to public 
policy (s 51(3)(c)).
Section 50 of the 1986 Act provides that where an overseas divorce is 
recognised in any part of the United Kingdom under these provisions, the 
fact that it would not be recognised elsewhere does not preclude either 
party to the marriage from re-marrying in the United Kingdom, or cause 
the re-marriage of either party (wherever that may occur) to be treated as 
invalid in the United Kingdom. For example, a party will be able to marry 
in Scotland following the granting of an overseas divorce even if that 
divorce is not recognised under the law of his domicile. In other words, 
the rules of recognition discussed in this chapter take priority over the rules 
of capacity contained in s 38 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 and 
discussed in Chapter 7.
Divorces obtained otherwise than by means of proceedings
The recognition of overseas divorces (and annulments and legal separa-
tions) obtained otherwise than by means of proceedings is governed by 
s  46(2). This section mirrors s 46(1) in requiring that the divorce be effec-
tive under the law of the country in which it was obtained (s 46(2)) but is 
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more onerous in that in also requires that, at the date on which the divorce 
was obtained, each party was domiciled in that country (s 46(2)(b)(i)) or 
either party to the marriage was domiciled in that country and the other 
party was domiciled in a country under whose law the divorce is recog-
nised as valid (s 46(2)(b)(ii)). Further, even if this requirements are fulfilled, 
recognition will not be extended to such a divorce where either party to 
the marriage was habitually resident in the United Kingdom throughout 
the period of 1 year immediately preceding the date on which it was 
obtained (s 46(2) (c)). As with s 46(1), a party to a marriage will be treated as 
 domiciled in a country if he was domiciled in that country either according 
to the law of that country in family matters or according to the law of the 
part of the United Kingdom in which the question of recognition arises. 
As with divorces obtained by means of proceedings, recognition of an 
overseas divorce obtained otherwise than by means of proceedings may be 
refused on the ground of irreconcilability (s 51(1)), if it was granted at a time 
when, according to the law of Scotland, there was no subsisting marriage 
between the parties (s 51(2)), or when recognition would be manifestly 
contrary to public policy (s 51(3)(c)). An overseas divorce obtained other-
wise than by means of proceedings may also be denied recognition in the 
absence of an official document certifying its effectiveness under the law 
of the country in which it was obtained (s 51(3)(b)(i)) or, in circumstances 
where the parties are not all domiciled in the country in which the divorce 
is obtained, in the absence of an official document certifying its recognition 
in the country of domicile (s 51(3)(b)(ii)).
Civil partnerships
The recognition of judgments concerning civil partnerships mirrors the 
scheme considered above in relation to marriage by distinguishing between 
domestic, European Union and overseas judgments. Judgments from else-
where in the United Kingdom are governed by s 233 of the 2004 Act, with 
only minor differences to the equivalent provisions of the Family Law Act 
1986. The recognition of EU judgments, which in this context includes 
Denmark, is governed by the Civil Partnership ( Jurisdiction and Recog-
nition of Judgments) (Scotland) Regulations 2005 (SSI 2005/629). These 
Regulations mostly mirror the equivalent terms of the Brussels IIa Regu-
lation. Sections 234–238 provide for the recognition or non-recognition 
of overseas judgments by replicating the provisions of the Family Law Act 
1986 discussed above.
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Essential Facts
• A Scottish court will have jurisdiction to entertain an action for 
divorce or separation if it has jurisdiction under the Brussels IIa 
Regulation or if the action is an excluded action and either of the 
spouses is domiciled in Scotland on the date when the action is 
begun (Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, s 7(2A)).
• If jurisdiction is taken under the Brussels IIa Regulation then lis 
pendens will apply to a conflict of jurisdiction; if jurisdiction is taken 
under the residual ground then the system of mandatory and discre-
tionary sists provided by Sch 3 to the 1973 Act will be applicable.
• Jurisdiction to dissolve a civil partnership is governed by ss 219 and 
225 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 and the Civil Partnership 
( Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments) (Scotland) Regula-
tions 2005 (SSI 2005/629), reg 4.
• A judgment given in one Member State will be recognised auto-
matically in all other Member States, subject to the limited grounds 
of non-recognition contained in Art 22 of Brussels IIa.
• The recognition of judgments granted in a country outside the 
European Union is governed by the Family Law Act 1986 which 
distinguishes between divorces obtained by means of proceedings 
(s  46(1)) and divorces obtained otherwise than by means of proceed-
ings (s 46(2)).
Essential Cases 
Sundelind Lopez v Lopez Lizazo (2008): residual grounds of 
jurisdiction may be utilised only when the respondent spouse is not 
“European” in terms of Art 6 and no other court of a Member State 
has jurisdiction under the Brussels IIa Regulation (Art 7).
De Dampierre v De Dampierre (1988): a discretionary sist under 
Sch 3, para 9 to the 1973 Act is the statutory equivalent of the forum 
non conveniens doctrine.
Quazi v Quazi (1980): relatively minimal formalities will be 
enough to constitute “proceedings” for the purposes of the Family 
Law Act 1986.
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9 THE PROPRIETARY CONSEQUENCES 
OF  MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
This chapter will consider the effect of marriage and divorce upon the 
property rights of the parties thereto. Although principally concerned 
with the law as applicable to marriage, brief consideration will be given 
at the end of the chapter to the proprietary consequences of other adult 
relationships, namely civil partnership and de facto cohabitation.
MARRIAGE
The effect that marriage has on property rights differs significantly from 
one legal system to another. Many jurisdictions adopt a system of matrimo-
nial regimes under which a community of property exists, with the conse-
quence that the marriage has the effect of vesting the property, owned by 
either spouse at the time of the marriage or acquired during its subsistence, 
in both spouses jointly. However, such matrimonial property regimes vary 
significantly in their scope, particularly as regards the precise property that 
will be included within the regime. Moreover, most matrimonial property 
regimes operate as the default system to be applied in the absence of choice, 
with parties permitted, to varying degrees, to exercise autonomy in coming 
to their own arrangements. In contrast, Scotland adopts a system of separa-
tion of property under which a marriage, subject to some exceptions, has 
no effect on the property rights of the spouses (Family Law (Scotland) Act 
1985, s 24), with spouses being free to enter into an agreement to regulate 
their proprietary relations should they so wish (Family Law (Scotland) Act 
2006, s 39(6)(b)).
Matrimonial regimes implied by statute
In many legal systems, particularly those of continental Europe, the absence 
of an express agreement between the spouses will result in the applica-
tion of a default statutory regime establishing a community of property 
as between the spouses. In Scotland, the decision of the House of Lords 
in Lashley v Hog (1804) was previously thought to prevent such default 
foreign regimes being given effect. This decision was distinguished by the 
same court in the English case of De Nicols v Curlier (1900) on the basis that 
the question in Lashley was not one of matrimonial property at all but one 
referable to the law of succession. Consequently, the House of Lords in De 
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Nicols gave effect to a French system of community of goods which oper-
ated in the absence of express agreement.
The rights which spouses acquire under a default statutory regime are 
thought to vest at the point of the marriage, even if the spouses subse-
quently become domiciled elsewhere. This is known as the doctrine of 
immutability. Although the decision in Lashley could be interpreted as 
applying the doctrine of mutability, whereby rights in matrimonial prop-
erty would adapt to the changed circumstances of the spouses, this decision 
can once again be distinguished on the basis that it is actually concerned 
with the law of succession rather than the law relating to matrimonial 
property regimes. Instead, the doctrine of immutability finds support in 
De Nicols, in which two French citizens, domiciled in France, married in 
that country in 1854 without entering into a written contract. The parties 
subsequently relocated to England and became domiciled in that country. 
When the husband died in 1897 it was held by the House of Lords that 
the proprietary rights created by the original matrimonial regime persisted 
and the wife therefore remained entitled to that property which fell within 
the French system of community of goods applicable at the time of the 
marriage.
Marriage contracts
In the absence of a default system of community of goods, or in place of 
such a system should the system permit its own displacement, spouses may 
enter into a private marriage contract to regulate their proprietary relations. 
Such contracts are expressly excluded from the provisions of the Rome I 
Regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Art 1(2)(c)). 
The consequence of this is that a marriage contract will be governed by the 
rules of the common law in that the proper law of a marriage contract will 
be considered to be either the law agreed by the parties, whether expressly 
or by implication, or, failing such agreement, the law with which the 
contract has the most real and substantial connection.
A marriage contract will be considered to be valid as to form if it complies 
with the requirements of either the law of the place of execution or the 
proper law. Essential validity is to be determined by the law with reference 
to which the contract was made, and which was intended by the parties to 
govern their rights and liabilities, namely the proper law. If the proper law 
has not been chosen expressly, the courts will consider the circumstances 
and terms of the contract to ascertain what intention should be imputed 
to the parties. The most important factor in this determination will be the 
domicile of the parties but other factors may also be relevant, depending on 
the specific circumstances. The proper law will also apply equally to both 
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moveable and immoveable property, although its application to the latter 
will be subject to the lex situs. 
The law applicable to issues of capacity is yet to be determined defini-
tively, with the balance of English authority, and an analogy with the topic 
of commercial contracts, pointing towards the proper law of the contract. 
However, the decision of the House of Lords in Cooper v Cooper (1888), 
on appeal from Scotland, has been interpreted as pointing towards the 
applicable law as being the domiciliary law of the person whose capacity 
is at issue, especially where this coincides with the lex loci contractus. Revo-
cability is an issue for the proper law of the contract, while capacity to 
revoke is an issue for the law of the domicile of the party at the time of the 
revocation (Sawrey-Cookson v Sawrey-Cookson’s Trustees (1905)). As regards 
immoveables, capacity will be referred to the lex situs of the property (Black 
v Black’s Trustees (1950)).
No implied regime or marriage contract
In the absence of both an implied default statutory scheme and a bespoke 
marriage contract, reference must be made to s 39 of the Family Law 
(Scotland) Act 2006 in order to identify the applicable law. Section 39(1) 
states that any question in relation to the rights of spouses to each other’s 
immoveable property arising by virtue of the marriage shall be determined 
by the law of the place in which the property is situated. Section 39(4) 
extends the application of the lex situs to the use or occupation of a matri-
monial home which is moveable and the use of the contents of a matri-
monial home (whether the home is moveable or immoveable). Where the 
spouses are domiciled in the same country, any question in relation to the 
rights of the spouses to each other’s moveable property shall be determined 
by the law of that country (s 39(2)). If the spouses are domiciled in different 
countries they shall be taken to have the same rights to such property as 
they had immediately before the marriage (s 39(3)). Should a spouse change 
his or her domicile this will not affect a vested right in moveable property 
which existed immediately before the change (s 39(5)). These rules do not 
apply in relation to the law on aliment, financial provision on divorce, or 
to the transfer of property on divorce or succession (s 39(6)(a)).
DIVORCE
A Scottish court will have jurisdiction to make orders for financial provi-
sion if it has jurisdiction to make a decree of divorce, separation or nullity 
of marriage (Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, s 10(1)). 
Accordingly, where a Scottish court has jurisdiction either under Art 3 of 
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the Brussels IIa Regulation or via the residual rule contained in s 7(2A)(b) 
of the 1973 Act it will also have jurisdiction over the financial aspects of 
divorce. Upon assuming such jurisdiction, the ownership of marital prop-
erty will be determined according to the provisions of the Family Law 
(Scotland) Act 1985. Stated succinctly, the 1985 Act defines matrimonial 
property as all property belonging to the parties (s 10(4)) at the date on 
which the parties cease to cohabit (s 10(3)). This property must have been 
acquired during the marriage, otherwise than by way of gift or succession, 
though, in the case of property intended for use as a family home or as 
furniture or plenishings for such a home, it may be acquired before the 
date of marriage (s 10(4)). The net value of the matrimonial property will 
be shared fairly between the parties, with fairness equated to equal sharing 
unless such other proportions are justified by special circumstances (s 10(1)).
Part IV of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 furnishes 
the Scottish courts with the jurisdiction to make orders for financial provi-
sion following a foreign divorce. This power will be available only when 
the strict jurisdictional requirements and additional conditions of s 28 are 
satisfied. Section 28 requires both parties to have a connection to Scot-
land. For the applicant, this connection must be in the form of domicile or 
habitual residence on the date the application is made (s 28(2)(a)). The other 
party to the marriage must also have a connection to Scotland and this may 
be in terms of domicile or habitual residence either on the date the applica-
tion is made (s 28(2)(b)(i)) or at the time when the parties last lived together 
as husband and wife (s 28(2)(b)(ii)). A connection can also be established via 
the ownership of property if, on the date when the application is made, 
the other party was an owner or tenant of, or had a beneficial interest in, 
property in Scotland which had at some time been a matrimonial home 
of the parties (s 28(2)(b)(iii)). If an application is made on this final juris-
dictional ground then the court is limited in the orders it may make to an 
order relating to that former matrimonial home or its furniture and plen-
ishings, or an order that the other party to the marriage shall pay to the 
applicant a capital sum not exceeding the value of that other party’s interest 
in the former matrimonial home and its furniture and plenishings (s 29(5)). 
Further localisation requirements apply when the action is brought in a 
sheriff court (s 28(2)(c)). 
Section 28(3) details a further six conditions that must be met before 
the court may entertain an application by one of the parties for an order 
for financial provision. If both the jurisdictional requirements of s  28(2) 
and the additional conditions of s  28(3) are satisfied, the application for 
an order for financial provision will be governed by Scots law as it would 
apply if the application were being made in an action for divorce in Scot-
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land (s 29). In relevant cases, the provisions of Pt IV will be superseded by 
the terms of Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on 
jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and 
co-operation in matters relating to maintenance obligations.
CIVIL PARTNERSHIP
Following the underlying principle of the Civil Partnership Act 2004, civil 
partners are treated identically to spouses as regards matrimonial property 
and financial provision following the dissolution of a civil partnership. 
Consequently, the terms of the 2004 Act and the amendments introduced 
thereby ensure that what is said above in relation to spouses can be applied 
to civil partners mutatis mutandis.
COHABITATION
Sections 25–30 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 provide cohabi-
tants, as defined in s 25, with limited proprietary and financial rights. 
Outwith the jurisdictional criteria applicable in respect of an action by a 
surviving cohabitation for provision on intestacy (s 29), the provisions of 
the 2006 Act are silent as to their private international law implications. 
It therefore remains a matter of speculation as to how the provisions will 
be interpreted should a case with international connections come before a 
Scottish court.   
Essential Facts
• Scotland adopts a system of separation of property under which 
a marriage, subject to some exceptions, has no effect on the prop-
erty rights of the spouses (Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985, s 24). 
In contrast, many other countries enforce matrimonial property 
regimes which create a community of property as between the 
spouses.
• The rights which spouses acquire under a default statutory regime 
are thought to vest at the point of the marriage, even if the spouses 
subsequently become domiciled elsewhere. This is known as the 
doctrine of immutability.
• The proper law of a marriage contract is the law chosen by the 
parties or, in the absence of such agreement, the law with which the 
contract has the most real and substantial connection.
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• Section 39 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 identifies the law 
applicable to determine matrimonial property rights in the absence 
of both an implied statutory scheme and a marriage contract. 
• A Scottish court will have jurisdiction to make orders for financial 
provision if it has jurisdiction to make a decree of divorce, separa-
tion or nullity of marriage (Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings 
Act 1973, s 10(1)). If jurisdiction exists, the ownership of marital 
property will be determined according to the provisions of the 
Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985.
• Part IV of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 
furnishes the Scottish courts with the jurisdiction to make orders 
for financial provision following a foreign divorce. This power will 
be available only when the strict jurisdictional requirements and 
additional conditions of s 28 are satisfied.
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10 MAINTENANCE
The principal legislative framework applicable to issues of maintenance is 
found in Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on 
jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and 
co-operation in matters relating to maintenance obligations (commonly 
referred to as the “Maintenance Regulation”), which came into force on 18 
June 2011. The Maintenance Regulation applies to all maintenance obliga-
tions arising from a family relationship, parentage, marriage or affinity, with 
the term “maintenance obligation” to be given an autonomous interpreta-
tion (Recital (11) and Art 1). Matters relating to maintenance previously 
fell within the scope of the Brussels I Regulation and its predecessor the 
1968 Brussels Convention but the Maintenance Regulation replaces these 
provisions and, accordingly, maintenance obligations are excluded specifi-
cally from the scope of the Brussels I Regulation (recast) in Art  1(2)(a). The 
Regulation applies in all Member States but, in relation to Denmark, only 
insofar as it amends the Brussels I Regulation.
JURISDICTION
Chapter II of the Maintenance Regulation details the jurisdictional rules 
applicable to matters relating to maintenance obligations. These rules bear 
a resemblance to those found in the Brussels I Regulation but have been 
refined in order to reflect the peculiarities of maintenance obligations. 
The general provisions as to jurisdiction are to be found in Art 3 which 
provides four alternative grounds of jurisdiction. First, jurisdiction will 
lie with the court for the place where the defendant is habitually resident 
(Art  3(a)), or the court for the place where the creditor is habitually resi-
dent (Art  3(b)). Article 3(c) provides that jurisdiction shall also lie with 
the court which, according to its own law, has jurisdiction to entertain 
proceedings concerning the status of a person if the matter relating to 
maintenance is ancillary to those proceedings, unless that jurisdiction is 
based solely on the nationality of one of the parties. A rule identical in its 
wording to Art  3(c) is contained in Art 3(d) regarding maintenance which 
is ancillary to parental responsibility proceedings. In the context of the 
United Kingdom and Ireland, the reference to “nationality” is to be read 
as a reference to domicile (Art 2(3)).
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Article 4 adopts the principle of party autonomy by allowing parties to 
come to an agreement conferring jurisdiction on a court or the courts of 
a Member State to settle any disputes in matters relating to a maintenance 
obligation which have arisen or may arise between them. This agreement 
shall be in writing with any communication by electronic means which 
provides a durable record of the agreement being equivalent to writing 
(Art 4(2)). Party autonomy is limited, however, to those courts identified 
in Art 4(1), namely: the courts of the Member State in which one of the 
parties is habitually resident (Art 4(1)(a)); the courts of the Member State 
of which one of the parties has the nationality (or domicile in the case of 
the United Kingdom and Ireland) (Art 4(1)(b)); or, in the case of mainte-
nance obligations between spouses or former spouses, the court which has 
jurisdiction to settle their dispute in matrimonial matters (Art 4(1)(c)(i)) 
or the courts of the Member State of the spouses’ last common habitual 
residence where that endured for at least 1 year (Art 4(1)(c)(ii)). In each 
circumstance the condition stated has to be met at either the time the 
choice of court agreement is concluded or at the time the court is seised. 
An agreement coming within the scope of Art 4 will be treated as exclusive 
unless the parties have agreed otherwise. Party autonomy is also subject to 
a more general restriction in that Art 4 does not apply to a dispute relating 
to a maintenance obligation towards a child under the age of 18 (Art 4(3)). 
Jurisdiction will also exist in the court of a Member State before which the 
defendant enters an appearance other than to contest jurisdiction (Art 5).
Article 6 provides a ground of subsidiary jurisdiction available in 
circumstances where no Member State has jurisdiction under Arts 3, 4 or 5 
and no state party to the 2007 Lugano Convention has jurisdiction under 
that instrument, the provisions of which remain applicable as regards the 
EFTA states. In such circumstances jurisdiction will lie with the courts of 
the Member State of the common nationality (or domicile in the case of 
the United Kingdom and Ireland) of the parties. For the purposes of Art  6, 
parties who have their domicile in different territorial units of the same 
Member State are treated as having their common domicile within that 
State (Art 2(3)). Finally, where no court of a Member State has jurisdic-
tion pursuant to Arts 3, 4, 5 or 6, Art 7 provides that a Member State 
court which has “sufficient connection” with the dispute may, on an excep-
tional basis, hear the case if proceedings cannot reasonably be brought, or 
conducted, or would be impossible, in a third State with which the dispute 
is closely connected. Guidance on this article is found in Recital (16) which 
explains that a “sufficient connection” could be the nationality (or domi-
cile) of just one of the parties and the “exceptional basis” justifying the use 
of this ground of jurisdiction may be deemed to exist when proceedings 
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prove impossible in the third state of close connection because of civil war. 
Article 8 seeks to prevent a maintenance debtor from modifying an 
existing order or bringing fresh proceedings in another Member State after 
a decision has been delivered. It applies both to judgments rendered in a 
Member State and also to judgments rendered in a Contracting State to the 
Hague Convention of 23 November 2007 on the International Recovery 
of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance. Subject to 
the exceptions listed in Art 8(2), Art 8(1) provides a negative rule of juris-
diction in stating that, where a decision is given in either a Member or 
Contracting State in which the creditor is habitually resident, proceedings 
to modify the decision or to have a new decision given cannot be brought 
by the debtor in any other Member State as long as the creditor remains 
habitually resident in the state of origin.
Articles 9–14 contain provisions replicating those found in the Brussels  I 
Regulation in providing an autonomous definition of the time at which 
the court will be deemed to be seised (Art 9), implementing the lis pendens 
system of jurisdiction allocation (Art 12) and delimiting the approach 
of the courts when related actions are pending in the courts of different 
Member States (Art 13). Article 10 requires that a court of a Member State 
seised of a case over which it has no jurisdiction shall declare of its own 
motion that it has no jurisdiction. Article 11 provides special rules as to the 
service of process when the defendant is habitually resident in a state other 
than the Member State where the action is brought and does not enter an 
appearance. Article 14 governs provisional and protective measures.
CHOICE OF LAW
Chapter III of the Maintenance Regulation contains a single article, Art  15, 
which does not provide explicit choice of law rules but instead states that 
the law applicable to maintenance obligations shall be  determined in 
accordance with the Hague Protocol of 23 November 2007 on the Law 
Applicable to Maintenance Obligations in the Member States bound by 
that instrument. The 2007 Hague Protocol provides a general rule that 
maintenance obligations shall be governed by the law of the state of the 
habitual residence of the creditor, save where the Protocol provides other-
wise (Art  3). The United Kingdom declined to opt into the decision of the 
European Union to sign and ratify the 2007 Hague Protocol and is there-
fore not bound by its terms. Accordingly, s 40 of the Family Law (Scotland) 
Act 2006 provides that a Scottish court will apply Scots internal law in any 
action for aliment which comes before it, subject to the  limited exceptions 
found in the Maintenance Orders (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1972.
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RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT
Chapter IV of the Maintenance Regulation contains provisions as to the 
recognition and enforcement of maintenance decisions, with different 
rules applying depending on the Member State from which the decision 
emanates. This distinction has been drawn on the basis of whether the 
Member State of origin is bound by the 2007 Hague Protocol (Art 16). 
Articles 17–22 apply to those states that are so bound, Arts 23–38 to those 
that are not. Articles 39–43 apply regardless of the Member State of origin. 
The United Kingdom and Denmark are the only Member States not to be 
bound by the 2007 Hague Protocol. 
Decisions given in a Member State bound by the 2007 Hague 
Protocol 
Article 17 abolishes exequatur in requiring that a decision given in a Member 
State will be recognised in another Member State without any special proce-
dure being required and without any possibility of opposing its recognition 
(Art 17(1)). Such a decision will also be enforced in another Member State 
without the need for a declaration of enforceability (Art  17(2)). Procedural 
fairness for defendants who did not enter an appearance in the Member 
State of origin is provided by the review mechanism of Art 19. The review 
must occur in the Member State of origin and only in the circumstances 
detailed in the article. The opportunity for the defendant to utilise this 
review procedure is subject to a time limit specified in Art 19(2). If the 
court of origin accepts the application for review, the maintenance decision 
shall be null and void. If, however, the court rejects the application then the 
decision will remain in force (Art 19(3)). The decision will be enforced in 
another Member State upon production of the relevant documents speci-
fied in Art 20. Article 21 details the limited grounds on which enforcement 
may be refused or suspended. First, enforcement may be refused if the right 
to enforce is extinguished by the effect of prescription or the limitation of 
action, under the law of either the Member State of origin or the Member 
State of enforcement – whichever provides for the longer limitation period 
(Art 21(2)). Second, enforcement may also be refused if the original deci-
sion is irreconcilable with a decision given in the Member State of enforce-
ment or with a decision given in another Member State or in a third state 
which fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition in the Member 
State of enforcement (Art 21(2)). Finally, enforcement may be suspended 
where the court of the Member State of origin has been seised of an Art 19 
review application and shall be suspended where the enforceability of the 
decision is suspended in the Member State of origin (Art 21(3)). 
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Decisions given in a Member State not bound by the 2007 
Hague Protocol 
The procedures for the recognition and enforcement of decisions given 
in a Member State not bound by the 2007 Hague Protocol (which, from 
the viewpoint of the United Kingdom, relate only to Denmark) are 
modelled on the equivalent provisions contained in the Brussels I Regula-
tion (Recital  (26)). The key difference in comparison with those  decisions 
given in Member States that are bound by the 2007 Hague Protocol 
is to be found in the fact that a decision from the United Kingdom or 
Denmark will be enforceable only in another Member State when it has 
been declared enforceable there (Art 26). The application for a declaration 
of enforceability, referred to in the United Kingdom as a “registration for 
enforcement”, must be accompanied by specific documentation as detailed 
in Art 28. Article 24 identifies the grounds on which recognition may be 
refused and these mirror Art 34 of the Brussels I Regulation in referring to 
public policy, natural justice and irreconcilability.
Assuming compliance with the required formalities, a decision will be 
declared enforceable without any review and without the party against 
whom enforcement is sought being able to make any submissions (Art  30). 
Thereafter both parties will be notified (Art 31) and an appeal can be lodged 
in accordance with the procedures in Art 32. The court with which the 
appeal is lodged shall revoke a registration only on those grounds specified 
in Art 24. 
United Kingdom orders
The free movement of orders for aliment or maintenance between the 
territorial units of the United Kingdom is governed by the Maintenance 
Orders Act 1950, s 17(2) of which provides that an order made in one part 
of the United Kingdom may be registered in the court of another part if 
the person liable to make the payments resides in that other part and it 
is convenient that the order should be enforceable there. The discretion 
exercisable under this section lies with the court of origin, not the court of 
registration. An order so registered in another part of the United Kingdom 
may be enforced in that part of the United Kingdom as if it had been made 
by the registering court (s 18(1)). 
Other regimes
A variety of other instruments and agreements play a role in facilitating 
the recognition and enforcement of maintenance orders, the applicability 
of which depends on the identity of the country from which the order 
 originates. For example, Pt I of the Maintenance Orders  (Reciprocal 
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Enforcement) Act 1972 provides a system of reciprocal enforcement 
 operative between the United Kingdom and reciprocating Common-
wealth  countries.
Essential Facts
• This area is governed primarily by Council Regulation (EC) No 
4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recog-
nition and enforcement of decisions and co-operation in matters 
relating to maintenance obligations (commonly referred to as the 
“Maintenance Regulation”).
• Chapter II of the Regulation details the jurisdictional rules appli-
cable to matters relating to maintenance obligations.
• Parties may agree that a particular court or courts of a Member State 
shall have jurisdiction to settle any disputes in matters relating to 
maintenance obligations but this choice is limited to those courts 
identified in Art 4.
• Section 40 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 provides that a 
Scottish court will apply Scots internal law in any action for aliment 
which comes before it, subject to the limited exceptions found in the 
Maintenance Orders (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1972.
• The Regulation applies different rules regarding the recognition 
and enforcement of maintenance decisions depending on whether 
or not the Member State of origin is bound by the Hague Protocol 
of 23 November 2007 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obli-
gations.
• For those Member States bound by the 2007 Hague Protocol, 
exequatur has been abolished and a decision given in such a Member 
State will be recognised and enforced in all other Member States 
without any special procedure being required (Art 17).
• A decision from a Member State not bound by the 2007 Hague 
Protocol (the United Kingdom and Denmark) shall be enforceable 
in another Member State when it has been declared enforceable 
there (Art 26).
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11 CHILDREN
Questions of private international law in relation to children arise in a 
number of different contexts. This chapter will consider the private inter-
national law issues relevant to children with regard to matters of status, 
parental responsibility, abduction and adoption. The importance of the 
latter three areas continues to rise as a consequence of the growth in inter-
national mobility leading to an increase in families with links to more than 
one jurisdiction. 
STATUS
In Scotland the concepts of legitimacy and illegitimacy, and the differ-
ences premised upon this categorisation, were abolished by the Family Law 
(Scotland) Act 2006. Section 21(2)(a) of the 2006 Act, which introduced 
a new s 1(1) to the Law Reform (Parent and Child) (Scotland) Act 1986, 
provides that no person whose status is governed by Scots law shall be ille-
gitimate and, accordingly, the fact that a person’s parents are not or have 
not been married to each other shall be left out of account in determining 
the person’s legal status or establishing the legal relationship between the 
person and any other person. 
As this amendment only applies to a person “whose status is governed 
by Scots law”, the marital status of a person’s parents may still be a relevant 
consideration for those persons whose status is not governed by Scots law, 
most notably when a Scottish court may be required to apply a foreign 
law in matters related to succession. Previously, problems of circularity 
bedevilled this area as under the common law the determination of domi-
cile depended on legitimacy but the status of legitimacy was to be deter-
mined by a person’s domicile. The 2006 Act has removed this problem 
in providing statutory rules for both the determination of status and the 
identification of domicile. Thus, s 41 of the 2006 Act provides that any 
question as to the effect on a person’s status of the fact that the person’s 
parents are, or have been, married to each other (or, are not married to each 
other) will be determined by the law of the country in which the person is 
domiciled at the time at which the question arises. Domicile will be deter-
mined in accordance with s 22, under which no reference is made to the 
marital status of the parents. 




There are three distinct jurisdictional regimes relating to matters of parental 
responsibility: Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 
2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsi-
bility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 (commonly referred to 
as the “Brussels IIa Regulation”); the Hague Convention of 19 October 
1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and 
Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the 
Protection of Children; and the rules of the Family Law Act 1986. There 
is a clear hierarchy between these regimes, with the Brussels IIa Regulation 
at the apex and the rules of the 1996 Hague Convention and the 1986 Act 
subordinate thereto.
The Brussels IIa Regulation
The Brussels IIa Regulation provides uniform jurisdictional rules in civil 
matters for the attribution, exercise, delegation, restriction or termination 
of parental responsibility (Art 1(1)(b)). The Regulation applies throughout 
the European Union with the exclusion of Denmark. The phrase “civil 
matters” is to be given an autonomous meaning and may therefore extend 
to measures which would be considered to be a matter of public law within 
the domestic legal system of a Member State (Proceedings Brought by A 
(2010)). Article 1(2) identifies a number of matters to which the Regulation 
will apply while Art 1(3) lists those matters which fall outside the scope 
of the Regulation. “Parental responsibility” is further defined in Art  2(7) 
as referring to all rights and duties relating to the person or the property 
of a child which are given to a natural or legal person by judgment, by 
operation of law or by an agreement having legal effect, including rights 
of custody and rights of access.
Article 8 (general jurisdiction): Article 8 establishes the primary juris-
dictional rule in matters of parental responsibility in that jurisdiction will 
lie with the courts of the Member State in which the child is habitually 
resident at the time the court is seised in terms of Art 16. A child will be 
habitually resident in a Member State in which he is physically present, 
with this presence not in any way temporary or intermittent but reflecting 
some degree of integration in a social and family environment. Factors 
relevant in the identification of habitual residence include, but are not 
limited to, the duration, regularity, conditions and reasons for the stay in 
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a Member State and the family’s move to that state, the child’s nationality, 
the place and conditions of attendance at school, linguistic knowledge, 
and the family and social relationships of the child in that state (Proceedings 
Brought by A (2010)). This ground of jurisdiction is subject to the provisions 
of Arts 9, 10 (discussed below) and 12 which deal with issues of continuing 
jurisdiction, jurisdiction in cases of child abduction and prorogation of 
jurisdiction respectively.
Article 9 (continuing jurisdiction): Once the court of a Member State 
is seised under Art 8 it may continue to have jurisdiction under Art 9 even 
after a change in the child’s habitual residence, thus preventing the courts in 
the Member State of the child’s new habitual residence taking jurisdiction 
under Art 8. This right of continuing jurisdiction applies only to access 
rights; it does not extend to other matters of parental responsibility. For the 
continuing jurisdiction of Art 9 to be effective the court originally seised 
under Art 8 must have issued a judgment on access rights before the child 
lawfully acquired a new habitual residence in another Member State while 
the holder of the access rights must continue to have his habitual residence 
in the Member State of the child’s former habitual residence (Art  9(1)). 
If these requirements are satisfied then the court originally seised under 
Art 8 will retain jurisdiction during a three-month period following the 
move for the purpose of modifying a judgment on access rights previously 
issued (Art 9(1)). This continuing jurisdiction will not apply if the holder 
of access rights has accepted the jurisdiction of the courts of the Member 
State of the child’s new habitual residence by participating in proceedings 
before those courts without contesting jurisdiction (Art 9(2)). Moreover, 
the provisions of Art 9 do not prevent the courts of the Member State of 
the child’s new habitual residence from exercising their Art 8 jurisdiction 
to decide matters of parental responsibility other than those relating to 
access rights.
Article 12 (prorogation of jurisdiction): Article 12 provides a limited 
measure of party autonomy in two distinct circumstances. First, Art 12(1) 
provides that a court of a Member State exercising jurisdiction in matrimo-
nial proceedings under Art 3 will also have jurisdiction in matters relating 
to parental responsibility when at least one of the spouses has parental 
responsibility in relation to the child (Art 12(1)(a)) and the juris diction 
of the court has been accepted, expressly or otherwise in an unequivocal 
manner, by the spouses as well as any holders of parental responsibility 
(Art  12(1)(b)). Mere submission in matrimonial proceedings is not sufficient 
to indicate unequivocal acceptance of the jurisdiction of that same court 
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in matters of parental responsibility (Bush v Bush (2008)). In addition, it 
must be in the “superior interests” of the child, a concept considered to be 
equivalent to the more familiar concept of the “best interests” of the child 
(Re I (A Child) (Contact Application: Jurisdiction) (2009)) for that court to take 
jurisdiction (Art 12(1)(b)). The jurisdiction conferred under Art 12(1) will 
cease upon the occurrence of one of the events listed in Art  12(2).
Alternatively, proceedings may also be brought under Art 12(3) in a 
Member State with which the child has a substantial connection and it is 
in his best interests for the proceedings to be brought in that state. This 
provision will be effective only when the jurisdiction of the courts has 
been accepted expressly or otherwise in an unequivocal manner by all the 
parties to the proceedings (Art 12(3)(b)). What may constitute a “substan-
tial connection” includes, but is not limited to, the fact that one of the 
holders of parental responsibility is habitually resident in that Member 
State or that the child is a national of that Member State (Art 12(3)(a)).
Article 12(4) provides that, where a child has his habitual residence in 
the territory of a third state which is not a contracting party to the 1996 
Hague Convention then jurisdiction under either Art 12(1) or (3) will be 
considered to be in the child’s superior/best interests. This will be particu-
larly so if it is impossible to hold proceedings in the third state in question.
Article 13 (presence): Should it not be possible to determine the habitual 
residence of the child, therefore precluding the application of Art 8, then, 
in the absence of an agreement under either limb of Art 12, proceedings 
may be brought on the basis of the child’s presence in a Member State. 
Article 14 (residual jurisdiction): Where no court of a Member State has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Arts 8–13, jurisdiction shall be determined, in each 
Member State, by the laws of that state. Any subsequent judgment will 
be recognised and enforced in other Member States pursuant to the rules 
of the Regulation. In Scotland this means that the Family Law Act 1986 
retains a limited jurisdictional role, discussed further below.
Article 15 (transfer of jurisdiction): Article 15 constitutes a notable 
exception to the otherwise rigid system of the allocation of jurisdiction 
found within the Brussels family of instruments by permitting the transfer 
of jurisdiction to a court considered better placed to hear a case. This 
mechanism may operate regardless of the ground on which the original 
court takes jurisdiction but is only effective to transfer jurisdiction to the 
courts of another Member State. 
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Article 15(1) provides that a Member State court with jurisdiction which 
considers that the courts of another Member State with which the child has 
a particular connection, defined in Art 15(3), would be better placed to 
hear the case, may, if it is in the best interests of the child, request that the 
other Member State assume jurisdiction. The provision may be invoked 
by a party alone, by the court seised of its own motion, or, by a court in 
a Member State with which the child has one of the identified particular 
connections (Art 15(2)). Article 15(4)–(6) provides further detail as to the 
manner in which this power may be exercised. 
Article 19 (lis pendens): The allocation of jurisdiction in a case of concur-
rent proceedings relating to parental responsibility will be determined 
according to the lis pendens rule considered in earlier chapters. Thus, where 
proceedings relating to parental responsibility relating to the same child and 
involving the same cause of action are brought before courts of different 
Member States, the court second seised shall of its own motion stay its 
proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of the court first seised is 
established (Art 19(2)), at which point the court second seised shall decline 
jurisdiction in favour of that court (Art 19(3)), unless the court first seised 
stays its proceedings under Art 15.
Article 20 (provisional and protective measures): Article 20(1) of the 
Regulation provides that, in urgent cases, its provisions do not prevent the 
courts of a Member State from taking such provisional, including protec-
tive, measures in respect of persons or assets in that state as may be avail-
able under the law of that Member State, even if, under the Regulation, 
the court of another Member State has jurisdiction as to the substance of 
the matter. As an exception to the Regulation’s system of jurisdiction, this 
basis must be interpreted strictly and relied on only in exceptional circum-
stances, such as where measures are necessary in a Member State other than 
that of the child’s habitual residence in order to address a situation likely 
seriously to endanger the welfare of the child.
The 1996 Hague Convention
The 1996 Hague Convention came into force in the United Kingdom on 
1 November 2012 and contains rules of jurisdiction which are similar, 
although not identical, to those contained in the Brussels IIa Regulation. 
The Convention defines “parental responsibility” as including parental 
authority, or any analogous relationship of authority determining the 
rights, powers and responsibilities of parents, guardians or other legal repre-
sentatives in relation to the person or the property of the child (Art 1(2)) 
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with Arts 3 and 4 setting out respectively what matters the  Convention 
will, and will not, apply to. The sum of these provisions is that the material 
scope of the Convention equates to that of the Regulation.
Article 5 of the Convention gives jurisdiction to the state of the child’s 
habitual residence, a rule which mirrors the general ground of jurisdiction 
under Art 8 of the Regulation. There is, however, no equivalent to the 
provision of Art 9 of the Regulation regarding continuing jurisdiction with 
regard to access rights following a change in the child’s habitual residence. 
Instead, Art 5(2) of the Convention expressly states that, subject to Art 7, 
which is applicable in the context of child abduction, following a change 
of the child’s habitual residence to another Contracting State, the authori-
ties of the state of the new habitual residence will have jurisdiction. It is 
also possible for jurisdiction to be founded on the presence of the child in 
a Contracting State when habitual residence cannot be established (Art 6).
Article 10 of the Convention grants a limited right of prorogation – a 
right which is even more constrained that that available under the Regula-
tion, as it allows only for the possibility of jurisdiction being taken by the 
matrimonial forum. Due to the global nature of the Convention, there is 
no requirement that the matrimonial forum be exercising jurisdiction by 
virtue of Art 3 of the Regulation. There is no equivalent of Art 12(3) of 
the Regulation which provides for jurisdiction being taken by the courts of 
a Member State with which the child has a substantial connection.
The transfer mechanism of Art 8, which inspired Art 15 of the Regula-
tion, permits a case to be transferred to a Contracting State other than that 
state with jurisdiction under Arts 5 or 6 if that other state comes within 
the terms of Art 8(2). Article 8(2) is similar in its terms to Art 15(3) of 
the Regulation, which exhaustively defines those Member States which are 
considered to have a “particular connection” to the child but, importantly, 
Art 8(2) merely identifies, among other states, a state with which the child 
has a “substantial connection” – a term which is left undefined. Accordingly, 
the Convention potentially offers a wider choice of states to which proceed-
ings may be transferred than that available under the Regulation. As in the 
Regulation, such a transfer of jurisdiction can be instigated by the authorities 
of a Contracting State to which jurisdiction could be transferred (Art 9).
The Convention also includes the possibility for temporary measures to 
be taken in cases of urgency (Art 11) or for the protection of the person or 
property of the child (Art 12). Article 13 contains a lis pendens clause but 
this is not applied as strictly as under the Regulation, notably as the court 
first seised is permitted to decline jurisdiction (Art 13(2)). In contrast with 
Art  14 of the Regulation, there is no rule in the Convention restricting 
the exercise of residual jurisdiction, with the consequence that recognition 
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of a judgment may be refused under the Convention if jurisdiction was 
founded on a non-Convention ground (Art 23(2)(a)).
The respective spheres of operation of the 1996 Hague Convention and 
the Brussels IIa Regulation depend on the habitual residence of the child. If 
the child is habitually resident in an EU Member State, the Regulation will 
apply; if the child is habitually resident in a non-EU Contracting State, the 
Convention will apply (Convention, Art 52; Regulation, Art 61).
The Family Law Act 1986
Prior to the coming into force of the Brussels IIa Regulation and the 1996 
Hague Convention, the jurisdiction of the Scottish courts to make an order 
with respect to the residence, custody, care or control of a child, contact 
with or access to a child, or the education or upbringing of a child was 
governed by Ch III of the Family Law Act 1986. These rules must now 
be read in light of s 17A of the 1986 Act (as introduced and subsequently 
amended by the European Communities (Matrimonial and Parental 
Responsibility Jurisdiction and Judgments) (Scotland) Regulations 2005 
(SSI 2005/42) and the Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protec-
tion of Children (International Obligations) (Scotland) Regulations 2010 
(SSI 2010/213) respectively) which provides that the provisions of Ch III 
are “subject to Sections 2 and 3 of Chapter II of the Council Regulation 
and are subject to the Hague Convention”. Consequently, recourse may be 
had to the provisions of the 1986 Act only when neither the Regulation 
nor the Convention is engaged.
Choice of law
While the Brussels IIa Regulation is limited to matters of jurisdiction and 
recognition and enforcement, the 1996 Hague Convention is broader in 
its scope by also identifying the law to be applied when jurisdiction is 
exercised thereunder. By virtue of r 6 of the Parental Responsibility and 
Measures for the Protection of Children (International Obligations) (Scot-
land) Regulations 2010 (SSI 2010/213) these choice of law provisions will 
also apply when jurisdiction is taken under the Regulation. However, the 
practical consequences of these choice of law provisions will be minimal 
as Art 15 of the Convention provides that, in exercising jurisdiction, the 
authorities of the Contracting States shall apply their own law. Accord-
ingly, whenever a Scottish court takes jurisdiction under either the Regu-
lation or the Convention, it will apply Scots law. Only in exceptional 
circumstances, insofar as the protection of the person or the property of 
the child requires, may the law of another state with which the situation has 
a substantial connection be applied or taken into consideration (Art  15(2)). 
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The attribution or extinction of parental responsibility by operation 
of law, without the intervention of a judicial or administrative authority, 
is governed by the law of the state of the habitual residence of the child 
(Art  16(1)). The attribution or extinction of parental responsibility by 
an agreement or a unilateral act, without intervention of a judicial or 
administrative authority, is governed by the law of the state of the child’s 
habitual residence at the time when the agreement or unilateral act takes 
effect (Art  16(2)). A change in the child’s habitual residence does not affect 
parental responsibility which exists under the law of the state of the previous 
habitual residence (Art 16(3)) but the attribution of parental responsibility 
by operation of law to a person who does not already have such respon-
sibility is governed by the law of the state of the new habitual residence. 
The Convention thus promotes both the retention and the acquisition of 
parental responsibility. The exercise of parental responsibility is governed 
by the law of the state of the child’s habitual residence. If the child’s habitual 
residence changes, it is governed by the law of the State of the new habitual 
residence (Art 17).
Recognition and enforcement
The Brussels IIa Regulation
As with matrimonial matters, the mutual recognition of judgments relating 
to matters of parental responsibility is central to the operation of the Brus-
sels IIa Regulation, with Art 21(1) providing that a judgment given in a 
Member State shall be recognised in all other Member States (excluding 
Denmark) without any special procedure being required. However, any 
interested party may apply for a decision that the judgment be or not be 
recognised (Art 21(3)) with the grounds of non-recognition being listed 
in Art 23. These grounds largely replicate those applicable to matrimonial 
judgments under Art 22, although they have been adapted and expanded 
in order to reflect specific issues relevant to judgments relating to parental 
responsibility. Further, the jurisdiction of the court of the Member State 
of origin may not be reviewed (Art 24), nor may a judgment be reviewed 
as to its substance (Art 26). With regard to enforcement, a judgment on the 
exercise of parental responsibility in respect of a child given in a Member 
State which is enforceable in that Member State and has been served shall 
be enforced in Scotland (or any other part of the United Kingdom) once 
it has been registered for enforcement (Art 28). The grounds for refusal of 
enforcement are the same as for the refusal of recognition. 
The Regulation provides special rules relating to certain judgments 
concerning rights of access and of certain judgments which require the 
return of an abducted child given pursuant to Art 11(8) (Art 40). Such 
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judgments given in one Member State will be recognised and enforced in 
other Member States automatically if the requirements of Ch III, s 4 of the 
Regulation are satisfied.
The 1996 Hague Convention
Similar, although not identical, provisions concerning recognition and 
enforcement are found in Ch IV of the 1996 Hague Convention. These 
provisions are distinguishable from their Brussels counterparts as they 
permit a greater degree of flexibility and judicial discretion than that found 
under the Brussels IIa Regulation. The Convention contains no equivalent 
to Ch III, s 4 of the Regulation regarding rights of access and return orders. 
The Family Law Act 1986
Section 26(1) of the 1986 Act provides that an order relating to parental 
responsibilities or parental rights in relation to a child which is made 
outside the United Kingdom shall be recognised in Scotland if the order 
was made in the country where the child was habitually resident. This rule 
will be displaced when an order comes within the terms of the recogni-
tion and enforcement provisions of the Brussels IIa Regulation (s 26(2)). 
Chapter V of the 1986 Act facilitates the almost automatic recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in intra-UK cases once the procedural steps 
detailed therein are satisfied.
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION
The formation and subsequent disintegration of “international” families 
has led to a significant increase in recent times of the wrongful removal 
and retention of children across international boundaries. The primary 
legal instrument in this area is the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 
on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, implemented in 
the United Kingdom by the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985. The 
1980 Hague Convention benefits from a global membership of Contracting 
States, with its principal aim being the prompt return of children wrong-
fully removed to or retained in a Contracting State (Art 1). Additionally, 
when the Contracting States are also EU Member States the Convention is 
“complemented” by the relevant provisions of the Brussels IIa Regulation 
(Recital (17)).
Application of the Convention
Before the “prompt return” mechanism of the Convention will be  activated 
it is necessary that the circumstances of the child fall within the scope of 
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the Convention. First, the child concerned must be habitually resident 
in a Contracting State and have been taken to, or retained in, another 
Contracting State (Art 4). If return is ultimately ordered then it will be 
a return to this state of habitual residence. The Convention thus provides 
an indirect rule of jurisdiction which identifies the courts of the state of 
the child’s habitual residence as the forum conveniens for determining any 
disputes in relation to the child. Article 4 also states that the Convention 
shall cease to apply when the child attains the age of 16 years and this will 
be so even if proceedings under the Convention are commenced before the 
child’s 16th birthday (Re H (Abduction: Child of 16) (2000)). If the removal 
or retention of the child is wrongful in terms of Art 3 then, where less than 
a year has elapsed, between the date of the wrongful removal or retention 
and the date of the commencement of the proceedings, the child is to be 
returned forthwith (Art 12(1)). Even if more than one year has elapsed a 
return should still be ordered (Art 12(2)). However, a return may be resisted 
if one of the exceptions to return is established (Arts 12(2) and 13). 
The concepts of removal and retention
The terms “removal” and “retention” are mutually exclusive. A child will 
either be removed to, or retained in, a Contracting State and the Conven-
tion does not countenance a situation whereby a retention follows an initial 
removal. A removal occurs where a child is taken across an international 
frontier without permission, whereas a retention involves a child being 
taken to a foreign jurisdiction lawfully but then being kept in this jurisdic-
tion beyond the agreed return date. Further, both removal and retention 
are considered to have occurred on a specific date, with the consequence 
that a retention is not a continuing state of affairs, it is a single event (Re H; 
Re S (Abduction: Custody Rights) (1991)).
Rights of custody
A removal or retention of a child will only be wrongful when the act is in 
breach of rights of custody which were actually being exercised at the time 
of the removal or retention (Art 3). The existence of such rights is to be 
referred to the law of the Contracting State in which the child was habitu-
ally resident immediately before the removal or retention (Art 3(a)). The 
Convention adopts a permissive approach to rights of custody in seeking 
to bring the largest possible range of right holders and sources of rights 
within its scope. Thus, rights of custody may be attributed to a person, an 
institution or any other body, including a court (Re H (Abduction: Rights 
of Custody) (2000)), and may arise in particular by operation of law or by 
reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement 
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having legal effect under the law of the state of habitual residence. 
While reference must be made to the law of the child’s state of habitual 
residence to determine what rights exist in respect of the child, the deter-
mination as to whether these rights constitute a right of custody for the 
purposes of the Convention is to be made in accordance with the auton-
omous definition found in Art 5(a) that rights of custody include rights 
relating to the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right 
to determine the child’s place of residence. A right to determine residence, 
notably via a power to veto any international relocation, will constitute a 
right of custody under the Convention, even if this right exists in isolation 
(Re D (A Child) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) (2006)). 
It is not sufficient that custody rights merely exist; the applicant must 
also show that these rights were actually being exercised at the time of 
the removal or retention (Arts 3(b) and 13(1)(a)). This is not a particularly 
onerous requirement to fulfil and, in the words of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, only acts of “clear and unequivocal aban-
donment” will indicate a failure to exercise rights of custody (Friedrich v 
Friedrich (1996)). This approach was approved by the Inner House of the 
Court of Session in AJ v FJ (2005). 
Exceptions to return
Where an applicant establishes that the removal or retention of a child 
was wrongful, the court seised in the state of refuge is required to order 
the return of the child unless it is satisfied that one of the exceptions to 
return has been established. The availability of these exceptions attempts 
to balance the principle that it is in the interests of children generally that 
issues concerning their future should be considered by the authorities in 
their home state against the necessity that in certain individual cases it will 
not be in the bests interests of the child to be returned. British courts, partic-
ularly the English Court of Appeal, have adopted a restrictive approach to 
these exceptions. Further, it is important to note that, even if an exception 
is made out, this simply gives the court the  discretion not to order a return; 
in most circumstances it does not mandate this course of action.
Consent
The first exception to return is that the person, institution or other body 
seeking the return had consented to the removal or retention (Art 13(1) (a)). 
Consent is something that is given before or at the time of the removal and 
denotes acceptance of the child living in another country, at least for the 
indefinite future. Consent may be given to a potential future removal as 
long and this consent remains effective at the time of the actual removal. 
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While consent must be real, positive and unequivocal this does not mean 
that it has to be in writing and it may be given orally or even inferred 
from conduct (Re K (Abduction: Consent) (1997)). Even if the court seised 
does consider the consent exception to be made out, it may still exercise 
its discretion in favour of returning the child (Re D (Abduction: Discretionary 
Return) (2000)).
Acquiescence
The acquiescence exception is very similar to the consent exception but 
concerns the actions of the left-behind parent following the removal or 
retention rather than before or at the time of the occurrence. Acquies-
cence will be established where that person’s words or actions clearly and 
unequivocally show that the return of the child is not being insisted upon. 
These words or actions must be wholly inconsistent with a request for 
the summary return of the child and acquiescence will not be found in 
attempts at reconciliation, efforts to maintain contact with the child in the 
requested state, or negotiations to secure a voluntary return. Delay in the 
issuing of a return petition may be a factor suggestive of acquiescence but 
the weight of this consideration will be lessened if there is a reasonable 
explanation for the delay (H v H (Child Abduction: Acquiescence) (1998)).
Grave risk of harm
Article 13(1)(b) provides that the judicial or administrative authority of 
the requested state is not bound to order the return of the child if there is 
a grave risk that the return would expose the child to physical or psycho-
logical harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation. As 
can be deduced from the wording of Art 13(1)(b), this is an exception 
that will be applicable only in particularly extreme circumstances and 
it has been interpreted very strictly by the British courts. It is accepted 
that some disruption and emotional upheaval is inevitable when a return 
is ordered and such incidental harm will not normally be sufficient to 
 activate Art  13(1)(b). The grave risk must be to the child and any grave risk 
to the abductor should he or she return to the child’s state of habitual resi-
dence is not directly relevant. Such risk to a parent will be relevant under 
Art  13(1) (b) only if it can be shown to cause the child psychological harm, 
or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation. 
If allegations of risk are raised in return proceedings, the approach of the 
courts is to consider if the authorities in the state of habitual residence will 
be able to provide an adequate response to these issues and put measures in 
place to protect the child. If the foreign authorities will be able to secure 
the safety of the child then the child will usually be returned and it is only 
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when there is clear evidence to suggest this will not happen that the “grave 
risk” exception will be upheld (Q, Petitioner (2001)). An argument of grave 
risk premised on the separation of the child from the abductor should the 
latter refuse to return with the child will usually be insufficient to activate 
the exception, as the abductor should not be allowed to both create and 
rely on the harmful situation. Should a grave risk of harm be established 
then, in contrast to the other exceptions, there is little scope for the exercise 
of judicial discretion still to order that the child be returned (Re D (A Child) 
(Abduction: Rights of Custody) (2006), per Baroness Hale at [55]).
Objections of the child
Under Art 13(2) a return may also be refused if a child objects to being 
returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is 
appropriate to take account of his views. There is no absolute threshold 
below which a child will not be considered to have attained such an age and 
the degree of maturity of the child will be considered on an individual basis 
(W v W (2010)). In evaluating the objections of the child the court must be 
wary that the views of the child may have been influenced by the abductor 
to an impermissible degree and do not reflect the genuine feelings of the 
child (C v C (2008)). While an expression of a preference to stay in one 
place may be viewed as an objection to going to another, it does not follow 
automatically that in all cases the expression of a preference amounts to the 
objection of the alternative (P v S (2002)). In intra-EU cases, Art 11(2) of 
the Brussels IIa Regulation requires that the child is given the opportunity 
to be heard during the proceedings unless this appears inappropriate having 
regard to his or her age or degree of maturity. Even if the views of the child 
are expressed, this does not mandate that they be accepted and, even if the 
views are accepted, the court may still order that the child be returned.
Settlement
The exception contained in Art 12(2) will only become operative once 
more than a year has elapsed between the commission of the wrongful act 
and the commencement of the return proceedings. Whether the child is 
to be considered settled in the requested state requires evidence of more 
than mere adjustment to the new surroundings. Instead, reference must 
be made to the physical and emotional attachments made by the child, the 
level of integration and the stability of the current living arrangements. 
While a child living in concealment in order to avoid detection may make 
a finding of settlement more difficult it does not preclude such a finding (Re 
C (Abduction: Settlement) (No 2) (2005)). As with other exceptions, a finding 
of settlement does not preclude an order for return being made and the 
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court seised may exercise its discretion to return the child notwithstanding 
such a finding.
Summary return and the ECHR 
The emphasis in the Convention on the prompt return of the child to 
its state of habitual residence has recently been considered by the Grand 
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in the context of 
Art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights which guarantees 
everyone the right to respect for his private and family life. The decision 
in Neulinger v Switzerland (2011) caused particular concern due to the very 
wide pronouncements made by the court (at paras 138 and 139) regarding 
the need for the requested court to give priority to the best interests of the 
individual child, to conduct an in-depth examination of the entire family 
situation and make a balanced and reasonable assessment of the respective 
interests of each person. While such an approach appears to be in direct 
contract to the Convention’s summary return mechanism, efforts have 
been made to minimise its effect by both the Supreme Court in Re E (Chil-
dren) (Abduction: Custody Appeal) (2011) and the President of the European 
Court of Human Rights, speaking in an extra-judicial capacity (as consid-
ered by the Supreme Court at para [25]).
Intra-EU child abductions
In cases of child abduction as between EU Member States the provisions 
of the 1980 Hague Convention must now operate in conjunction with the 
relevant articles of the Brussels IIa Regulation, primarily Arts 10 and 11. 
Article 10 regulates jurisdiction in cases of child abduction by providing 
that, in cases of wrongful removal or retention of the child, the courts 
of the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately 
before the wrongful removal or retention shall retain jurisdiction until the 
child has acquired a habitual residence in another Member State and one of 
a number of alternative conditions contained in Art 10 is satisfied. 
Article 11(2), as has been considered above, ensures that the child is 
given the opportunity to be heard during the proceedings, while Art 11(3) 
requires courts to act expeditiously in child abduction proceedings. Article 
11(4) states that a court cannot refuse to return a child on the basis of grave 
risk if it is established that adequate arrangements have been made to secure 
the protection of the child after his or her return and therefore reflects the 
existing practice considered above. Article 11(6), (7) and (8) introduces a 
review mechanism which operates in conjunction with, and may override, 
a decision made under the 1980 Hague Convention. Article 11(6) provides 
that where a non-return order is made on the basis of one of the Art 13 
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exceptions, notification of this fact shall be given to the authorities in the 
child’s state of habitual residence. Article 11(7) then provides for the court 
in the state of habitual residence to examine the question of custody of 
the child. Should the outcome of these proceedings be a judgment which 
requires the return of the child to that state then, notwithstanding the 
earlier judgment of non-return under the Convention, this subsequent 
judgment will automatically be enforceable in all Member States and must 
be complied with by the courts of the Member State to which the child was 
removed or in which he was retained in. 
Non-Convention cases
Where a child habitually resident in a non-Contracting State is wrongfully 
removed to, or retained in, Scotland the case will be dealt with under the 
common law. Although such cases have been influenced by the approach 
taken under the Convention, they can be distinguished on the basis that 
priority is to be given to the best interests of the individual child, supported 
by a more detailed inquiry into the child’s situation, and, consequently, less 
weight will be attached to the principle of summary return (Re J (A Child) 
(Custody Rights: Jurisdiction) (2005)).
ADOPTION
The Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007 establishes a single frame-
work for both domestic and inter-country adoptions which mostly, but not 
entirely, replaces the previously applicable legislative provisions. Within 
this framework an important distinction is drawn between Convention 
adoptions and non-Convention adoptions, the Convention in question 
being the Hague Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children 
and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (implemented in 
the United Kingdom by the Adoption (Intercountry Aspects) Act 1999). 
The former category refers to intercountry adoptions involving the 
United Kingdom and another Contracting State of the 1993 Convention. 
The latter category of non-Convention, or overseas, adoptions refers to 
those intercountry adoptions involving a country which is on the United 
Kingdom’s list of designated countries as set out in the Adoption (Designa-
tion of Overseas Adoptions) Order 1973 (SI 1973/19). A small number of 
adoptions do not come within the terms of either of these categories and 
remain subject to the common law.
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Convention adoptions
Part 3 of the Adoptions with a  Foreign  Element (Scotland)  Regula-
tions  2009 (SSI 2009/182) regulates the adoption procedure in Scotland 
when the United Kingdom is either the receiving state or the state of 
origin under the 1993 Hague Convention. The former refers to the situ-
ation of incoming adoptions where a person or couple habitually resident 
in the British Islands wishes to adopt a child habitually resident outwith 
the British Islands (regs 10–37) and the latter refers to the situation of an 
outgoing adoption where a person or couple habitually resident outwith 
the British Islands wishes to adopt a child who is habitually resident in the 
British Islands (regs 38–52). 
The Convention itself establishes a detailed procedural framework which 
aims to control and regulate the manner in which intercountry adoptions 
between Contracting States may be arranged and completed. The Conven-
tion will apply where a child habitually resident in one Contracting State, 
(the “state of origin”), has been, is being, or is to be moved to another 
Contracting State (the “receiving state”), either after the adoption in the 
state of origin by spouses or a person habitually resident in the receiving 
state, or for the purposes of such an adoption in the receiving state or in the 
state of origin (Art 2(1)). The material scope of the Convention is limited 
to adoptions which create a permanent parent–child relationship (Art 2(2)), 
even if the adoption does not completely extinguish all previous parent–
child relationships, and which involve children under 18 (Art 3). Articles 
4 and 5 then provide an extensive list of requirements that must be satis-
fied by the authorities in both the state of origin (Art 4) and the receiving 
state (Art 5) before an adoption within the scope of the Convention will 
be permitted. These requirements include such issues as the authorities in 
the state of origin having given due consideration to the possibilities for 
placement of the child in the state of origin (Art 4(b)) and, as regards the 
authorities in the receiving state, it having been determined that the child 
is or will be authorised to enter and reside permanently in the receiving 
state (Art 5(c)).
Chapter IV of the Convention details the procedural requirements of 
intercountry adoptions which are implemented in Scotland by the Adop-
tions with a Foreign Element (Scotland) Regulations 2009 (SSI 2009/182). 
Article 14 provides that persons habitually resident in a Contracting State, 
who wish to adopt a child habitually resident in another Contracting State, 
shall apply to the Central Authority in the state of their habitual resi-
dence. This prerequisite is augmented in Scotland so as to require habitual 
 residence in a part of the British Islands for a period of not less than a 
year ending with the date of application (2009 Regulations, reg 12(1)(b)). 
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 Articles 15–22 then detail the roles and responsibilities of the Central 
Authorities in both the state of origin and the receiving state.
Chapter V of the Convention clarifies the recognition to be given to, 
and the effects of, an adoption granted in one Contracting State in all other 
Contracting States. Under Art 23, an adoption certified by the competent 
authority in the state of the adoption, whether this be the state of origin 
or the receiving state, as having been made in accordance with the Conven-
tion shall be recognised by operation of law in the other Contracting 
States. The recognition of an adoption may be refused in a Contracting 
State only if the adoption is manifestly contrary to its public policy, taking 
into account the best interests of the child (Art 24). Articles 26 and 27 
detail the legal consequences which will flow from the recognition of a 
Convention adoption.
Non-Convention adoptions
Non-Convention, or overseas, adoptions are those adoptions to or from a 
country which is on the United Kingdom’s list of designated countries as 
set out in the Adoption (Designation of Overseas Adoptions) Order 1973 
(SI 1973/19). The requirements for non-Convention cases are set out in 
Pt I, Ch 6 of the Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007 which, like 
the procedural requirements applicable to Convention adoptions, places 
restrictions on both incoming and outgoing adoptions. Further require-
ments are to be found in the Adoptions with a Foreign Element (Scotland) 
Regulations 2009 (SSI 2009/182), Pt 2. Such overseas adoptions will be 
recognised automatically in Scotland as if the adoption order had been 
made in Scotland. The Court of Session may, however, find that such an 
adoption is no longer valid in Great Britain, on the ground that the adop-
tion is contrary to public policy or that the authority which purported to 
authorise the adoption was not competent (2007 Act, s 68(2)).
Adoption orders at common law
Where an adoption does not come within the scope of either the Conven-
tion or the statutory regime then recognition must be sought under the 
common-law rules. Such an adoption is likely to be recognised only if 
the adoptive parents are domiciled in the state of origin and, even if this 
requirement is satisfied, recognition may still be refused on grounds of 
public policy (Re Valentine’s Settlement (1965)).




• The concepts of legitimacy and illegitimacy are no longer relevant 
to the determination of status under Scots law but may still be rele-
vant when a person’s status falls to be determined according to some 
other law.
Parental responsibility
• There are three distinct jurisdictional regimes relating to matters of 
parental responsibility: (1) the Brussels IIa Regulation; (2) the 1996 
Hague Convention; and (3) the Family Law Act 1986.
• Chapter II, section 2 of the Brussels IIa Regulation governs jurisdic-
tion in matters of parental responsibility and identifies the habitual 
residence of the child as the principal ground of jurisdiction.
• Chapter II of the 1996 Hague Convention governs jurisdiction 
when a child is habitually resident in a non-EU Contracting State 
and contains provisions that are similar, but not identical, to those 
contained in the Brussels IIa Regulation.
• Cases that fall outside the scope of both the Brussels IIa Regulation 
and the 1996 Hague Convention will be governed by Ch III of the 
Family Law Act 1986.
• Chapter III of the 1996 Hague Convention identifies the applicable 
law in matters of parental responsibility and these rules are also 
applicable when jurisdiction is taken under the Regulation. 
• Chapter III of the Brussels IIa Regulation facilitates the mutual 
recognition of judgments between Member States. Corresponding 
rules of recognition and enforcement are found in Ch IV of the 
1996 Hague Convention and Ch V of the 1986 Act.
International child abduction
• The principal aim of the 1980 Hague Convention is to ensure that a 
child wrongfully removed to, or retained in, one Contracting State 
is returned promptly to the Contracting State in which he is habitu-
ally resident.
• A return may be refused if it can be shown that the rights of custody 
were not being exercised at the time of the removal or retention; 
that the removal or retention had been consented to or subsequently 
acquiesced in; that the return would subject the child to a grave risk 
of harm; that the child objects to the return; or that the child is now 
settled in his new environment.
DUP_PrivateInternationalLaw5.indd   140 12/09/2014   14:43
CHILDREN 141
• In cases of child abduction as between EU Member States the 1980 
Hague Convention operates in conjunction with the Brussels IIa 
Regulation. In particular, Art 11(6), (7) and (8) of the Regulation 
introduce a review mechanism which may override a non-return 
order made under the 1980 Hague Convention.
Adoption
• The Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007 establishes a single 
framework for both domestic and inter-country adoptions, with a 
distinction being drawn between Convention adoptions and non-
Convention adoptions.
• Convention adoptions are those governed by the Hague Conven-
tion of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation 
in Respect of Intercountry Adoption.
• Non-Convention, or overseas, adoptions are those adoptions to or 
from a country which is on the United Kingdom’s list of designated 
countries as set out in the Adoption (Designation of Overseas Adop-
tions) Order 1973 (SI 1973/19).
Essential Cases
Proceedings Brought by A (2010): the factors relevant in the 
identification of habitual residence under the Brussels IIa Regula-
tion in matters of parental responsibility include, but are not limited 
to, the duration, regularity, conditions and reasons for the stay in a 
Member State and the family’s move to that state, the child’s nation-
ality, the place and conditions of attendance at school, linguistic 
knowledge, and the family and social relationships of the child in 
that state. 
Re D (A Child) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) (2006): the 
concept of a right of custody is given an autonomous definition 
under the 1980 Hague Convention independent of national classi-
fications. In particular, a right to determine residence, notably via a 
power to veto any international relocation, will constitute a right of 
custody under the Convention, even if this right exists in isolation. 
Q, Petitioner (2001): a return was refused under Art 13(1)(b) (grave 
risk) of the 1980 Hague Convention as the Scottish court was not 
convinced that the French authorities would be able to provide two 
children with adequate protection. 
DUP_PrivateInternationalLaw5.indd   141 12/09/2014   14:43
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW142
Neulinger v Switzerland (2011): decision of the Grand Chamber 
of the European Court of Human Rights which considers the oper-
ation of the 1980 Hague Convention in light of Art 8 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights which guarantees everyone the 
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The distinction between moveable and immoveable property is funda-
mental to the private international law of Scotland and this classification 
will be made in accordance with the rules of the lex situs, the law of the 
country in which the property is situated (Macdonald v Macdonald (1932)). 
This classification will be followed even if it leads to a different result to that 
which would apply in a purely domestic context. As will be seen below, 
nearly every question relating to immoveable property will be referred to 
the lex situs, while questions relating to moveable property may be referred 
to one or more of a number of different laws.
IMMOVEABLE PROPERTY
The rule that questions relating to immoveable property are governed by 
the lex situs is premised on the principle that the law of the country in 
which the property is situated will have the strongest connection to the 
property. This principle is reflected in international instruments, with the 
Brussels I Regulation providing that the courts of the Member State in 
which immoveable property is situated will have exclusive jurisdiction in 
proceedings which have as their object rights in rem in that property or a 
tenancy of that property (Art 22(1)). Further, Art 4(1)(c) of the Rome  I 
Regulation (Art 4(3) of the 1980 Rome Convention) provides that, in 
the absence of choice, a contract relating to a right in rem in immoveable 
 property or to a tenancy of immoveable property will be governed by the 
law of the country where the property is situated.
Capacity
Capacity and the power to transact in relation to immoveable property are 
governed by the lex situs. 
Contracts
A distinction should be drawn between contractual obligations relating to 
immoveable property and the actual transfer/conveyance of a right in rem 
in immoveable property. In relation to the former, formal validity will be 
governed by Art 11 of the Rome I Regulation (Art 9 of the Convention) 
as regards those contractual obligations which come within the scope of 
the instrument. Article 11(1) provides that a contract concluded between 
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persons who, or whose agents, are in the same country at the time of its 
conclusion is formally valid if it satisfies the formal requirements of the law 
which governs it in substance under the Regulation, or of the law of the 
country where it is concluded. However, where the subject-matter of the 
contract is a right in rem in immoveable property or a tenancy of immove-
able property, Art 11(1) is buttressed by Art 11(5) (Art 9(6) of the Conven-
tion) which provides that the contract will be subject to the requirements 
of form of the law of the country where the property is situated if by that 
law those requirements are imposed, irrespective of the country where the 
contract is concluded and irrespective of the law governing the contract, 
and those requirements cannot be derogated from by agreement. Under 
the common law a distinction is made between an obligation to convey 
and the conveyance itself and a contract relating to immoveable property in 
Scotland will satisfy the requirements of formal validity if it complies with 
either the lex situs or the lex loci actus (Hamilton v Wakefield (1993)). 
Under the Rome I Regulation the essential validity of a contract relating 
to immoveable property will be determined according to the applicable law 
identified elsewhere in the Regulation (Art 10(1)), subject to the exception 
contained in Art 10(2) (with the equivalent provisions found in Art 8 of 
the Convention). If the dispute is before a court in Scotland then the appli-
cable law will be subject to the overriding mandatory provisions of the 
forum (Art 9 of the Regulation; Art 7 of the Convention). As the appli-
cable law, whether it be chosen by the parties under Art 3 or determined 
in the absence of choice under Art 4(1)(c), is likely to be the lex situs of the 
property, this law will usually determine matters of essential validity. The 
same law would also be applicable to matters of essential validity under the 
common law. 
Proprietary rights
The existence and nature of real rights in land or other immoveables are 
governed by the lex situs. This rule applies to all property regarded as 
immoveable according to the lex situs. All deeds of title must comply with 
the lex situs in matters of both form and essentials.
MOVEABLE PROPERTY
The category of moveable property can be further subdivided into corpo-
real moveables (such as motor vehicles), and incorporeal moveables (such as 
money debts). Different rules apply depending on into which sub-category 
the property in question falls.
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Corporeal moveables
Historically, the law applicable to corporeal moveables was considered to 
be the law of the domicile of the owner of the property in question. While 
this law may still be applicable in certain circumstances, it is now possible 
that another law, such as the lex situs, will be applicable. The universality 
that may have existed in the past is now no longer apparent and no single 
system of law has a claim to govern every question relating to the transfer 
of corporeal moveables. 
As a general rule, proprietary rights in corporeal moveable property are 
governed by the lex situs. The consequence of this rule is that, following a 
transfer of corporeal moveable property situated abroad, any proprietary 
rights conferred on the transferee will be recognised in Scotland if the 
transfer was validly effected in accordance with the lex situs. Conversely, 
a real right to moveable property in Scotland does not pass by virtue of 
transactions effected abroad until these have been intimated to the custo-
dian in Scotland.
A further distinction exists between questions of personal liability 
affecting the parties to a contract to transfer moveable property and the 
matter of a real right to the property itself. Under this distinction, the 
questions in relation to the former will be referred to the applicable law of 
the contract while questions as regards the latter will be a matter for the lex 
situs (North-Eastern Bank v Poynter & Co (1894) and Inglis v Robertson (1898)).
Difficulties arise when matters of contract law and property law inter-
sect in the context of retention of title clauses. Such clauses generally 
provide that goods delivered by the seller to the buyer remain the property 
of the former until the goods have been paid for in full. Where both the 
contract and the property are subject to the same applicable law then this 
will cause few issues but problems can develop when the applicable law of 
the contract differs from the lex situs of the goods. In such circumstances 
there is no clear answer on the question as to whether a clause acceptable by 
the governing law of the contract of which it forms part will be regarded as 
invalid if it is not also recognised as valid under the lex situs of the property 
at the time at which the contract is entered into.
Incorporeal moveables
The category of incorporeal moveables signifies those proprietary rights 
which have no physical existence, such as debts, shares and securities 
or funds in bank accounts. As these rights have no physical location, an 
artificial situs must be identified for the purposes of classification, with, 
for example, a money debt being situated at the place where the debtor 
resides. There are a number of different laws which may be applicable to 
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the assignation of an incorporeal right, namely: the lex domicilii of either 
the  creditor or the debtor; the lex loci actus; or the lex situs. Incorporeal 
moveables are of several different classes and the same conflicts rules may 
not be applicable in each case.
Article 14 of the Rome I Regulation (Art 12 of the 1980 Rome Conven-
tion) may also be applicable to certain assignations, subject to the exclusions 
contained in Art 1(2). If the Regulation is engaged, Art 14 will apply to 
not only the contractual aspects of the assignation but also the proprietary 
aspects (Recital (38)). Article 14(1) provides that the relationship between 
assignor and assignee under a voluntary assignation or contractual subroga-
tion of a claim against another person (the debtor) shall be governed by the 
law that applies to the contract between the assignor and assignee under the 
Regulation, ie as chosen under Art 3 or identified in the absence of choice 
under Art 4. Article 14(2) states that the law governing the assigned or 
subrogated claim shall determine its assignability; the relationship between 
the assignee and the debtor; the conditions under which the assignment or 
subrogation can be invoked against the debtor; and whether the debtor’s 
obligations have been discharged. Article 14(3) defines “assignment” as 
including outright transfers of claims, transfers of claims by way of secu-
rity and pledges or other security rights over claims.
Essential Facts
• There is a fundamental distinction between moveable and immove-
able property, with this classification being made according to the 
rules of the lex situs.
• Matters relating to immoveable property will in general be referred 
to the lex situs.
• Moveable property can be subdivided further into corporeal move-
ables and incorporeal moveables.
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It is now increasingly likely that a person domiciled in Scotland will acquire 
property situated in another country or, conversely, that persons domi-
ciled outside Scotland will own property situated within Scotland. Upon 
death, the devolution of such an international estate raises key questions 
of private international law, particularly with regard to the identification 
of the appropriate law to govern the distribution of the deceased’s estate. 
This chapter will consider the rules of private international law applicable 
to both testate and intestate succession, focusing principally on issues of 
choice of law and beginning with a brief overview of the rules applicable 
to the administration of estates.
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES
No person is entitled to take any administrative act in the estate of a 
deceased person who has left property in Scotland until he has obtained 
the authority of the court. In Scotland, this is known as confirmation 
– a process whereby executors are judicially recognised in their office 
and receive a title to the property and assets of a deceased person. Once 
confirmed, the executor is entrusted with the task of administering the 
estate in order to ensure that all debts are satisfied and that the net surplus 
of the estate is distributed to the appropriate heirs. Confirmation is depen-
dent on the existence of property in Scotland and if the deceased left no 
such property then confirmation will not be granted, even if the deceased 
died domiciled in Scotland. Conversely, if a deceased person leaves prop-
erty in Scotland, his executors may obtain confirmation in the Scottish 
courts even though the person died domiciled elsewhere. 
Under ss 1 and 2 of the Administration of Estates Act 1971, a Scottish 
confirmation will, if granted in respect of an estate of a person who died 
domiciled in Scotland, be treated for the purposes of the law of England 
and Wales and Northern Ireland as if it had been granted under the equiva-
lent procedures in place in those jurisdictions. A reciprocal provision is 
found in s 3 to ensure that grants from England and Wales or Northern 
Ireland will be of the like force and effect and have the same operation in 
relation to property in Scotland as a Scottish confirmation. Accordingly, 
where a person dies domiciled in Scotland, the granting of confirmation in 
13 SUCCESSION
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Scotland will be recognised throughout the entire United Kingdom and be 
effective in relation to all property situated therein.
Where a person dies domiciled outside the United Kingdom, the Scot-
tish courts will follow the law of the deceased’s domicile and grant confir-
mation to the person entrusted with the administration of the estate under 
that law in relation to property situated in Scotland. If such a person is yet 
to be appointed in the country of the domicile of the deceased, confirma-
tion will be granted to the person who would be entitled under that law 
to administer the estate of the deceased. If the deceased is domiciled in 
a country which does not provide for a process analogous to confirma-
tion, confirmation will be given to the person entitled to administer the 
estate by the law of the domicile. If a person domiciled overseas nominates 
an executor in his will, this person will be confirmed in relation to prop-
erty situated in Scotland if the will is valid according to the law of the 
deceased’s domicile. 
Special provisions exist for the “resealing” of grants of representation, 
corresponding to a Scottish confirmation, made in those countries iden-
tified under the Colonial Probates Act 1892 and the Colonial Probates 
(Protected States and Mandated Territories) Act 1927. Once resealed in 
Scotland, grants from those countries specified will have the like force and 
effect and the same operation as if it were a confirmation granted by the 
Scottish court. Reciprocal provisions exist for the resealing of Scottish 
confirmations in the identified countries.
MATTERS RELEVANT TO BOTH INTESTATE AND TESTATE 
SUCCESSION
The scission principle
Fundamental to the Scottish choice of law rules governing succession, 
whether testate or intestate, is what is known as the “scission principle”. 
Under this principle a distinction is drawn between succession to move-
ables (referred to the law of the domicile of the deceased), and succession to 
immoveables (referred to the lex situs, the law of the country in which the 
property is situated). The approach of Scots law (and the law of England 
and Wales) can be compared with the approach taken in other jurisdictions 
which have rejected the scission principle in favour of a single governing 
law applicable to the entirety of the deceased’s estate.
Legal rights
Legal rights may be claimed under both intestate and testate succession 
and provide a surviving spouse (jus relicti/jus relictae) or civil partner (Civil 
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Partnership Act 2004, s 131) and/or issue (legitim) a right to a share in the 
estate of the deceased that cannot be defeated by testamentary provision. 
Thus, where a person dies survived by a spouse or civil partner then, if 
there are no issue, that person is entitled to one-half of the moveable net 
estate belonging to the deceased at the time of death. If the deceased is 
also survived by issue, the surviving spouse or civil partner has a right to 
one-third of that moveable net estate. Similarly, the surviving issue of the 
deceased have a right to one-half of the moveable net estate belonging to the 
deceased at the time of death if there is no surviving spouse or civil partner, 
and a right to one-third if there is such a survivor. Due to such rights being 
limited to the moveable estate of the deceased, such rights may, by defini-
tion, be claimed only when the deceased died domiciled in Scotland.
INTESTATE SUCCESSION
Immoveable property
It is a well-established rule that all questions of intestate succession to 
immoveables are governed by the lex situs. This law will determine both 
whether the property is immoveable and whether it has fallen into intes-
tacy and, if so, it will be determinative in identifying the person to whom 
the property is to descend.
Moveable property
It is equally well settled that intestate succession to moveable estate is 
governed by the law of the deceased’s domicile at the date of his death, 
wherever that property may be situated.
Prior rights
Prior rights were established by the Succession (Scotland) Act 1964 and are 
available in circumstances of total or partial intestacy. Prior rights are not 
exercisable in circumstances where the deceased has disposed of his entire 
estate by testamentary disposition. Section 8 of the 1964 Act confers on 
the surviving spouse or civil partner of an intestate an interest in a quali-
fying dwellinghouse where that interest does not exceed £473,000. As 
the dwellinghouse will be classified as immoveable property, governed 
therefore by the lex situs, this prior right will be applicable to all qualifying 
dwellinghouses in Scotland, irrespective of the domicile of the deceased 
at his date of death. Conversely, this prior right will not be exercisable 
against a dwellinghouse situated outside Scotland, even if the deceased 
died domiciled in Scotland. Where the value of the dwellinghouse exceeds 
£473,000, the survivor is entitled to receive a sum of money in lieu of the 
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house. Although prima facie a right in moveable property, this right to a 
sum of money in lieu of the dwellinghouse will be treated as immoveable 
property and therefore governed by Scots law – the lex situs.
Where a person dies intestate leaving a spouse or civil partner, and the 
intestate estate includes the furniture and plenishings of a dwellinghouse, 
s  8(3) provides that the surviving spouse or civil partner shall receive a prior 
right in such furniture and plenishings to a maximum value of £29,000. 
This prior right is an interest in moveable property and available only when 
the deceased died domiciled in Scotland.
Section 9 entitles the surviving spouse or civil partner to a prior right to 
financial provision on intestacy, the value of which depends on whether or 
not the intestate was survived by issue. Although prima facie moveable, this 
right is to be “borne by, and paid out of, the parts of the intestate estate 
consisting of heritable and moveable property respectively” (s 9(3)). Conse-
quently, where the deceased dies domiciled in Scotland, this sum will be 
paid out of his moveable estate wherever situated and his immoveable estate 
in Scotland. If the deceased is domiciled outside Scotland then the charge 
will be operative against only that immoveable estate situated in Scotland.
Cohabitants
Section 29 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 provides that a surviving 
cohabitant may make an application to the court for a payment out of the 
deceased’s net intestate estate of a capital sum, and for the transfer of such 
property (whether heritable or moveable) from that estate. An application 
under s 29 may be made only when the deceased was domiciled in Scotland 
immediately before his death (s 29(1)(b)(i)).
TESTATE SUCCESSION 
Capacity
Personal capacity is concerned with the effect factors such as age, facility 
and circumvention or undue influence may have upon a testator’s ability 
to create a valid will. These issues will be governed by the law of the testa-
tor’s domicile as regards moveables. Where a testator’s domicile changes 
as between the date of execution of the will and the date of death, the 
domicile apparent at the earlier date should govern such issues. Questions 
of personal capacity relating to immoveables will be referred to the lex situs. 
Formal validity
Whether a will is properly executed in matters of form will be governed 
by the law identified under the Wills Act 1963. This Act implements the 
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provisions of the Hague Convention of 5 October 1961 on the Conflicts 
of Laws Relating to the Form of Testamentary Dispositions and provides a 
permissive system under which questions of formal validity may be referred 
to a number of different laws. Accordingly, s 1 provides that a will shall be 
treated as properly executed if its execution conformed to the internal law 
in force in the territory where it was executed, or in the territory where, 
at the time of its execution or of the testator’s death, he was domiciled or 
had his habitual residence, or in a state of which, at either of those times, 
he was a national. This section applies to wills concerning both moveables 
and immoveables but, in relation to the latter, s 2(1)(b) provides that, in 
addition to those laws identified under s 1(1), a will, so far as it disposes of 
immoveable property, will be treated as properly executed if its execution 
conformed to the internal law in force in the territory where the property 
is situated. Section 2(1)(a) provides an additional rule of closest connection 
with regard to wills executed on board a vessel or aircraft.
Essential validity
Essential validity is concerned with all matters pertaining to the validity 
and enforceability of the provisions of a will, such as whether a testator 
can completely disinherit his spouse or children. These matters are some-
times referred to as the“proprietary capacity” of the testator. The essential 
validity of testamentary dispositions will be governed by the law of the 
deceased’s last domicile as regards moveables and by the lex situs as regards 
immoveables. 
Construction
A will is to be construed according to the law intended by the testator. A 
testator may expressly choose the law by which his will should be construed 
but this choice will be given effect only insofar as it is  consistent with the 
law of his domicile. Where the intention of the testator is uncertain there is 
a presumption that a will of moveable estate falls to be construed in accor-
dance with the law of the domicile of the testator, and a will of immoveable 
estate will probably also be construed according to the same law (Mitchell 
and Baxter v Davies (1875)). These are, however, only presumptions and may 
be rebutted by evidence that the testator intended a different law to govern 
matters of construction (Dellar v Zivy (2007)). The reference to the testa-
tor’s domicile as regards moveable estate is a reference to the domicile of 
the testator at the time the will is made, not domicile at the time of death. 
This interpretation is consistent with the terms of s 4 of the Wills Act 1963 
which provides that the construction of a will shall not be altered by reason 
of any change in the testator’s domicile after the execution of the will. 
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Revocation
A later will may revoke an earlier will either expressly or by implication. 
A revocation will be operative only if the original instrument is capable 
of revocation and the testator has capacity to revoke under the law of his 
domicile at the time of the alleged revocation (Sawrey-Cookson v Sawrey-
Cookson’s Trustees (1905)). The validity and construction of the later instru-
ment will be subject to the rules discussed above, with an additional rule 
as regards formal validity available under s 2(1)(c) of the Wills Act 1963 to 
the effect that a deed of revocation will be treated as properly executed if it 
satisfies the terms of s 1 or if it conforms to the formalities of any system by 
reference to which the revoked will would be treated as properly executed. 
The lex situs may also be relevant where the disposition is one of immove-
able property. 
A will disposing of moveables may also be revoked by operation of law, 
with the question of whether the will is actually revoked being referred 
to the law of the testator’s domicile at the time of the alleged revocation 
and not at the time of death. For example, the English rule that a marriage 
revokes any previous will has effect only if the testator is domiciled in 
England immediately after the marriage (compare Re Martin (1900) with 
In the Estate of Groos (1904)). An identical approach is taken in Scotland to 
the conditio si testator sine liberis decesserit, with an earlier will being revoked 
only if the testator is domiciled in Scotland at the time at which the child 
is born.
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
Domestically, the Scottish Law Commission’s 2009 Report on Succes-
sion (Scot Law Com No 215) recommends a number of changes to the 
current law of succession, with Pt 5 of the Report dealing specifically with 
issues of private international law. These recommendations are yet to be 
implemented. At the European level, Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdic-
tion, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and accep-
tance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession 
and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession will apply to 
the estates of individuals dying on or after 17 August 2015 (Art 83(1)). The 
United Kingdom, along with Ireland and Denmark, has decided not to opt 
into this Regulation. 
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TRUSTS
The private international law aspects of trusts are now governed prin-
cipally by the Recognition of Trusts Act 1987 which gives effect to the 
Hague Convention of 1 July 1985 on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on 
their Recognition. The common law retains a residual role. While Art 22 
of the Convention provides that the Convention applies to trusts regard-
less of the date on which they were created, s 1(5) of the 1987 Act limits 
the temporal applicability of the Convention to trusts created after the 
coming into force of the Act, or to acts or omissions occurring after the 
coming into force of the Act even if the trust was created before this date. 
Further, and in contrast to the terms of Art  24, s 1(2) applies the rules of 
the Convention not only to overseas trusts but also to trusts arising under 
the law of another part of the United Kingdom. Finally, the application of 
the Convention is not limited to the recognition of trusts arising under the 
law of a Contracting State and, instead, the United Kingdom applies the 
terms of the Convention generally, whether or not the trust arises under 
the law of a Contracting State. The Convention, therefore, is applied 
universally, both inside and outside the United Kingdom, to conflicts of 
law in matters relating to trusts. 
Article 2 of the Convention defines the meaning of the term “trust” 
for the purposes of the Convention, with this definition being drawn very 
broadly in order to accommodate the divergent understanding of trusts 
under different legal systems. If the trust does come within the terms of 
Art 2 then Ch II provides rules as to the applicable law. Article 6 states the 
primary rule that a trust will be governed by the law chosen by the settlor, 
whether expressly or by implication. In the absence of choice, or in light of 
an ineffective choice, Art 7 provides that a trust shall be governed by the law 
with which it is most closely connected and details a non-exhaustive list of 
factors relevant in this determination. Article 5 states that the Convention 
does not apply to the extent that the law specified by Ch II does not provide 
for trusts or the category of trusts involved. Should Art 5 be operative 
then recourse must be made to the common law. The law specified under 
either Art 6 or Art 7 will govern the validity of the trust, its construction, 
its effects, and the administration of the trust and Art  8(2) provides further 
specification as regards the matters that this law will govern. 
The recognition of trusts is facilitated by Ch III, Art 11(1) of which 
states that a trust created in accordance with the law specified in Ch II 
will be recognised as a trust. This basic statement is given more context 
in Art 11(2) where it is explained that recognition implies, as a minimum, 
that the trust property constitutes a separate fund; that the trustee may 
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sue and be sued in his capacity as trustee; and that he may appear or act in 
this capacity before a notary or any person acting in an official capacity. 
Article 11(3) provides further detail as to what the recognition of a trust 
will imply in light of the applicable law. Article 11 operates subject to the 
rules contained in Ch IV.
Essential Facts
• Under the scission principle, questions regarding succession to 
move ables will be referred to the law of the deceased’s domicile, 
while succession to immoveables will be governed by the law of the 
country in which the property is situated.
• Legal rights may be claimed only when the deceased died domiciled 
in Scotland.
Intestate succession
• The prior right of a surviving spouse or civil partner on intestacy in 
a dwellinghouse under s 8 of the Succession (Scotland) Act 1964 is 
available whenever the property is situated in Scotland, regardless of 
the domicile of the deceased. 
• The prior right in the furniture and plenishings of a dwellinghouse 
(s 8(3)) will be available only when the deceased dies domiciled in 
Scotland. 
• The prior right to financial provision on intestacy under s 9 will be 
paid out of both moveables and immoveables when the deceased 
died domiciled in Scotland but only out of the immoveable estate 
situated in Scotland if the deceased died domiciled elsewhere.
•  An application under s 29 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 by 
a surviving cohabitant for provision on intestacy may only be made 
when the deceased died domiciled in Scotland.
Testate Succession
• Capacity will be governed by the lex domicilii as regards moveables 
and the lex situs in relation to immoveables.
• Whether a will is properly executed in matters of form will be 
governed by the law identified under the Wills Act 1963.
• Essential validity will be governed by the law of the deceased’s last 
domicile as regards moveables and by the lex situs as regards immove-
ables.
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Trusts
• The private international law aspects of trusts are governed prin-
cipally by the Recognition of Trusts Act 1987 which gives effect 
to the Hague Convention of 1 July 1985 on the Law Applicable to 
Trusts and on their Recognition.
Essential Cases
Dellar v Zivy (2007): a will is to be interpreted in accordance with 
the law intended by a testator. In the absence of indications to the 
contrary, this law is presumed to be the law of the testator’s domicile 
at the time the will was made. This presumption may be rebutted 
by evidence that the testator intended his will to be interpreted 
according to the law of some other country.
Sawrey-Cookson v Sawrey-Cookson’s Trustees (1905): a revo-
cation will be effective only if the original instrument is capable of 
revocation and the testator has capacity to revoke under the law of 
his domicile at the time of the revocation.
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